LEBANON: HARIRI PROMISES SINIORA WILL SEND SECOND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000651 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2017 TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY SUBJECT: LEBANON: HARIRI PROMISES SINIORA WILL SEND SECOND LETTER; ASSURES US THAT SAUDIS ARE ONBOARD Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b) . SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Indicative of increasing momentum toward Chapter VII, March 14 parliamentary majority leader Saad Hariri told the Ambassador in a 5/8 meeting that PM Siniora is about to send a second, more emphatic letter to UNSYG Ban Ki-moon. Although Chapter VII was not explicitly referred to in the draft presented to the Ambassador, Hariri indicated that he would persuade the Prime Minister to insert that phrase if the U.S. and France believe it could be pivotal. Hariri, just returned from a visit to Riyadh, said that despite rumors to the contrary, the Saudi royal family firmly supports the use of Chapter VII, if that is the only way to establish the tribunal. The Future Movement leader also said he was using his influence to turn off any further travel to Lebanon by the UN Secretary General prior to a Security Council vote, saying any such visit would play directly into the hands of Syria and Hizballah. Lastly, he conveyed the message that Saudi leadership believes Syria and Iran had a slight falling out during last week's Sharm al Sheikh conference, with the Iranians upset that Syria's foreign minister had apparently wasted an opportunity by allowing SecState to set a narrow Iraqi agenda for their bilateral meeting. End summary. ¶2. (C) Saad Hariri, son of slain former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, met with the Ambassador and Special Assistant on 5/8 in his heavily fortified residence in West Beirut. One of Hariri's close advisors, Dr. Ghattas Khoury, also attended the meeting. Hariri said he had just returned from Saudi Arabia where he attended the funeral of one of King Abdullah's closest family members and was returning almost immediately due to the death of yet another royal prince. He indicated that PM Siniora was currently in LONDON and would be visiting several other capitals this week in an accelerating effort to gain additional support for the approaching showdown in the Security Council. INCREASED PACE TO GATHER SUPPORT -------------- ¶3. (C) MP Hariri clearly indicated that the time for negotiation with the opposition was over and that all energies were now directed toward winning passage of Chapter VII authority. Based upon his consultations in Riyadh, he said the Saudis had sent a message to the Syrian regime during the Sharm al Sheikh conference that the Special Tribunal was going to happen, with the implied message that the Syrians should instruct Hizballah accordingly. Responding to recently heard rumors that Saudi Arabia was not truly onboard with the Chapter VII option, Hariri flatly stated that King Abdullah was completely supportive of the effort and had instructed his foreign policy apparatus "not to stop for any reason until the measure has passed." ¶4. (C) The majority leader also said that PM Fouad Siniora had spoken with SYG Ban Ki-moon on 5/7 and had re-emphasized that the internal process was hopelessly stalemated and if the UN was serious about the tribunal, the Security Council would have to use its authority -- and as soon as possible. Reportedly, PM Siniora also informed the SYG that another visit to Beirut was not necessary and could well be counter-productive, because it would reward the delay tactics of Syria and its proxy, Hizballah. Hariri also said he would lobby UN Special Envoy to Lebanon Geir Pedersen to advise the SYG of the futility of another visit to Beirut. (The Ambassador met Pedersen later in the day; Pedersen said that he, too, recommended against another Ban trip to Beirut. "When you have the nine votes, move!" Pedersen emphasized.) ¶5. (C) In a further attempt to quiet unfounded rumors of wavering Lebanese commitment to Chapter VII, Hariri stated that Siniora was about to send a second letter to Ban Ki-moon, with significantly more specific language in it explaining previous unsuccessful efforts to resolve the impasse internally and the unrealistic and ultimately unreasonable demands the anti-tribunal opposition, and its Syrian masters, were making. Hariri presented a draft of the proposed Siniora letter and asked the Ambassador for his BEIRUT 00000651 002 OF 004 comments and suggested changes. The Ambassador said he would ask Washington and New York for their views, particularly on the operative "request" paragraph of the letter and would respond as soon as practicable. (Note: The draft text of this section of Siniora's letter is contained below.) ¶6. (C) Referring to other reports that the Russians thought that Siniora may be hedging a bit, Hariri explained that Russian President Putin may have misconstrued Siniora in a 5/6 telephone call in which Siniora understandably mentioned that an internal political solution would have been preferable, when what the Prime Minister wanted to emphasize was that it had been attempted, but had failed. Hariri continued that PM Siniora had also emphasized to the Russian president that "those that want civil war" (i.e. Syria) in Lebanon should not be rewarded and that Putin had indicated he understood. ¶7. (C) Referring to related diplomatic efforts, Hariri, whose father was a close friend of French President Jacques Chirac, said that Chirac has also just spoken with Putin and urged him to throw Russia's important support to the tribunal. According to Hariri, Putin listened to the persuasive French president and had indicated a possible change of heart when he assured Chirac that "at the end of the day" Russia would support Lebanon. ¶8. (C) Other efforts underway by Hariri and PM Siniora include receiving a promise from Pakistan's President Musharrif to lobby Indonesia and the Senegalese President's assurances that he would urge support for the tribunal from their neighbors Ghana and the Congo, current members of the Security Council. Lastly, Hariri said he would use his considerable influence in South Africa to help win over their support as well. REQUEST FOR ACTIVE U.S. INVOLVEMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) But what was really needed at this point, Hariri maintained was engagement at the highest levels in the USG, perhaps even at the White House. Hariri suggested that direct requests for support of Chapter VII at that level would ensure passage, particularly when one considered the list