Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BEIRUT645
2007-05-07 14:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON TRIBUNAL, BRAMMERTZ,

Tags:  PTER PREL UNSC LE SY 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8121
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000645 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2027
TAGS: PTER PREL UNSC LE SY
SUBJECT: FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON TRIBUNAL, BRAMMERTZ,
PRESIDENCY, HIS OWN DEPARTURE

REF: A. USUN 349


B. BEIRUT 638

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000645 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2027 TAGS: PTER PREL UNSC LE SY SUBJECT: FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON TRIBUNAL, BRAMMERTZ, PRESIDENCY, HIS OWN DEPARTURE REF: A. USUN 349 ¶B. BEIRUT 638 Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a 5/7 meeting with Ambassador Feltman, French Ambassador Bernard Emie, just back from Paris, reported that France wants to move quickly toward a simple UNSCR establishing the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Emie agreed that it appears that the pro-Syrians already recognize the inevitability of Chapter VII action and are establishing the position that they will refuse to recognize the tribunal. Like the Ambassador, Emie expressed deep concern of rumors that UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon wants to come to Beirut for one last try to get the Lebanese together, a futile mission in Emie's view that would serve only to delay action in New York. Emie noted unconfirmed rumors that, on the margins of Sharm al-Sheikh conference, the Syrians had at last given comments on the tribunal to Saudi Arabia. If true, such comments were surely designed to delay, not facilitate, the tribunal's establishment. ¶2. (C) On other topics, Emie expressed deep concern that the U.S. and UK are being insufficiently helpful in finding an onward position for UNIIIC Commissioner Serge Brammertz. In France's view, the U.S. and UK refusal to consider Brammertz as Carla del Ponte's successor at the ICTY will lead Brammertz to leave UNIIIC in June, a "catastrophic development," in Emie's view. The two Ambassadors also spoke inconclusively about Lebanon's presidency. Emie, citing consultations in Paris, thought that incoming French President Sarkozy would not change France's Lebanon policy significantly, but he perhaps will succumb to pressure to engage Syria. In terms of his own succession, Emie plans to leave Lebanon for Turkey in August. If President Emile Lahoud denies agrement to Emie's successor, then Ambassador-designate Andre Parant (currently France's Ambassador to Senegal) will arrive in Lebanon anyway, as charge d'affaires. End summary. FRENCH CITIZENS IN LEBANON VOTE FOR SARKOZY BY 71 PERCENT -------------- ¶3. (C) Receiving Ambassador Feltman at the French Embassy on 5/7, Emie reported that 52 percent of the registered French voters resident in Lebanon had cast their ballots at &
#x000A;nine polling stations throughout the country. While this percentage was lower than the French domestic turnout exceeding 80 percent, it was considerably higher than the 40 percent worldwide French expatriate voting. Of the more than 6,000 votes cast in Lebanon, 71 percent went for the winner, Nicolas Sarkozy. What was interesting, Emie said, was that in Sidon, the polling station furthest to the south, Segolene Royal received well over half the votes -- suggesting to Emie that Hizballah had issued orders to its supporters who were dual nationals. SARKOZY WON'T CHANGE SUBSTANCE (BUT MAYBE TONE) OF FRANCE'S LEBANON POLICY, EMIE PREDICTS -------------- ¶4. (C) Emie, who had returned the previous day from a week of consultations in Paris, reported that he had met with some of Sarkozy's advisors in Paris. Emie predicted that Sarkozy would follow a similar policy to Chirac's regarding Lebanon, including continuity in the coordination with the USG. If anything, Sarkozy's views on Hizballah will probably be closer to the American thinking. Of course, Emie noted, at the personal level Sarkozy will have a far different relationship with the Lebanese, as he does not have the personal connections with the Hariri family than Jacques Chirac enjoys. Emie did express concern that Sarkozy would find it hard to resist the pressure to engage Syria in talks. With the U.S. talking to Syria at Sharm al-Sheikh, it becomes that much more difficult for France to continue its (relative) isolation policy, Emie said. The Ambassador noted that Sarkozy's views on Hizballah might quickly put a break on any potential French rapprochement with Syria and that perhaps we could finally have some unified positions regarding terrorist financing. FRANCE WANTS TO MOVE 'QUICKLY' FOR TRIBUNAL, BEIRUT 00000645 002 OF 003 BUT EMIE NOT SURE OF A SPECIFIC TIMEFRAME -------------- ¶5. (C) Emie cited the Special Tribunal for Lebanon as an example of an issue where "we can safely predict" that Sarkozy will continue the policy of his predecessor. France believes that all domestic roads in Lebanon are blocked, Emie said, and "therefore it is time for the international community to step up to its responsibilities." While saying that France wants to move "quickly" toward UNSC action, Emie acknowledged that he did not have a specific timeframe in mind. Chirac would like at least for PM Siniora to have sent his second letter to the UN by Chirac's last day in office, ten days from now. The French envision a simple resolution bringing the existing tribunal agreement into force, but Emie had not yet seen a specific text. Emie's understanding of the steps to be taken correspond with those in ref A. RUMORS OF A RETURN OF BAN KI-MOON, A TRIP THAT WOULD ONLY DELAY UNSC ACTION -------------- ¶6. (C) The Ambassador noted that Special Coordinator for Lebanon Geir Pedersen had hinted that UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon is considering another trip to Lebanon, to make one last try to