LEBANON: A/S WELCH DISCUSSES DEVELOPMENTS WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000696

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE IS SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: A/S WELCH DISCUSSES DEVELOPMENTS WITH
WALID JUMBLATT


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b)
and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a 5/15 meeting with Walid Jumblatt, Marwan
Hamadeh, Ghazi Aridi and other March 14th figures, NEA A/S
Welch assured them that U.S. support is non-negotiable and
the pro-reform movement in Lebanon enjoys strong bi-partisan
support in Congress. The state of play in the UN SECURITY
Council regarding the anticipated Chapter VII resolution was
discussed at length, with an emphasis on the need for the
Lebanese to press all undecided members as hard as possible
during the next week. Jumblatt, while wary of Syrian
reaction to the establishment of the tribunal, was relieved
that the pro-reform movement can now move on to a
well-defined program to buttress Lebanon's fragile democracy.
Concerning Lebanon's upcoming presidential election, A/S
Welch informed the group that as long as FPM leader Michel
Aoun is in league with Hizballah, the U.S. will not
countenance an Aoun presidency. Larger regional issues were
also discussed -- the Arab-Israeli conflict, Saudi and
Egyptian strategy toward Syria, U.S. strategy toward Iran --
but A/S Welch advised the March 14th leaders to concentrate
on issues inside Lebanon that are within their ability to
influence. These include opening parliament, the selection
of a pro-reform presidential candidate, and continuing
political and economic reforms. Jumblatt also expressed deep
concern about arms smuggling across the Syrian-Lebanese
border. End summary.


2. (C) Druse leader Walid Jumblatt hosted the NEA Assistant
Secretary David Welch, the Ambassador, NEA STAFF Assistant,

SIPDIS
and Embassy notetaker for a dinner at his Beirut residence on
May 15. Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh,
Minister of Information Ghazi Aridi, Druse MP Faysal Sayegh,
Sunni MP Misbah Ahdab, and former MP Ghattas Khoury, who is
an advisor to parliamentary majority leader Saad Hariri were
present.


3. (C) Jumblatt appeared to speak for the group when he
remarked that it was a great relief to break out of the
"vicious cycle" of the past few months and finally be in the
end game to establish the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, a
process that has placed considerable pressure on the Siniora
government and the pro-reform movement. He acknowledged the
Assistant Secretary's caution that Chapter VII was not a done
deal by any means and that Siniora government and its allies
must exert as much influence as possible in the coming week.
All present expressed clear satisfaction that the long,
difficult road to the tribunal was nearing an end.


4. (C) The Druse leader said that all March 14th leaders
were now engaged in trying to convince SECURITY COUNCIL
members that Chapter VII was the only means to achieve the
tribunal. The longer it took to pass a resolution, the more
likely it would be that Syria would strike out in one last
attempt to block the court it fears. Jumblatt couldn't help
but wonder aloud what Hafez al-Asad would have done in the
situation his son now finds himself. He was certain that
Hafez would never have used the blustery declaration that
Bashar issued this week that the "region could go up in
flames." Clearly implying that Bashar al-Asad was not up to
the task of leading Syria and was vulnerable to direct
pressure, Jumblatt (characteristically) urged the U.S. to use
its power forcefully, recalling Don Corleone's threat, "to
make him an offer he can't refuse."


5. (C) Minister of Information Aridi stated that even
though he agreed with Jumblatt that Bashar was an ineffective
leader who had been successful only in isolating his country
from the rest of the Arab world, he was still capable of
wreaking havoc in Lebanon and expected the Syrian regime to
unleash violence in the near term. Because of this threat,
Aridi urged the U.S. to move as swiftly as possible toward
Chapter VII, to dissuade both Syria and its supporters in
Lebanon.

