LEBANON: PRO-REFORM LEADERS URGE CHAPTER VII

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000633

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2017
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: PRO-REFORM LEADERS URGE CHAPTER VII
ACTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

REF: BEIRUT 00623

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b)
.

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a 5/3 meeting at the Embassy, a broad range of
leaders from the March 14th movement, including Walid
Jumblatt, Marwan Hamadeh, Ghattas Khoury and Nassib Lahoud,
discussed the chances for a successful vote on a Chapter VII
resolution, likely Syrian and opposition reaction to such a
development, and what the pro-reform movement would do once
the Special Tribunal is established. The participants almost
uniformly urged introduction of a Chapter VII resolution as
soon as possible, but no later than next week. They argued
that the decks have been cleared -- last week's unsuccessful
attempt by UN/OLA Chief Nicolas Michel to broker a solution,
a futile visit by UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon to Damascus, the
opposition's rejection of Siniora's 17-13 proposal, and the
self-imposed withdrawal of Speaker Berri from the field of
battle. Most attendees were confident of passage, but
promised to engage with as many of the wavering Security
Council members as possible over the next week. The
scheduled address of Ban to the Council next week was viewed
as the trigger to introduce a resolution. Concerning what
comes next, Walid Jumblatt in particular stated that a
focused effort to explain the pro-reform movement's vision
for the country must be enunciated and effectively
communicated to the Lebanese people -- and that vision must
offer more than just the tribunal. End summary.


2. (C) Influential pro-government leaders MP Walid
Jumblatt, Minister of Telecommunication Marwan Hamadeh, close
Hariri advisor former MP Ghattas Khoury, Druse MP Wael Abu
Faour, MP Samir Franjieh and former MPs Fares Souaid and
Nassib Lahoud met with the Ambassador, A/DCM, Public Affairs
Section Chief, Special Assistant and Senior Political FSN at
the Embassy yesterday afternoon for discussion and lunch. UN
Special Coordinator to Lebanon Geir Pedersen, who has been in
close contact with SYG Ban Ki-Moon on the tribunal, also
attended the meeting.

"MUCH WORK STILL NEEDS TO BE DONE"
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3. (C) Both the Ambassador and UN Envoy Pedersen gave the
gathered March 14th leaders abbreviated accounts of where
Chapter VII stood following Nicolas Michel's 5/2 briefing to
Security Council members in New York. While the Ambassador
indicated that perhaps six members were firmly on board with
the anticipated resolution, Pedersen demurred and said that
perhaps only five were fully committed. Both officials
informed the March 14th leaders that much work still needed
to be done before the U.S. and France could confidently
request a Council vote. Pedersen in particular noted that
the most effective action at this point would be a focused
campaign directed at the capitals of the council members
still in play, namely, South Africa, Indonesia, Panama,
Congo, Italy and Ghana. The UN envoy stated he was fairly
confident there would be no veto by Russia or China, but by
no means was passage with the required nine votes a sure
thing. (Privately, Pedersen took aside many of the
participants one-by-one to reinforce his point of lobbying
capitals.)


4. (C) Close Hariri advisor Ghattas Khoury expressed
surprise that Indonesia was still considered in the
"possible" category, while Marwan Hamadeh said that when he
and Walid Jumblatt were recently in New York, they had
campaigned hard with South Africa's representatives and were
confident of their support. The need to convince Italy also
came as a surprise and several attendees asked if this was
related to frequently mentioned fears of possible attacks on
UNIFIL forces.


5. (C) Both Khoury and Hamadeh, who indicated they have
been in close contact with the French Foreign Ministry, said
they believed the situation in the Council was considerably
more favorable for success that Pedersen and the Ambassador
described. They estimated that a Chapter VII resolution
would pass on the order of 10 or 11 "sure" votes. Pedersen
again cautioned the assembled politicians not to be

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overconfident and if they wanted to present their case to
various governments, now was the time to do so. When Hamadeh
suggested sending a delegation of pro-reform Members of
Parliament, Pedersen -- underscoring his point again about
the need to lobby capitals -- said that efforts directed at
the various Foreign Ministries would have far greater effect
at this stage of the process.


6. (C) Concerning timing, all present acknowledged that the
much-discussed conference in Sharm el-Sheik had to be
concluded before a Chapter VII resolution could be tabled,
but without exception, they indicated that such action should
not put off much past Ban's anticipated address to the
Council next week. Hamadeh specifically said that any
further delay would risk a serious loss of momentum and play
into the hands of Syria and its anti-tribunal proxies in
Lebanon.


