LEBANON: A/S WELCH AND PM SINIORA COORDINATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000692

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2017
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: A/S WELCH AND PM SINIORA COORDINATE
CHAPTER VII STRATEGY


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b)
and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a 5/16 meeting, PM Siniora informed the visiting
NEA A/S Welch that he is ready to initiate an all-out final
diplomatic push to garner support for Chapter VII to
establish the Special Tribunal. Once the P-3 draft
resolution text has been agreed upon, Siniora will
concentrate on winning the support of South Africa and
Indonesia, and will make a special effort to assure Italy
that Chapter VII is needed, and needed now. Siniora, who is
sending his senior advisor Mohamad Chatah and probably Acting
FM Tarek Mitri to New York to engage with Security Council
representatives one-on-one, will also ask his regional allies
to pressure the Congo, Ghana, Peru, and Panama. He
acknowledged that Russia, China, and Qatar will be difficult,
but he intends to make direct appeals to those nations as
well. Concerning other matters, Siniora asked for continued
U.S. support for Lebanon's post-Chapter VII phase in which
the next major challenge is the election of the president.
Siniora believes that if Syria is successfully frustrated by
the establishment of the tribunal, Syria will do everything
in its power to ensure the election of another pro-Syrian
president. Siniora and his close aides were clearly relieved
when informed by the Assistant Secretary that although the
U.S. is not in the business of selecting Lebanon's next
president, it would not stand idly by and accept another
pro-Syrian lackey. Finally, the Prime Minister promised that
the pro-reform movement would now expeditiously address the
primary concerns of the Lebanese people: economic reform,
elimination of corruption, security, and political peace
among all Lebanon's factions. (See para 16 for our most
current information on the GOL strategy to encourage Chapter
VII approval of the tribunal.) End summary.


2. (C) Prime Minister Fouad Siniora received Assistant
Secretary David Welch, the Ambassador, A/S Staff Assistant

SIPDIS
and Embassy notetaker at the Grand Serail on May 16. Senior
Advisor to the Prime Minister Mohamad Chatah, advisor Rola
Nouraddine, and Lebanon's Ambassador-designate to the U.S.
Antoine Chedid also attended the meeting. Toward the end of
the meeting, PM Siniora received a call from the Secretary,
in which he warmly thanked the Secretary and President Bush
for their indispensable support to Lebanon and invited her to
visit Beirut as soon as UN Security Council action on the
Special Tribunal was complete.

CHAPTER VII STRATEGY
--------------


3. (C) PM Siniora and A/S Welch compared notes on UNSYG Ban
Ki-moon's briefing to the Security Council and agreed that it
was a bravura performance that set the stage for a Chapter
VII resolution. A/S Welch thanked the Prime Minister for his
"excellent" letter to Ban and said our UN Ambassador was now
prepared to use our influence to win as many votes as
possible for Chapter VII establishment of the tribunal.
Siniora assured us that his government was deeply
appreciative of U.S. support and was about to launch a final,
concerted push for Security Council votes.


4. (C) Acknowledging that the P-3 and Belgium were solid
affirmative votes, Siniora said he would be traveling to
Indonesia on May 24 to discuss the resolution with that
nation's president. He was confident he would gain
Indonesian support. Even if the tribunal vote had already
occurred by then, it would be important to win Indonesia's
support for future UNSC action in support of Lebanon. The
Prime Minister also indicated he has influence with South
Africa and would concentrate on that important Council
member. Siniora took under advisement from the A/S that
South Africa has recently been unexpectedly contrarian in
Council deliberations, but by all means to go after their
vote. Referring to his pocket tally sheet, Siniora said he
expected that France should be able to convince the
governments of both Ghana and the Congo.


5. (C) The Prime Minister was surprised that Italy was not
yet in the "yes" column, but indicated he understood they
wanted to carefully evaluate the risks in light of their
heavy presence in the UNIFIL force in south Lebanon.