BEYOND THE TRIBUNAL
--------------


6. (C) MP Misbah Ahdab, whose district is in the
predominantly Sunni city of Tripoli, agreed on the need to

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move quickly for the reasons mentioned by Aridi. He added
that the the sooner the tribunal issue was settled, the
sooner the March 14th group could address the pressing
matters that worry the Lebanese people. Of particular
concern in the north, he continued, was the growing influence
of fundamentalist and pro-Syrian Sunnis. Once considered a
power-base for majority leader Saad Hariri, Tripoli and its
surrounding region were now vulnerable to pro-Syrian leaders
who urged that people re-direct their support away from the
Hariri bloc. MP Ahdab believes it is important for Hariri's
Future Movement to re-energize its efforts in north Lebanon
or they will be bitterly surprised when the next
parliamentary elections occur.


7. (C) Both Hamadeh and Jumblatt argued that the pro-reform
movement also has to pay attention to the Chouf and the
region surrounding the strategic village of Jezzine, where
they claim Hizballah-affiliated Shia are engaged in an
aggressive program of land purchases and consolidation. They
conceded that although it is difficult to counter the
demographic reality of a rapidly expanding Shia community,
Hamadeh believed that an improved economy would allow Druse
and Christian landowners to hold on to ancestral lands that
they might otherwise be compelled to relinquish. Hamadeh was
careful to note that the Shia community was a vital and
undeniable part of Lebanon's NATIONAL identity, but if
traditionally important regions like the Chouf and the Biqa
Valley became exclusively Shia, the uniqueness of Lebanon as
a moderate, pluralistic nation -- the only one in the region
-- would soon be lost.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
--------------


8. (C) Echoing previously heard positions, those present
agreed that the alliance between Michel Aoun and Hizballah
had seriously handicapped the Christian community, which
according to Taif and the constitution, has the exclusive
right to propose candidates for the presidency. Aoun not
only split the Christian vote, but in effect had given
Hizballah a veto on any aspirant for the office. All
professed satisfaction with the new resolve of Maronite
Patriarch Sfeir, who has not only warned pro-Syrian President
Lahoud to respect the constitution regarding the presidency,
but has also cautioned Aoun that his half-baked plan to elect
a president by popular vote threatened to marginalize the
Christian community.


9. (C) When informed that A/S Welch would meet with Aoun
during his visit, the March 14th leaders urged him to warn
Aoun of the consequences of his excessive ambition. A/S
Welch stated he would make clear that unless Aoun abandoned
his alliance with Hizballah, the U.S. could never deal with
him as president. While some members present thought Aoun
could come to the realization that his pact with Hizballah
was detrimental to the point of breaking the March 8-Aoun
coalition, others, particularly Aridi and Jumblatt, flatly
stated that Aoun was irretrievable.


10. (C) After answering several questions about regional
developments, specifically U.S.-Iranian relations and rumored
U.S. discussions with Syria, A/S Welch advised those present
to concentrate on Lebanese matters. He assured his hosts the
U.S. and its allies were serious about trying to achieve
progress on a wide range of long-standing regional
challenges, but the most effective use of their resources was
for the election of a pro-reform president, the strengthening
of democratic institutions, and rapid implementation of the
political and economic reforms pledged by Lebanon at the
Paris III Donors Conference. As at each of his other
meetings, A/S Welch also assured those present that the U.S.
would not bargain with Lebanon's sovereignty and asked them
to pay attention to our actions and not the rumors of those
who were inimicable to a democratic Lebanon.

CONCERN ABOUT SYRIAN-LEBANESE BORDER
--------------


11. (C) At several times throughout the evening, Jumblatt
expressed deep worry about arms smuggling across the
Syrian-Lebanese border. The March 14 representatives agreed
with A/S Welch that the GOL needed to be doing more itself,
including raising alarm bells, but also asked that the
international community help. A/S Welch asked for the GOL's

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help in allowing the USG to view any seized arms, so that we
could help trace the origin.


12. (U) A/S Welch has not cleared this message.
FELTMAN