7. (C) Commenting on the much-speculated views of the
UNSYG, UN Envoy Pedersen remarked that Ban is convinced the
present state of affairs cannot continue, that is, a frozen
political process in Lebanon without a Chapter VII vote in
the Council. Pedersen also stated that, although the UNSYG
is deeply concerned about possible Syrian reprisals against
Lebanese pro-democratic figures, and perhaps even UNIFIL
itself, reports that Ban Ki-moon fears civil conflict have
been "greatly exaggerated." ("I wouldn't read too much into
such reports," Pedersen told the Ambassador later.) Pedersen
noted that the SYG wants the tribunal, one way or the other.
(Note: In a pull-aside, Pedersen told the Ambassador and
Hamadeh that considerably more "homework" has to be done
before Chapter VII could be assured. He also informed the
Ambassador that the time has passed for a letter from PM
Siniora to the Council, and indeed it was no longer expected.
In Pedersen's view, the key question for undecided Council
members was whether the Lebanese domestic process was at a
dead end, not whether Siniora will make a specific request.
The Council has stated by previous resolutions that it wants
the tribunal established, and if Chapter VII is the only
option, so be it. Pedersen said that Nicolas Michel made a
strong case on 5/2 that not only was Lebanon's approval
process completely stalled, but had added that Lebanon's
judiciary was simply not up to the political strain a
tribunal would place on it. Pedersen suggested that these
are the arguments that should be used to convince member
nations who are not yet on board. End note.)

NEXT STEPS FOR THE PRO-REFORM ALLIANCE
--------------


8. (C) Picking up on a discussion held the previous day
with MP Samir Franjieh and former MP Fares Souaid (reftel),
the Ambassador asked the assembled leaders (which included
Franjieh and Souaid) whether their alliance could do a better
job in delivering their pro-democratic, pro-sovereignty
message to the Lebanese people. He asked whether it wasn't
(past) time for the alliance to draft and promulgate a clear
declaration of principles, as well as their vision for
Lebanon's future. The Ambassador further suggested that
given the imminence of a vote on the tribunal, as well as
rumblings from their relentless adversary Michel Aoun that
his movement would soon be unveiling a "comprehensive plan"
for Lebanon's future, wouldn't it be prudent to seize the
initiative. The up-to-then unusually quiet Jumblatt
emphatically declared that he had been trying to convince the
others to do exactly that "for months," but had little to
show for it. Without bothering to supply details, Ghattas
Khoury peevishly insisted it had already been tried and
simply did not work -- a statement which produced quizzical
looks from several participants.


9. (C) After several exchanges dealing with the feasibility
of a diffuse alliance like March 14 coming up with a process
that could produce a unified, coherent message, there was
general agreement to discuss the issue at the next meeting of
the movement's leaders. In an apparent attempt to achieve
some specificity, Walid Jumblatt said he would discuss the
concept with Saad Hariri when he returned to Beirut. In
closing, staunch pro-reform leader Nassib Lahoud emphasized
to his colleagues that this was an extremely important
matter, in that since the alliance had spent so much effort
on establishing the tribunal, it was in danger of appearing
to be a one-issue movement to many Lebanese. Lahoud
concluded that the pro-sovereignty, pro-growth core

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principles of March 14 were exceedingly powerful and
appealing, but unless the movement was able to convey this to
the Lebanese public, it would cost them dearly.

COMMENT
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10. (C) Discussions on the tribunal are delicate. On the
one hand, we need to emphasize -- as the Ambassador and
Pedersen did repeatedly -- that the tribunal is not in the
bag. People should not be overconfident; March 14 and GOL
leaders need to do their homework. On the other hand, we
can't make the situation regarding the tribunal appear to be
so difficult or on such a long timeline that March 14 leaders
become demoralized and start to give up or shift positions.
Several of the participants at the lunch discussion called
the Ambassador later to express concern about the breaking
news of Secretary Rice's pull-aside with Syrian Foreign
Minister Mu'allim in Sharm al-Sheikh. Further delays in
establishing the tribunal, they argued, will reinforce the
impression of a thaw in U.S.-Syrian relations that the March
8-Aoun alliance want people to believe is happening. To
counter the dangers that the Lebanese will start seeing the
pro-Syrians as being on the ascendency, the tribunal should
be approved soon, our contacts argued. The Ambassador
reminded them of Pedersen's advice, to lobby capitals hard
now.

FELTMAN