of still-undecided council members. Hariri also asked for advice as to whether sending a parliamentary delegation to New York would be effective at this point, or perhaps a second letter from the pro-reform parliamentary bloc. He indicated they were willing to try any maneuver to achieve the tribunal, because without it, a democratic Lebanon will probably not survive. STRATEGY ONCE THE TRIBUNAL IS ESTABLISHED -------------- ¶10. (C) Hariri felt that once the tribunal is established, all the energies of March 14 should be directed toward the upcoming presidential election. Trying to force the Parliament open against the stubborn opposition of Nabih Berri was almost hopeless until the start of the presidential season sometime in mid-September. He agreed with the Ambassador that March 14 has a less-than-stellar record when it comes to projecting a clear, appealing message, but they were working hard to eliminate that critical weakness. ¶11. (C) But beyond formulating a message, Hariri said it would also be necessary to re-engage with Speaker Berri. Despite his obvious flaws, he viewed the Speaker as the unavoidable conduit for reaching some sort of agreement with the opposition over the issue of the presidency. He did express confidence that if the tribunal is finally established, it would help immeasurably in the anticipated negotiations because a definite shift in fortunes would be evident to the people of Lebanon. ¶12. (C) Hariri explained how his lengthy negotiations with Berri earlier this spring had essentially been put on hold and he believed he could pick up close to where the talks had recessed. The primary objective, he believes, is to somehow get representatives of the Shia community back into the government. He thought that would require some adjustment in the cabinet, most likely an expansion which would permit greater flexibility in representation, but under no BEIRUT 00000651 003 OF 004 circumstances should March 14 give the opposition the undeserved victory of a new government. ¶13. (C) In his opinion, the key to the situation in Lebanon are negotiations with Iran, whose leadership he believes have a suspect opinion of Syrian judgment and strategy. Hariri said he couldn't believe that Iran, after investing so many resources in Hizballah, would jeopardize their prize possession for the sake of the Syrian regime. Accordingly, he argued the Iranians want to close the book on the tribunal and concentrate their efforts on Lebanon's presidency, with the goal being a president who would protect Hizballah's privileged position and relative immunity from the laws that govern all the other confessions in Lebanon. ¶14. (C) He bluntly stated that almost all of Lebanon's presidential aspirants now realize the next president will be somewhere between the two opposing camps. "All except Aoun, of course" who would never admit to a reality which does not result in his presidency. He concluded that it was really only Syria that does not want some type of resolution to the question of the presidency -- they would much prefer political chaos, which would presumably facilitate a Syrian return. ¶15. (C) Perhaps reflecting allegiance to his principal source of power, Hariri stated that Saudi Arabia was Lebanon's best hope of influencing Iran toward more acceptable behavior. Interestingly, he said that in his many discussions with Saudi leadership, their biggest fear is being "left out in the cold" as a result of some unanticipated agreement between Iran and the U.S. He recounted the steps that he says Saudi Arabia has taken to advance stability in the region: taking the initiative to discuss issues with Iran, calling a meeting of seven Islamic countries in Pakistan, resurrecting their original Middle East peace initiative, and trying to assist struggling Iraq through significant debt write-offs. According to Hariri, his benefactors are still waiting for others to step forward as they have, and seeing "how far out in front" they are in the region is making them increasingly nervous. In closing, Hariri suggested that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia cooperate more closely on regional solutions, particularly making a genuine effort to finally resolve the decades-old tragedy of the Palestinian people. TEXT OF DRAFT SINIORA LETTER -------------- ¶16. (C) Text of draft Siniora letter to SYG Ban Ki-moon (Note: the opening three paragraphs, which the Ambassador read but was given a copy, were simply a recap of the political events that led to the present impasse.) Begin quote: In light of the above, and further to the communication of the parliamentary majority to you on May (insert date) reaffirming their position in support of the Special Tribunal, the Lebanese Government believes that the time has come for the United Nations to help Lebanon make the Special Tribunal a reality. We therefore ask you, as a matter of urgency, to put before the Security Council our request that the Special Tribunal be put into effect. A binding decision regarding the Tribunal on the part of the Security Council will be fully consistent with the importance the UN has attached to this matter from the outset, when the investigation commission was established. Further delays in setting up the Tribunal would be most detrimental to Lebanon,s stability, to the cause of justice, to the UN,s own credibility, and to peace and security in the region. End quote. COMMENT -------------- ¶17. (C) It is good news that Siniora, apparently, tried to dissuade Ban Ki-Moon from traveling again to Beirut. Geir Pedersen told the Ambassador separately that a SYG trip would be "bad for the UN (as the SYG's mission would fail) and bad for Lebanon" (as the SYG's trip would simply delay action, leaving Lebanon in dangerous limbo for a longer period of BEIRUT 00000651 004 OF 004 time). So, if the Ban trip is definitively off, then PM Siniora should presumably conclude the drafting of his letter. We know that Mohamad Chatah was waiting for a copy of the draft resolution, to align as closely as possible the language in the Siniora letter to what is in the resolution. To the best of our knowledge, the GOL does not yet have the draft UNSCR. ¶18. (C) We will provide any comments from Washington and New York on the timing and the language of the letter to PM Siniora and Chatah when they return from the PM's private trip to the UK (where he is attending his daughter's graduation) and official visit to Portugal. We do not expect that Siniora will be able to send his letter any earlier than Friday evening, given his travel and his need to consult with his cabinet and March 14 allies. FELTMAN