BEIRUT 00000692 002 OF 004


Although he made it clear he would personally contact the
leadership of each council member, Siniora indicated that his
influence with Panama and Peru was not notable. That left
Russia, China and Qatar -- all difficult for various reasons,
but particularly concerning veto-empowered Russia and China.
A late-in-the-meeting call from the Secretary gave him
increased confidence regarding Russia's intentions, but
Siniora indicated he would continue to reach out to President
Putin.


6. (C) To be ready for last-minute arm twisting, Siniora
said he would send his closest advisor, former Ambassador
Mohamad Chatah, back to New York to steadfastly lobby and
explain Lebanon's situation to the pertinent UN
representatives. He was also thinking of sending veteran
diplomat Tarek Mitri, his Acting Foreign Minister, who has
become an expert on the tribunal and the already-approved
documents. When Siniora indicated he would also send Judge
Ralf Riachi, one of his judges who had been working with OLA
Chief Nicolas Michel over the past few months, Ambassador
Chatah interjected that the French had just asked them to
refrain from actively proposing legal changes at this time,
to minimize complications with the proposed resolution text.
Siniora agreed with this recommendation and said he would
send his legal expert to New York, but to remain in the
background until his expertise was needed.


7. (C) Like his March 14th colleagues who met with A/S
Welch the night before at Walid Jumblatt's dinner (septel),
the Prime Minister was clearly energized by the fact that the
tribunal finish line was now within sight. Although it was
the non-negotiable centerpiece of GOL's overall strategy to
keep Syria out of Lebanon, Siniora realized the patience of
the Lebanese people was wearing thin and the pro-reform
movement had to move forward to offer Lebanon a clear vision
of its democratic future.

NEXT STEPS
--------------


8. (C) Once the tribunal is established, Siniora said his
government, along with its international supporters, had to
focus on the critical presidential election, scheduled to be
decided in a special session of parliament in late September.
If Syria suffers a defeat with the tribunal, Siniora
believes Bashar al-Asad will spare no effort to continue
Syrian control of Baabda palace. He stated his belief that
the Syrians, however, have underestimated not only Lebanon's
democratic tradition, but the basic common sense of the
Lebanese people as well. He reminded his guests that Lebanon
is the only Arab country that has living former presidents
and is a country that is proud of its record of leadership
change through elections vice hereditary succession or coup
d'etat.


9. (C) Siniora proposed to engage the Lebanese people --
and confound the opposition -- by promulgating a clear
statement of democratic objectives that when achieved, would
create a stable, pluralistic, democratic, prosperous country
at peace with its neighbors. He conceded that far too much
time and effort had been expended on the tribunal and that
expenditure of energy had nearly exhausted the Lebanese
people. He understood the complaints that, at times, it
merely looked like the tribunal was the only concern of the
Siniora government. To combat this understandable, but
incorrect perception, and to politically disarm the powerful
opposition, Siniora suggested that a statement of democratic
principles put forth by March 14th, and supported by the
Patriarch and the international community, could be used to
define what a president of Lebanon should be -- and by
extension, peel away support from candidates who were
essentially little more than Syrian agents.


10. (C) Alluding to the painfully ambitious leader of FPM,
Siniora said that even Michel Aoun was beginning to realize
that his drive to the presidency was faltering. Chatah
referred to independent polling that showed Aoun's popularity
has fallen below 30 percent, barely half the support he
enjoyed when the former general returned from exile in
mid-2005. Now that successful resolution of the tribunal
issue was within hailing distance, Siniora believed the
intrinsic appeal of the pro-reform message has a real chance
to succeed, with the result being a president representative
of all of Lebanon's communities.

BEIRUT 00000692 003 OF 004




11. (C) A/S Welch stated his support for this approach and
reiterated that even though the U.S. would not recommend
specific candidates, he stated that he had made it clear in
each of his on-going meetings that neither would the U.S.
stand quietly aside if a Lahoud clone, subservient to either
Damascus or Hassan Nasrallah, claimed the presidency. If
that unfavorable development occurred, the U.S./Lebanese
relationship would suffer accordingly. The Prime Minister
received this news, and the fact that it was being broadly
shared with all factions, including Aoun, with undisguised
enthusiasm.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS
--------------


