LEBANON: PRO-REFORM LEADERS URGE CHAPTER VII

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000633 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2017 TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY SUBJECT: LEBANON: PRO-REFORM LEADERS URGE CHAPTER VII ACTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE REF: BEIRUT 00623 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b) . SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a 5/3 meeting at the Embassy, a broad range of leaders from the March 14th movement, including Walid Jumblatt, Marwan Hamadeh, Ghattas Khoury and Nassib Lahoud, discussed the chances for a successful vote on a Chapter VII resolution, likely Syrian and opposition reaction to such a development, and what the pro-reform movement would do once the Special Tribunal is established. The participants almost uniformly urged introduction of a Chapter VII resolution as soon as possible, but no later than next week. They argued that the decks have been cleared -- last week's unsuccessful attempt by UN/OLA Chief Nicolas Michel to broker a solution, a futile visit by UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon to Damascus, the opposition's rejection of Siniora's 17-13 proposal, and the self-imposed withdrawal of Speaker Berri from the field of battle. Most attendees were confident of passage, but promised to engage with as many of the wavering Security Council members as possible over the next week. The scheduled address of Ban to the Council next week was viewed as the trigger to introduce a resolution. Concerning what comes next, Walid Jumblatt in particular stated that a focused effort to explain the pro-reform movement's vision for the country must be enunciated and effectively communicated to the Lebanese people -- and that vision must offer more than just the tribunal. End summary. ¶2. (C) Influential pro-government leaders MP Walid Jumblatt, Minister of Telecommunication Marwan Hamadeh, close Hariri advisor former MP Ghattas Khoury, Druse MP Wael Abu Faour, MP Samir Franjieh and former MPs Fares Souaid and Nassib Lahoud met with the Ambassador, A/DCM, Public Affairs Section Chief, Special Assistant and Senior Political FSN at the Embassy yesterday afternoon for discussion and lunch. UN Special Coordinator to Lebanon Geir Pedersen, who has been in close contact with SYG Ban Ki-Moon on the tribunal, also attended the meeting. "MUCH WORK STILL NEEDS TO BE DONE" -------------- ¶3. (C) Both the Ambassador and UN Envoy Pedersen gave the gathered March 14th leaders abbreviated accounts of where Chapter VII stood following Nicolas Michel's 5/2 briefing to Security Council members in New York. While the Ambassador indicated that perhaps six members were firmly on board with the anticipated resolution, Pedersen demurred and said that perhaps only five were fully committed. Both officials informed the March 14th leaders that much work still needed to be done before the U.S. and France could confidently request a Council vote. Pedersen in particular noted that the most effective action at this point would be a focused campaign directed at the capitals of the council members still in play, namely, South Africa, Indonesia, Panama, Congo, Italy and Ghana. The UN envoy stated he was fairly confident there would be no veto by Russia or China, but by no means was passage with the required nine votes a sure thing. (Privately, Pedersen took aside many of the participants one-by-one to reinforce his point of lobbying capitals.) ¶4. (C) Close Hariri advisor Ghattas Khoury expressed surprise that Indonesia was still considered in the "possible" category, while Marwan Hamadeh said that when he and Walid Jumblatt were recently in New York, they had campaigned hard with South Africa's representatives and were confident of their support. The need to convince Italy also came as a surprise and several attendees asked if this was related to frequently mentioned fears of possible attacks on UNIFIL forces. ¶5. (C) Both Khoury and Hamadeh, who indicated they have been in close contact with the French Foreign Ministry, said they believed the situation in the Council was considerably more favorable for success that Pedersen and the Ambassador described. They estimated that a Chapter VII resolution would pass on the order of 10 or 11 "sure" votes. Pedersen again cautioned the assembled politicians not to be BEIRUT 00000633 002 OF 003 overconfident and if they wanted to present their case to various governments, now was the time to do so. When Hamadeh suggested sending a delegation of pro-reform Members of Parliament, Pedersen -- underscoring his point again about the need to lobby capitals -- said that efforts directed at the various Foreign Ministries would have far greater effect at this stage of the process. ¶6. (C) Concerning timing, all present acknowledged that the much-discussed conference in Sharm el-Sheik had to be concluded before a Chapter VII resolution could be tabled, but without exception, they indicated that such action should not put off much past Ban's anticipated address to