LEBANON: ISF'S GENERAL RIFI SEES SYRIA BEHIND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000733 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE SY SUBJECT: LEBANON: ISF'S GENERAL RIFI SEES SYRIA BEHIND FATAH AL-ISLAM Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador on May 23, Director General of the Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF) General Ashraf Rifi added his voice to the chorus of those who assume a Syrian role in the recent violence in Lebanon. Rifi supports immediate action to eliminate Fatah al-Islam from the Nahr al-Barid camp, either through internal Palestinian efforts or by military force. The General expressed sincere gratitude for U.S. political and military assistance to the ISF and to Lebanon. End Summary. U.S. SUPPLIES KEY IN THE NORTH -------------- ¶2. (C) On May 23, the Ambassador, Embassy Regional Security Officers (RSO's),and POLOFF visited ISF Director General Ashraf Rifi to convey U.S. support for the ISF and its efforts in the north. Director of the ISF Information Bureau Colonel Wissam Hassan also participated in the meeting. General Rifi opened his comments by extending gratitude for U.S. assistance to the ISF and to Lebanon. He said U.S. supplies have been vital for current ISF operations in the north. FIGHTING FATAH AL-ISLAM -------------- ¶3. (C) Rifi stressed the need to put an end to the violence at the Nahr al-Barid camp and eliminate Fatah al-Islam's presence there. He proposed two options: the Palestinians resolve the situation among themselves, or the military uses force to "solve" the issue on its own. Rifi claimed Fatah al-Islam initially consisted of about 200 fighters, and that many of the group's major figures have been killed either in the camp or in the in-town Tripoli raids. Rifi supports evacuating Palestinian civilians to the Karami exhibition center near Tripoli -- where he believed that ISF and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) troops would provide security -- but admits this would only provide a temporary remedy. When asked by the Ambassador about the ISF's "Black Panther" unit that had deployed to the north, Rifi explained the unit consisted of only about 80 soldiers. He commended the group's professionalism and motivation. The General described plans to establish a similar force that would work closely with ISF intelligence elements. TIES TO SYRIA IN TV COVERAGE, TRAVEL, AND BOMB METHODS -------------- ¶4. (C) General Rifi and Colonel Hassan both bemoaned footage from Al-Jazeera network and "New TV" that highlighted the civilian casualties in Nahr al-Barad. Hassan theorized that Damascus was urging such coverage to put pressure on LAF General Sleiman and deter continued action against the camp. Hassan assessed that Syria needs Fatah al-Islam in Nahr al-Barid to maintain an on-call destabilizing force in Lebanon; he and Rifi believe the group had been planning a larger operation when the ISF stormed its Tripoli safehouse. According to Hassan, media focus on civilian casualties also served to demoralize LAF and ISF forces. ¶5. (C) Hassan stated that Fatah al-Islam arrived in Lebanon with the aid of Syrian intelligence. He pointed to information the ISF recently obtained from a detained Fatah al-Islam member as evidence of a Syrian link. His informant's brother had recently traveled with an explosives expert named Hassan al-Turki from Lebanon through Syria to Iraq -- and back -- in one day; Hassan described this as impossible without Syrian complicity. Hassan shared information on eight Fatah al-Islam members captured by the ISF; six were Lebanese and two were Syrian. However, only one of the 11 bodies of fighters recovered was Lebanese; the other ten included Saudi Arabians, Tunisians, and Syrians. Additionally, Hassan pointed out that several leading Fatah al-Islam members had spent time in Syrian jails. ¶6. (C) General Rifi also saw a link to Syria in the recent car bombing in the affluent Christian Beirut neighborhood of Achrafieh. He claimed that the car used in the Achrafieh explosion was purchased in the same month using the same BEIRUT 00000733 002 OF 002 methods as the cars involved in the attacks against Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Murr and deceased An-Nahar journalist Gibran Tueini. The three cars were purchased a month before the Syrians were forced to leave Lebanon and were paid for using false names and false phone numbers. Rifi did not include the recent bombing in Verdun in his assessment since the bomb used in Verdun was placed underneath a civilian's car, as opposed to wired within the car like the others. COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) Rifi only hinted in passing at the storm of controversy now swirling around the ISF, and engulfing Rifi and Hassan in particular. The ISF is being accused of having recklessly endangered the lives of LAF soldiers when the ISF in the wee hours of Sunday morning arrested bank robbers associated with Fatah al-Islam. This seemed to be the action that sparked the Fatah al-Islam attacks on LAF and ISF security positions, with 17 LAF soldiers taken unawares and killed execution style as the fight began. Rifi commented that the ISF, by going after bank robbers, had foiled what probably was a much larger plan by Fatah al-Islam, given the large amounts of weaponry and ammunition stored in the Tripoli safehouses. Even if serious and tragic mistakes were made, Rifi is probably right, that Fatah al-Islam planned something more spectacular. ¶8. (C) Moreover, what the March 8-Aounist opposition would have us believe -- that the ISF intentionally provoked the death of the LAF soldiers -- is an outrageous distortion of the facts. Because Hizballah and its allies do not have the same presence in the Sunni-allied ISF as in the LAF, the pro-Syrians and Michel Aoun seize all opportunities to discredit the ISF as a Sunni militia belonging to Saad Hariri, a simplistic view at best but one with great resonance among Aoun and Hizballah supporters. What drives Michel Aoun and Hizballah nuts is that the ISF is unambiguously loyal to the GOL. Had the ISF failed to go after the bank robbers, we are sure that Aoun and Hizballah would have accused the ISF of coddling Sunni criminals. FELTMAN