12. (C) When it became clear by their inquiries that the
Prime Minister and his team were concerned whether the
discussions at Sharm el-Sheikh or other venues could impact
Lebanon's sovereignty, the A/S stated unequivocally that the
U.S. would not use Lebanon as a "bargaining chip" with either
Syria or Iran. The discussions in Sharm el-Sheikh and the
planned meetings with Iranian representatives in Baghdad were
bore-sighted on Iraq and its stability. He conveyed to
Siniora his impression that Syrian FM Walid Moallem came away
from Sharm el-Sheikh disappointed and perplexed, because he
had apparently come to the summit with the misperception that
the stated focus on Iraq security was merely a cover for a
broader agenda. Likewise with Iran, he explained how their
Foreign Minister was unable to expand the discussions beyond
the stated purpose of the meeting. A/S Welch re-emphasized
that the Syrian regime could expect little dialogue from the
U.S. unless it changed its behavior -- principally toward
Iraq, but Lebanon as well.


13. (C) Siniora indicated his strong approval for this
approach, not only because it would erode some of the
inexplicable confidence of Syria, but it would also give
pause to some of the more aggressive pro-Syrian sympathizers
in Lebanon itself, especially Michel Aoun. Siniora said that
Lebanon very much wished to build good relations with Syria,
but only if Lebanon's sovereignty was fully respected.


14. (C) As he has in nearly every meeting since last
summer's conflict, Siniora asked about progress on Shebaa
Farms. A/S Welch advised the Prime Minster to be careful not
to make a territorial issue the centerpiece of his position
on UNSCR 1701, since that would only give Hizballah, Iran,
and Syria a cause celebre. He advised Siniora it would be
far more effective, and more likely to succeed, if the Prime
Minister use the upcoming UNSCR 1701 progress report to
re-energize his government's 7 points plan. By keeping the
focus on a comprehensive resolution of Lebanon's challenges,
using not only the 7 points, but also UNSCR 1701, a
democratic GOL was far more likely to achieve success without
having to share credit with Hizballah. A/S Welch said by
adhering closely to Lebanon's constitution, 1701 and the 7
points, Siniora could make it untenable for Aoun, and
like-minded opposition members, to remain in their
ill-conceived alliance with Hizballah. He urged the Prime
Minister not to let himself get bogged down in the
single-issue trap of Shebaa, to the benefit of the so-called
"resistance."

BORDER SECURITY
--------------


15. (C) The meeting concluded with a review of border
security in which Siniora expressed his full support of an
impending UN border assessment, but cautioned that according
to his understanding the assessment was scheduled to take 2-3
months and would not provide an immediate solution to an
acknowledged problem. Siniora emphasized, however, that the
German-led Northern Border Pilot Project was proceeding well
and was a constant item on his daily agenda, implying he was
directing his security services to comprehensively support
the effort. A/S Welch said quicker and more comprehensive
action was not only needed, but required by the articles of
UNSCR 1701. He cautioned the Prime Minister that illicit
movement of weaponry across the border could quickly undo all
the progress Siniora and his government had achieved.
Siniora indicated he well understood the situation and the
risks.


BEIRUT 00000692 004 OF 004


UPDATE ON CHAPTER VII STRATEGY
--------------


16. (C) Subsequent to A/S Welch's meeting with Siniora, the
GOL strategy for pushing for Chapter VII approval of the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon came together in more detail,
including the following elements:

-- PM Siniora briefed UNSC ambassadors and charges on 5/16
(to be reported septel).
-- Mohamad Chatah and Judges Chucri Sadr and Ralf Riachi
will leave for New York on Friday, 5/18. Sadr and Riachi
will not be there to negotiate the text but to explain the
finer points of Lebanese law, should UNSC members have
questions.
-- Based on "intelligence" from Chatah and others in New
York, PM Siniora will start lobbying non-permanent UNSC
members by telephone. Siniora will only begin once a draft
UNSC is circulating, so that he will push for approval of
something specific.
-- Acting Foreign Minister Tariq Mitri and UN
PermRep-Designate Nawaf Salam will arrive in New York by the
middle of next week to participate in the UNSC discussions.


17. (U) A/S Welch departed post before clearing this cable.
FELTMAN