PATRIARCH SFEIR UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT VATICAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000665

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2027
TAGS: PREL KDEM PGOV LE SY
SUBJECT: PATRIARCH SFEIR UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT VATICAN
ENVOY, MORE FLEXIBLE ON MARCH 14 CANDIDATES


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Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a 5/10 meeting with the Ambassador, Maronite
Patriarch Sfeir downplayed the possibility of a special
Vatican envoy helping to solve Lebanon's political crisis. A
Vatican envoy, Sfeir said, would be perceived as coming to
unite the Christians in advance of presidential elections.
As the envoy would fail in such an impossible task, the
Church would be tarnished and the morale of Lebanon's
Christians would sink deeper into morass. The Patriarch
agreed that Michel Aoun needed a strong warning, but he
thought the Papal Nuncio would be a more appropriate
messenger than an envoy. On the Presidency, the Patriarch
repeated his now-standard formula that Lebanon's president
should be equal distance from both March 8 and March 14
political blocs. But he offered a nuance absent in our
previous meetings: he would accept March 14 (or,
theoretically, March 8) candidates, if they had the right
criteria (including commitment to Lebanon's independence from
Syria) and as long as the successful candidate, once in
office, adopted a non-partisan position. The Patriarch
demurred from playing the "name game" on presidential
candidates, but he indicated particular distaste for former
Minister Fares Bouiez and eliminated Riad Salameh and Michel
Sleiman by virtue of Sfeir's opposition to any constitutional
amendment. End summary.

PROBING (UNSUCCESSFULLY) FOR WHAT
THE VATICAN TOLD THE PATRIARCH
--------------


2. (C) In a one-on-one meeting, the Ambassador asked the
Patriarch about his recent visit to the Vatican. What, the
Ambassador asked, was the Vatican's message to the Patriarch
about Lebanon? Despite prodding from the Ambassador, Sfeir
stuck to banal comments, along the lines of "the Vatican
supports Lebanon" and "the Vatican is concerned." But, the
Ambassador said, what is the Vatican going to do to show its
support and address its concern? What does the Vatican
expect the Patriarch to do? "It's a problem," Sfeir said;
"the Christians are divided."

DOWNPLAYING UTILITY OF A VATICAN ENVOY
--------------


3. (C) His body stiffening, Sfeir became more focused when
the Ambassador asked whether the Vatican had expressed any
interest in sending an envoy to Lebanon. Without answering
the question directly, Sfeir said that he saw no point to
such a mission. In fact, a Vatican envoy now would be
counterproductive. Everyone would assume that the envoy was
arriving in order to unite Lebanon's Christians in advance of
the autumn presidential elections. But the envoy would fail
-- the divisions are too great. That failure would reflect
badly on the Church and would further demoralize Lebanon's
already depressed Christians.


4. (C) The Ambassador asked the Patriarch whether he still
agreed that MP Michel Aoun was charting a course not in the
Christians' best interest. Sfeir nodded, saying that Aoun's
people are always trying to justify Aoun's positions, "but I
don't agree with them." Aoun pointed out that his recent
statements about respecting the constitution are in part
designed to thwart Aoun's call for popular presidential
elections, "which would be the end of the Christians in
Lebanon." In that case, the Ambassador said, wouldn't a
Vatican envoy be able to deliver a stiff message to Aoun? A
Vatican envoy could take the burden off the Patriarch's
shoulders in speaking truth to Aoun. Then, if such a message
leaked, it would be clear that the Vatican envoy arrived not
to unite the Christians but to reprimand Aoun. Sfeir
expressed doubt that Aoun would listen. Moreover, the
Vatican does not operate in the way the Ambassador
envisioned: the real message would never leak. So Aoun's
followers, who might be susceptible to such a Vatican
message, would never hear it. They would see the Vatican
sending a special envoy to Aoun and assume he was being
blessed for the presidency. (Of course, if the envoy saw
several Christian candidates, this is an easily solved
problem.) If Aoun needs to hear a message, it would be
better for the Papal Nuncio to deliver it, Sfeir concluded.

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DON'T IGNORE AOUN
--------------


5. (C) Regarding Aoun, the Ambassador asked the Patriarch
for his recommendations of how one should deal with the
General. His odious views harm his credibility and make it
difficult for us to justify meeting with him. "I know! I
know!" Sfeir said, throwing up his hands. Moreover, if we
meet him, it conveys a credibility on him that he no longer
deserves in our view, the Ambassador continued. The
Patriarch responded that many people still follow Aoun.
Those people are Maronites, Lebanese, and they don't wish to
be ignored. "And we don't want to ignore them." Sfeir said
that he wanted the Ambassador to continue to see Aoun, in
hopes of helping to "correct" his positions. While the
Patriarch thought it unlikely that Aoun would change, he
thought it was worse for Lebanon's Christians to have one of
their primary leaders marginalized. Aoun's followers will
then feel marginalized, too, whereas they need to continue to
see the West, not Iran and Syria, as their partners.
Moreover, if the Ambassador would continue to meet Aoun,
maybe he could succeed at least in "calming him down."