bring the Lebanese together around the tribunal. Ban said as much in an interview with Al-Hayet newspaper. Emie noted that he had heard "worrying rumors" to that effect as well. Both Emie and Ambassador Feltman agreed that, with the domestic roads in Lebanon all blocked, a trip by the UNSYG now would simply serve as a delaying tactic. There is no objective reason for such a trip, Emie said; "it's worse than pointless." Noting that Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa would not travel to Lebanon before the establishment of the tribunal (ref A),the Ambassadors agreed to recommend to their capitals to try to discourage such a trip at this point. Emie, noting that he was seeing Pedersen later today, also said that he would try to persuade the UN envoy to recommend against such a trip. ¶7. (C) Emie said that he had heard rumors that the Syrians, perhaps on the margins of the Sharm al-Sheikh meetings, had at last passed comments on the tribunal to Saudi Arabia. The Ambassador noted that, while he had heard the same rumors, this was not the first time such a story had circulated. If indeed Syria has passed on comments ("something we need to check"),Emie concluded that the Syrians were hoping to delay UNSC action, not facilitate the establishment of the tribunal. And "we shouldn't wait a month" to evaluate any Syrian comments in any case, Emie argued. PRO-SYRIANS INDICATING THAT THEY WILL REFUSE TO DEAL WITH TRIBUNAL -------------- ¶8. (C) The two ambassadors also talked about a recent escalation in rhetoric from March 8 politicians regarding the tribunal. They agreed that the harsh tone could be intended to give UNSC members second thoughts about moving ahead on Chapter VII action. But the more likely scenario, they speculated, is that the pro-Syrians have already concluded that Chapter VII approval of the tribunal is inevitable. Therefore, Nabih Berri, Hizballah, and others are signaling that they will refuse to recognize the tribunal and refuse to cooperate with it. "They are going to treat the tribunal as they treat 1559," Emie said, "with or without Chapter VII." EMIE FINGERS U.S., UK AS COMPLICATING BRAMMERTZ' ABILITY TO STAY ON AS UNIIIC HEAD -------------- ¶8. (C) Turning to a different subject, Emie said that France is deeply worried that Serge Brammertz will leave his UNIIIC post in June, creating a vacuum in the UNIIIC in advance of its July report. This would be a "catastrophic development," Emie said, arguing that Lebanon's pro-Syrians will use Brammertz' departure to claim that international interest in Lebanon is waning. The only reason we are facing this problem, Emie argued, is because the U.S. and UK are refusing to agree to allow Brammertz to succeed Carla del Ponte when she steps down as the head of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) later in the year. "Frankly, we don't understand your position," Emie grumbled, wondering why we wouldn't be exerting all efforts to keep Brammertz in place. "Do you really want to give Syria a victory, just now?" BEIRUT 00000645 003 OF 003 ¶9. (C) The Ambassador asked Emie whether Brammertz was really so eager to leave in June. Everyone knows that Brammertz and his immediate superior at the ICC do not get along. Might Brammertz be using the threat of resignation to manipulate France and the United States, two countries that are very aware of how important it is that he stay in place? Emie insisted that he was convinced that Brammertz would quit if nothing solid materializes quite soon. "He's not, what do you say, 'crying wolf.'" Emie discounted the possibility of getting the UN to create something appropriate for Brammertz in New York in time to give Brammertz the job security he demands as the price of staying at the UNIIIC for six more months. After all, Brammertz had his experience with the UN trying to create and fill positions. He knows not to trust the word of the UN, Emie concluded. "We have to come up with something firm," and the ICTY is "our best bet." LEBANON'S PRESIDENCY: AFTER TRIBUNAL, NEED TO ADDRESS THIS SERIOUSLY -------------- ¶10. (C) The two ambassadors agreed that the March 14 leaders need to develop a clear strategy on how they will approach Lebanon's presidential elections in autumn. This issue will need to be addressed seriously immediately after the tribunal is established. The ambassadors touched inconclusively on the usual subjects regarding the presidency -- the role of Maronite Patriarch Sfeir, the relative positions of various candidates, the connections between some candidates and the Syrians, and so forth -- without covering new ground. EMIE'S PLANNED ROTATION TO ANKARA; FRANCE TO SEND AMBASSADOR AS CHARGE -------------- ¶11. (C) Asked by Ambassador Feltman about his own plans, Emie said that he had just received word from the French Embassy in Ankara that the Turks had given agrement for his assignment as ambassador to Turkey. Emie did not think that Sarkozy's people would reverse Chirac's decision in this regard. Emie hoped to use the July 14 national day cocktail as his farewell, with an actual departure in August. ¶12. (C) Emie noted that his Embassy had submitted a request for agrement for Andre Parant, currently France's Ambassador to Senegal, to replace him in Beirut. Acting Foreign Minister Tariq Mitri "just laughed and put the request in his pocket," Emie noted. While there is a chance that President Emile Lahoud, in an attempt to turn over a new leaf with France upon the election of Sarkozy, will grant agrement to Parant, it is more likely, in Emie's view, that Lahoud will stonewall, as he has with other countries boycotting him (including the U.S.). In that case, France will follow the lead of Greece and simply send Parant as Charge d'Affaires, to be upgraded to the accredited ambassador whenever circumstances permit. Emie described Parant as "a carbon copy of myself," able to play a powerful role even without formal accreditation. FELTMAN

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