LEBANON: BERRI PRESENTS HIS ROADMAP:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000697

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: BERRI PRESENTS HIS ROADMAP:
"CONSTITUTION, CUSTOM, AND CONSENSUS"


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Sections 1.4 (b
) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a 5/16 meeting with A/S Welch, Parliament Speaker
Nabih Berri argued that the U.S. should welcome and support
his announcement of, and commitment to, a 9/25 parliamentary
session to initiate Lebanon's parliamentary elections. That
date can be used as the action-forcing event to resolve the
presidency. Any valid election will require a two-thirds
quorum, Berri argued, due to precedent and as a sign of
national consensus. Finally, Berri sought U.S. support to
avert President Lahoud's effort to form a second government,
and offered comments on U.S.-Iran relations. End Summary.

ANOTHER INSTITUTION IN JEOPARDY
--------------


2. (C) Parliamentary Speaker Berri, accompanied by MP Ali
Bazzi and Foreign Policy advisor Ali Hamdan, warmly welcomed
Assistant Secretary David Welch and Ambassador Feltman on May
16, recalling his close cooperation with U.S. officials to
end the July-August war. Berri then reiterated a carefully
prepared explanation for his failure to convene parliament;
it is not to avoid the issue of the tribunal, but rather
because the cabinet is illegitimate without Shia
participation. (The Lebanese cabinet sits on a raised dias
behind the Speaker during parliamentary sessions, an honor
Berri refuses to convey since the Shia seats would be empty.)
Since the problem is not with the tribunal, but with the
government, UN Security Council passage of the tribunal under
Chapter VII will not change the political stalemate in
Lebanon, Berri asserted. Instead, only a national unity
government can end the political stalemate and avert a
two-government scenario.


3. (C) In turn, A/S Welch commended Berri for representing
both Shia and national interests during the war, but
questioned Berri's decision not to guard national interests
this spring by opening parliament. A/S Welch urged Berri to
use both his political influence and parliamentary role to
solve the political crisis. A/S Welch reminded Berri that
current developments threaten both his personal political
position and the institution of parliament; the Shia position
as Speaker of the Parliament could fall into the complete
disarray that the presidency has fallen into if Berri does
not act.

BERRI'S ROADMAP OUT OF THE CRISIS:
CONSTITUTION, CUSTOM, AND CONSENSUS
--------------


4. (C) "My road map now is to use the constitution and custom
to reach consensus" and form a new government, Berri told us.
Berri is ready to open parliament as soon as a new
government is formed, and to that end has committed himself
to convening a special limited electoral session of
parliament at the first possible opportunity. He is
committed to the parliamentary session to elect the president
even if the cabinet crisis is not resolved, he explained, for
then the parliament meets as an electoral college, without
the presence of GOL cabinet ministers. The first date
possible will be two months before the president's term ends
on November 24. Once the new president takes office, the
constitution requires that the cabinet dissolve and the
president form a new cabinet.


5. (C) Berri argued that based on precedent and the need for
national consensus, a two-thirds quorum is necessary for the
first round of voting. Since the time of independence, no
president has been elected with less than two-thirds of the
parliament present. This tradition reflects a national
desire to demonstrate consensus. This time an adequate
number of MPs will show up to vote only if there is consensus
prior to the election. In addition, "If we have consensus,
it does not matter whether the candidate is from March 14,
March 8, or some other group", Berri said. He added, "I am
with compromise because I don't want Lebanon to continue like
this." If after the first round of voting no consensus is
reached, during the second round of voting a simple majority
will be adequate.


6. (C) Berri argued that the U.S. should welcome his
commitment to 9/25 opening date for the presidential rounds

BEIRUT 00000697 002 OF 002


in parliament. This date can be the action-forcing event
that allows a consensus to emerge.


7. (C) A/S Welch reminded Berri that to ensure free,
democratic institutions for Lebanon's future stability, a
president must support such a platform and not be beholden to
any foreign power. Berri responded, "If you want a truly
Lebanese rather than a pro-U.S. or pro-Syrian president, you
need a Lebanese solution." Such a solution can best be
reached by applying the constitution and encouraging
consensus by requiring a two-thirds quorum for the election,
he clarified.

BERRI SEEKING U.S. SUPPORT
--------------


8. (C) On the way out of the meeting, Berri sought indirect
U.S. support. The head of the EU parliament is due to arrive
for a visit on May 31, which is the day the first Lebanese
parliamentary session in 2007 is due to end. Berri asked
that we encourage the EU to move up this date to give him an
excuse to convene parliament briefly before the session ends,
in order to prevent President Lahoud from calling the
parliament unconstitutional because it did not meet as
required. President Lahoud is waiting for an excuse to form
a second government, Berri declared. (It was not clear from
this meeting how Berri would avoid having Siniora's cabinet
show up fo this session.)


9. (C) Berri also expressed a keen interest in the status of
U.S.-Iran relations, and tried to offer advice. He urged the
U.S. to focus on those areas the Iranian ambassador has told
Berri are shared bilateral interests: the Gulf, Iraq,
Afghanistan, and the Palestinian territories. Don't worry
about apparent divisions in Iranian decision-making, Berri
advised us, as only Khamenei's opinion counts. In a
back-handed swipe at Siniora, he cautioned A/S Welch about
U.S. support for "weak leaders" in the region. Finally,
Berri noted that Al-Qaeda fighters from Afghanistan are
Iran's worst enemy, as the Al-Qaeda recruits in Iran now
prefer to target Shia rather than Americans in Iraq.


10. (U) This message has not been cleared by A/S Welch.
FELTMAN