PATRIARCH SFEIR UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT VATICAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000665 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2027 TAGS: PREL KDEM PGOV LE SY SUBJECT: PATRIARCH SFEIR UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT VATICAN ENVOY, MORE FLEXIBLE ON MARCH 14 CANDIDATES BEIRUT 00000665 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a 5/10 meeting with the Ambassador, Maronite Patriarch Sfeir downplayed the possibility of a special Vatican envoy helping to solve Lebanon's political crisis. A Vatican envoy, Sfeir said, would be perceived as coming to unite the Christians in advance of presidential elections. As the envoy would fail in such an impossible task, the Church would be tarnished and the morale of Lebanon's Christians would sink deeper into morass. The Patriarch agreed that Michel Aoun needed a strong warning, but he thought the Papal Nuncio would be a more appropriate messenger than an envoy. On the Presidency, the Patriarch repeated his now-standard formula that Lebanon's president should be equal distance from both March 8 and March 14 political blocs. But he offered a nuance absent in our previous meetings: he would accept March 14 (or, theoretically, March 8) candidates, if they had the right criteria (including commitment to Lebanon's independence from Syria) and as long as the successful candidate, once in office, adopted a non-partisan position. The Patriarch demurred from playing the "name game" on presidential candidates, but he indicated particular distaste for former Minister Fares Bouiez and eliminated Riad Salameh and Michel Sleiman by virtue of Sfeir's opposition to any constitutional amendment. End summary. PROBING (UNSUCCESSFULLY) FOR WHAT THE VATICAN TOLD THE PATRIARCH -------------- ¶2. (C) In a one-on-one meeting, the Ambassador asked the Patriarch about his recent visit to the Vatican. What, the Ambassador asked, was the Vatican's message to the Patriarch about Lebanon? Despite prodding from the Ambassador, Sfeir stuck to banal comments, along the lines of "the Vatican supports Lebanon" and "the Vatican is concerned." But, the Ambassador said, what is the Vatican going to do to show its support and address its concern? What does the Vatican expect the Patriarch to do? "It's a problem," Sfeir said; "the Christians are divided." DOWNPLAYING UTILITY OF A VATICAN ENVOY -------------- ¶3. (C) His body stiffening, Sfeir became more focused when the Ambassador asked whether the Vatican had expressed any interest in sending an envoy to Lebanon. Without answering the question directly, Sfeir said that he saw no point to such a mission. In fact, a Vatican envoy now would be counterproductive. Everyone would assume that the envoy was arriving in order to unite Lebanon's Christians in advance of the autumn presidential elections. But the envoy would fail -- the divisions are too great. That failure would reflect badly on the Church and would further demoralize Lebanon's already depressed Christians. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador asked the Patriarch whether he still agreed that MP Michel Aoun was charting a course not in the Christians' best interest. Sfeir nodded, saying that Aoun's people are always trying to justify Aoun's positions, "but I don't agree with them." Aoun pointed out that his recent statements about respecting the constitution are in part designed to thwart Aoun's call for popular presidential elections, "which would be the end of the Christians in Lebanon." In that case, the Ambassador said, wouldn't a Vatican envoy be able to deliver a stiff message to Aoun? A Vatican envoy could take the burden off the Patriarch's shoulders in speaking truth to Aoun. Then, if such a message leaked, it would be clear that the Vatican envoy arrived not to unite the Christians but to reprimand Aoun. Sfeir expressed doubt that Aoun would listen. Moreover, the Vatican does not operate in the way the Ambassador envisioned: the real message would never leak. So Aoun's followers, who might be susceptible to such a Vatican message, would never hear it. They would see the Vatican sending a special envoy to Aoun and assume he was being blessed for the presidency. (Of course, if the envoy saw several Christian candidates, this is an easily solved problem.) If Aoun needs to hear a message, it would be better for the Papal Nuncio to deliver it, Sfeir concluded. BEIRUT 00000665 002.2 OF 003 DON'T IGNORE AOUN -------------- ¶5. (C) Regarding Aoun, the Ambassador asked the Patriarch for his recommendations of how one should deal with the General. His odious views harm his credibility and make it difficult for us to justify meeting with him. "I know! I know!" Sfeir said, throwing up his hands. Moreover, if we meet him, it conveys a credibility on him that he no longer deserves in our view, the Ambassador continued. The Patriarch responded that many people still follow Aoun. Those people are Maronites, Lebanese, and they don't wish to be ignored. "And we don't want to ignore them." Sfeir said that he wanted the Ambassador to continue to see Aoun, in hopes of helping to "correct" his positions. While the Patriarch thought it unlikely that Aoun would change, he thought it was worse for Lebanon's Christians to have one of their primary leaders marginalized. Aoun's followers will then feel marginalized, too, whereas they need to continue to see the West, not Iran and Syria, as their partners. Moreover, if the Ambassador would continue to meet Aoun, maybe