the Council next week. Hamadeh specifically said that any further delay would risk a serious loss of momentum and play into the hands of Syria and its anti-tribunal proxies in Lebanon. ¶7. (C) Commenting on the much-speculated views of the UNSYG, UN Envoy Pedersen remarked that Ban is convinced the present state of affairs cannot continue, that is, a frozen political process in Lebanon without a Chapter VII vote in the Council. Pedersen also stated that, although the UNSYG is deeply concerned about possible Syrian reprisals against Lebanese pro-democratic figures, and perhaps even UNIFIL itself, reports that Ban Ki-moon fears civil conflict have been "greatly exaggerated." ("I wouldn't read too much into such reports," Pedersen told the Ambassador later.) Pedersen noted that the SYG wants the tribunal, one way or the other. (Note: In a pull-aside, Pedersen told the Ambassador and Hamadeh that considerably more "homework" has to be done before Chapter VII could be assured. He also informed the Ambassador that the time has passed for a letter from PM Siniora to the Council, and indeed it was no longer expected. In Pedersen's view, the key question for undecided Council members was whether the Lebanese domestic process was at a dead end, not whether Siniora will make a specific request. The Council has stated by previous resolutions that it wants the tribunal established, and if Chapter VII is the only option, so be it. Pedersen said that Nicolas Michel made a strong case on 5/2 that not only was Lebanon's approval process completely stalled, but had added that Lebanon's judiciary was simply not up to the political strain a tribunal would place on it. Pedersen suggested that these are the arguments that should be used to convince member nations who are not yet on board. End note.) NEXT STEPS FOR THE PRO-REFORM ALLIANCE -------------- ¶8. (C) Picking up on a discussion held the previous day with MP Samir Franjieh and former MP Fares Souaid (reftel), the Ambassador asked the assembled leaders (which included Franjieh and Souaid) whether their alliance could do a better job in delivering their pro-democratic, pro-sovereignty message to the Lebanese people. He asked whether it wasn't (past) time for the alliance to draft and promulgate a clear declaration of principles, as well as their vision for Lebanon's future. The Ambassador further suggested that given the imminence of a vote on the tribunal, as well as rumblings from their relentless adversary Michel Aoun that his movement would soon be unveiling a "comprehensive plan" for Lebanon's future, wouldn't it be prudent to seize the initiative. The up-to-then unusually quiet Jumblatt emphatically declared that he had been trying to convince the others to do exactly that "for months," but had little to show for it. Without bothering to supply details, Ghattas Khoury peevishly insisted it had already been tried and simply did not work -- a statement which produced quizzical looks from several participants. ¶9. (C) After several exchanges dealing with the feasibility of a diffuse alliance like March 14 coming up with a process that could produce a unified, coherent message, there was general agreement to discuss the issue at the next meeting of the movement's leaders. In an apparent attempt to achieve some specificity, Walid Jumblatt said he would discuss the concept with Saad Hariri when he returned to Beirut. In closing, staunch pro-reform leader Nassib Lahoud emphasized to his colleagues that this was an extremely important matter, in that since the alliance had spent so much effort on establishing the tribunal, it was in danger of appearing to be a one-issue movement to many Lebanese. Lahoud concluded that the pro-sovereignty, pro-growth core BEIRUT 00000633 003 OF 003 principles of March 14 were exceedingly powerful and appealing, but unless the movement was able to convey this to the Lebanese public, it would cost them dearly. COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) Discussions on the tribunal are delicate. On the one hand, we need to emphasize -- as the Ambassador and Pedersen did repeatedly -- that the tribunal is not in the bag. People should not be overconfident; March 14 and GOL leaders need to do their homework. On the other hand, we can't make the situation regarding the tribunal appear to be so difficult or on such a long timeline that March 14 leaders become demoralized and start to give up or shift positions. Several of the participants at the lunch discussion called the Ambassador later to express concern about the breaking news of Secretary Rice's pull-aside with Syrian Foreign Minister Mu'allim in Sharm al-Sheikh. Further delays in establishing the tribunal, they argued, will reinforce the impression of a thaw in U.S.-Syrian relations that the March 8-Aoun alliance want people to believe is happening. To counter the dangers that the Lebanese will start seeing the pro-Syrians as being on the ascendency, the tribunal should be approved soon, our contacts argued. The Ambassador reminded them of Pedersen's advice, to lobby capitals hard now. FELTMAN