LEBANON: AOUN'S MESSAGE: FORGET ABOUT HIZBALLAH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000726 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING, STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO FOR ATACHCO E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: AOUN'S MESSAGE: FORGET ABOUT HIZBALLAH Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) a nd (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) On May 22, an agitated Gebran Bassil insisted on calling on the Ambassador on behalf of General Aoun, but, even after an hour conversation, the reasons he requested the meeting remained obscure. Bassil stressed Aoun's support for the LAF, but said that the GOL had not heeded Aoun's warnings about terrorists. Bassil offered a brief proposal for a national unity government, but shied away from any discussions of Aoun's relationship with Hizballah. Bassil said that Aoun is a friend to the Sunnis, although the Siniora government favors them unfairly. Aoun is worried that the violence might spread, and that the LAF will not be able to deal with it. End summary. ¶2. (C) An earnest but agitated Gebran Bassil engaged the Ambassador (with Acting Pol/Econ chief) in a game of verbal tennis on May 22. Bassil, Aoun's son-in-law and foremost member of Aoun's inner circle, seemed intent on convincing the Ambassador that the General is right-minded, and sincerely worried about both the LAF and the state of Lebanon. He said that Hizballah is very worried about Sunni extremists as well. However, he dodged every attempt made to engage him on Aoun's continued relationship with Hizballah, saying at several points in the discussion, "Forget about Hizballah!" As the Ambassador pointed out at every turn, the key issue with Aoun's pitch is that the USG cannot forget about Hizballah. GOVERNMENT DID NOT HEED AOUN'S WARNINGS -------------- ¶3. (C) Bassil said that "the General" wanted him to tell the Ambassador how worried he is about the situation, but at the same time, how he has been warning about the possibility of terrorist insurrection for at least two years. Aoun had asked for a Parliamentary security commission in the first session of Parliament after his return, but never received an answer. He also pointed out that those arrested for the bus bombings had apparently confessed to plans to attack Tripoli and rob banks, and were placed under surveillance. However, Aoun faulted the Siniora government for not heeding the warnings, and for allowing the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF) to compete against one another. He said that the ISF had taken cameras with them to the raid on the Fatah al-Islam bank robbers in order to score a media coup. The ISF never told the LAF about its planned raid. Therefore, once Fatah al-Islam knew of the strike, the terrorists could prepare its response before the Army could prepare itself. THE GENERAL LOVES THE ARMY -------------- ¶4. (C) Bassil countered media reports that the General was critical of how the LAF had conducted itself. On the contrary, Aoun loves the army and was devastated by the loss of life. He believes that "the army should terminate this," leave the camp surrounded, and try to deal with the other Palestinian groups to achieve a solution. Bassil said Aoun was angry both because he is a national leader, and because he is a former commander of the LAF. He said that the "green light" to attack Fatah al-islam was given to the LAF too late. If the army is barely able to deal with Nahr el-Bared, what if something happens in the camps in the south? Bassil acknowledged that Aoun is aware that the LAF is not prepared to enter the camps. Asked if Aoun believes that there is a tie between the trouble with Fatah al-Islam and the recent bombs in Beirut, Bassil said that the General believe that such murderers would seek to kill as many people as possible, and the bombs were clearly not designed to do that. FORGET ABOUT HIZBALLAH! -------------- ¶5. (C) When the Ambassador said that Aoun never criticizes Hizballah, which is the cause of valuable resources being diverted away from the real crisis in the north, Bassil said that Aoun is dealing constructively with Hizballah. The Ambassador observed that Aoun never criticizes Syria; Bassil replied that Aoun had criticized Syria the previous day. BEIRUT 00000726 002 OF 002 When the Ambassador said that Aoun should remove the tents from downtown Beirut to free up security resources, Bassil said that the tents are empty. When the Ambassador asked why Aoun is not taking action now against Hizballah now that Syria is out of Lebanon, Bassil again replied, "Forget about Hizballah!" Bassil said that Aoun knows what to do about Hizballah, but that Siniora is an unknown; "What can you do about it? They (the Siniora government) are losers; they spread lies and their security information is flawed." In particular he argued that on several occasions Siniora has appeared to have favored the Sunnis unfairly, such as in releasing prisoners at the request of the Sunni Mufti. SUNNIS ARE NOT THE ENEMY -------------- ¶6. (C) Bassil said that Aoun's relationship with the Shia is very different from that of others, and because "the Shia are already behind Hizballah," General Aoun recognizes that Lebanon cannot be rebuilt without the Shia. "We're not crazy!" he reiterated. However, Aoun does not intend to give the Shia "God and money" according to the Hizballah plan for the Shia. The Ambassador returned frequently to the question of Aoun's relationship with Hizballah, asking why Aoun did not make a gesture of reconciliation with the GOL. He suggested that Aoun could go to Siniora and say, "While we don't agree on many things, we could cooperate in resolving the situation in Tripoli." Bassil dodged the question, although he said later that Aoun is trying to compromise between what he wants and what Hizballah wants. He also pointed out that although Walid Jumblatt had said as recently as previous day that the question of Hizballah arms could be left until later, in the face of the current crisis, the USG does not treat Jumblatt as a supporter of Hizballah; why the General? Told repeatedly by the Ambassador that the USG cannot support Aoun while he allies himself with Hizballah, Bassil again retreated behind a plea to, "Forget about Hizballah!" (Comment: What Jumblatt actually said was that Hizballah should give its arms to the LAF or even fight with the LAF to win the battle in the north. End comment.) WHAT DOES AOUN WANT? -------------- ¶7. (C) Pressed by the Ambassador again to say what Aoun wants, Bassil reluctantly and rather vaguely offered Aoun's proposal: a national unity government with three objectives. Those objectives would be a resolution to the current crisis; resolving the Presidency; and no second government. He said that Aoun was not encouraged about prospects for success of this formula because no one (i.e., not even A/S Welch) encouraged Aoun to pursue his initiative. Arguing that Aoun really wants the international tribunal, even if it cannot be achieved by internal GOL actions, he admitted that Aoun does not have the kind of relationship with Qatar that would allow him to persuade Qatar to adopt a tribunal UNSCR under Chapter 7. ¶8. (C) In regard to strife in the north, Bassil recommended pushing the Palestinians back inside the camps and "not accepting terrorists." Saying that the terrorists do not move freely outside of the camps, he protested again about the "money and God" support that keeps them supplied. He also suggested that, "We take care of the Shia front, and you take care of the rest." While not asking the USG to withdraw support from Siniora, he suggested a full investigation of the events leading up to the outbreak of violence in Nahr el-Bared. The Ambassador then offered that, if Aoun insists on an investigation, it might be useful to open Parliament in order to call for an investigation. Bassil seemed to consider this, although he countered by saying that maybe the Parliament should set up an investigating committee for "all investigations." COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) While Bassil never really explained to us what he wanted or why he was sent to speak to the Ambassador, Bassil himself seemed to think he was delivering an important message. To the best of our understanding, one message would be that the General is very nervous about his position, and that if violence consumes Lebanon, he will not have friends to rescue him. "Forget about Hizballah!" is advice the General should take himself. End comment. FELTMAN