he could succeed at least in "calming him down." STICK TO THE CONSTITUTION FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS -------------- ¶6. (C) The Patriarch expressed considerable worry about the "two-cabinet" option and noted that he would find opportunities in the coming days to make his unhappiness with such talk known. He reinforced his view that presidential elections should take place on time, and according to Lebanon's constitution. The constitution should not be amended again, he said, laughing (in seeming agreement) when the Ambassador noted that he had just eliminated Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh and Army Commander Michel Sleiman from the presidential sweepstakes. (Both men, by virtue of their senior positions in the civil service, require a cooling-off period between leaving their current jobs and being eligible for president.) The Patriarch said that he believed that a two-thirds quorum was needed for the validity of the elections, "although some tell me that is not the case." Noting that he was not a lawyer, he said that he believed that it was an obligation for all MPs to show up to vote in any case, negating the need to argue about a quorum. MARCH 14 CANDIDATES NOT ELIMINATED -- BUT THE WINNER SHOULD BECOME NON-PARTISAN -------------- ¶7. (C) Queried by the Ambassador, the Patriarch went through his now-standard lists of qualifications for a good president: someone with high morale standards, someone equidistant from the March 8 and March 14 camps, someone with sufficient credibility and strength to restore the office, and so on. When the Ambassador tried to engage the Patriarch into playing a name game to define who would be in such a field of candidates, the Patriarch resorted to his usual enigmatic self -- grunting, shrugging, muttering a few words of response as the Ambassador listed the names of those Maronites presumed to be candidates. The only name that raised more than a passing comment was former Minister Fares Bouiez. "How could such a dirty man be president?" Sfeir asked, shaking his head. Bouiez's "moral character" was not up the standards Sfeir has in mind for the post-Lahoud presidency. ¶8. (C) When the Patriarch made what appeared to be positive noises after the names of Nassib Lahoud and Samir Franjieh (while maintaining silence after Boutros Harb's name and saying "why not? with no enthusiasm for Nayla Mouawad),the Ambassador noted that these were both March 14 activists: would the Patriarch accept then nonetheless? The Patriarch clarified that he expected the president to be equidistant from both March 8 and March 14, to play a balancing, protecting role once in office. But he was not eliminating March 14 politicians from running. Indeed, March 14 politicians who shared his commitment to Lebanon's independence and democracy should of course be qualified as candidates. But whoever is elected should be above politics. And March 8 candidates? the Ambassador asked. If they are committed to Lebanon's freedom from Syria, the Patriarch laughed. BEIRUT 00000665 003.2 OF 003 COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Getting a straight answer from the suspicious Patriarch is a chore. Preferring to remain in listening mode, he carefully chooses words that are usually enigmatic. He tends to respond in brief sentences rather than offer comments. Nevertheless, analyzing his words and body language, we conclude that Sfeir wants nothing to do with a Vatican envoy. Given his opposition, we do not think we should push it for now. We believe that we will have the opportunity to see Sfeir again next week, and we'll see if he has additional thoughts on the idea. ¶10. (C) The Ambassador's meeting with the Patriarch took place exactly 24 hours before Sfeir's dramatic trip today (5/11) to Baabda Palace, a visit which everyone assumes he undertook in order to reprimand President Emile Lahoud. We wonder if Sfeir's sudden and unexpected activism was in reaction to a message he heard last week at the Vatican: did the Vatican stiffen his spine to assume a leadership role in addressing Lebanon's political crisis? Or is Sfeir so allergic to the idea of a Vatican envoy that he decided to show that he doesn't need one. While Sfeir came across as more engaged than he had in recent meetings, there was otherwise no indication from what he said to the Ambassador that he was about to make a move in -- presumably -- warning Lahoud directly about the path down which he was sending Lebanon. (Lebanon being Lebanon, journalists and pundits are already linking the Ambassador's meeting with Sfeir to the talk with Lahoud.) ¶11. (C) We will try to find out more about the substance of the Patriarch's meeting with Lahoud today. While Sfeir's comments to the media upon exiting Baabda Palace were encouraging -- he repeated his insistence on presidential elections on time and according to the constitution -- we have a hard time imagining Lahoud would show contrition to even the harshest message from Sfeir. It is far more likely that Lahoud will turn Sfeir's visit into a sign that his presidency is being rehabilitated. Indeed, our March 14 contacts whom we surveyed informally are, six hours after Sfeir saw Lahoud, of decidedly mixed opinions: some find the visit worrying, something Lahoud will exploit, while others are convinced that Sfeir finally gave Lahoud the tongue-lashing he deserves. We find it unlikely Sfeir dropped his habit of speaking in riddles, and we find it equally unlikely that Lahoud will change his ways. FELTMAN