STICK TO THE CONSTITUTION
FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
--------------


6. (C) The Patriarch expressed considerable worry about the
"two-cabinet" option and noted that he would find
opportunities in the coming days to make his unhappiness with
such talk known. He reinforced his view that presidential
elections should take place on time, and according to
Lebanon's constitution. The constitution should not be
amended again, he said, laughing (in seeming agreement) when
the Ambassador noted that he had just eliminated Central Bank
Governor Riad Salameh and Army Commander Michel Sleiman from
the presidential sweepstakes. (Both men, by virtue of their
senior positions in the civil service, require a cooling-off
period between leaving their current jobs and being eligible
for president.) The Patriarch said that he believed that a
two-thirds quorum was needed for the validity of the
elections, "although some tell me that is not the case."
Noting that he was not a lawyer, he said that he believed
that it was an obligation for all MPs to show up to vote in
any case, negating the need to argue about a quorum.

MARCH 14 CANDIDATES NOT ELIMINATED --
BUT THE WINNER SHOULD BECOME NON-PARTISAN
--------------


7. (C) Queried by the Ambassador, the Patriarch went
through his now-standard lists of qualifications for a good
president: someone with high morale standards, someone
equidistant from the March 8 and March 14 camps, someone with
sufficient credibility and strength to restore the office,
and so on. When the Ambassador tried to engage the Patriarch
into playing a name game to define who would be in such a
field of candidates, the Patriarch resorted to his usual
enigmatic self -- grunting, shrugging, muttering a few words
of response as the Ambassador listed the names of those
Maronites presumed to be candidates. The only name that
raised more than a passing comment was former Minister Fares
Bouiez. "How could such a dirty man be president?" Sfeir
asked, shaking his head. Bouiez's "moral character" was not
up the standards Sfeir has in mind for the post-Lahoud
presidency.


8. (C) When the Patriarch made what appeared to be positive
noises after the names of Nassib Lahoud and Samir Franjieh
(while maintaining silence after Boutros Harb's name and
saying "why not? with no enthusiasm for Nayla Mouawad),the
Ambassador noted that these were both March 14 activists:
would the Patriarch accept then nonetheless? The Patriarch
clarified that he expected the president to be equidistant
from both March 8 and March 14, to play a balancing,
protecting role once in office. But he was not eliminating
March 14 politicians from running. Indeed, March 14
politicians who shared his commitment to Lebanon's
independence and democracy should of course be qualified as
candidates. But whoever is elected should be above politics.
And March 8 candidates? the Ambassador asked. If they are
committed to Lebanon's freedom from Syria, the Patriarch
laughed.

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COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) Getting a straight answer from the suspicious
Patriarch is a chore. Preferring to remain in listening
mode, he carefully chooses words that are usually enigmatic.
He tends to respond in brief sentences rather than offer
comments. Nevertheless, analyzing his words and body
language, we conclude that Sfeir wants nothing to do with a
Vatican envoy. Given his opposition, we do not think we
should push it for now. We believe that we will have the
opportunity to see Sfeir again next week, and we'll see if he
has additional thoughts on the idea.


10. (C) The Ambassador's meeting with the Patriarch took
place exactly 24 hours before Sfeir's dramatic trip today
(5/11) to Baabda Palace, a visit which everyone assumes he
undertook in order to reprimand President Emile Lahoud. We
wonder if Sfeir's sudden and unexpected activism was in
reaction to a message he heard last week at the Vatican: did
the Vatican stiffen his spine to assume a leadership role in
addressing Lebanon's political crisis? Or is Sfeir so
allergic to the idea of a Vatican envoy that he decided to
show that he doesn't need one. While Sfeir came across as
more engaged than he had in recent meetings, there was
otherwise no indication from what he said to the Ambassador
that he was about to make a move in -- presumably -- warning
Lahoud directly about the path down which he was sending
Lebanon. (Lebanon being Lebanon, journalists and pundits are
already linking the Ambassador's meeting with Sfeir to the
talk with Lahoud.)


11. (C) We will try to find out more about the substance of
the Patriarch's meeting with Lahoud today. While Sfeir's
comments to the media upon exiting Baabda Palace were
encouraging -- he repeated his insistence on presidential
elections on time and according to the constitution -- we
have a hard time imagining Lahoud would show contrition to
even the harshest message from Sfeir. It is far more likely
that Lahoud will turn Sfeir's visit into a sign that his
presidency is being rehabilitated. Indeed, our March 14
contacts whom we surveyed informally are, six hours after
Sfeir saw Lahoud, of decidedly mixed opinions: some find the
visit worrying, something Lahoud will exploit, while others
are convinced that Sfeir finally gave Lahoud the
tongue-lashing he deserves. We find it unlikely Sfeir
dropped his habit of speaking in riddles, and we find it
equally unlikely that Lahoud will change his ways.

FELTMAN