LEBANON: MARCH 14 ATTEMPTS TO COUNTER AOUN'S NEW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000623

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/2107
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MARCH 14 ATTEMPTS TO COUNTER AOUN'S NEW
INITIATIVE


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b)
.

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Two founding members of the pro-reform March 14th
movement expressed genuine concern that FPM leader Michel
Aoun's shewd proposal to select Lebanon's next president by
direct elections has to be effectively countered -- and soon.
MP Samir Franjieh and former MP Fares Souaid argued that the
danger with Aoun's progressive-sounding proposal is that it
would completely overturn the 1989 Taif Agreement, which
ended the country's civil war and guarantees a strong
political voice for what they perceive as a beleaguered
Christian community. In their view, the Aoun gambit is part
of an overall destabilizing campaign being directed from
Damascus and Tehran through their two primary proxies:
Michel Aoun and Hassan Nasrallah. In response, Franjieh and
Souaid are trying to convince their March 14th colleagues to
enlist the support of both the Maronite Patriarch and the
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to compel adherence to the Taif
Agreement and the country's constitution. The well-respected
political leaders also plan to come up with a clear
declaration of principles, as well as a political vision for
the Lebanon's future, to counter a growing public sense that
March 14th is merely reactive in nature, and lacks the
initiative and creativity needed to solve the country's
numerous problems. End summary.


2. (C) Veteran supporter of democracy and Lebanese
sovereignty MP Samir Franjieh, who is a close relation (but
no friend) to influential pro-Syrian former Minister Suleiman
Franjieh, and former MP Fares Souaid met with the Ambassador
and Special Assistant on May 2 at the Embassy. The previous
day, former general Michel Aoun had announced at a rally of
enthusiastic FPM supporters that Lebanon's next president
should be elected by direct vote, rather than the
constitutionally-mandated election in Parliament. Even
though a direct election of the president was contrary to the
constitution and the almost-sacrosanct Taif Agreement, both
Franjieh and Souaid were deeply concerned that Aoun's
proposal would resonate with part of (read: FPM supporters
and Hizballah) Lebanon's anxious electorate. Therefore, an
immediate and effective response was imperative.

THE PATRIARCH AND THE ARMY
--------------


3. (C) Although he acknowledged that decisive, coordinated
action was not a particular strength of the March 14th
coalition, Fares Souaid outlined a comprehensive response
that he believed would be quickly accepted by the alliance's
diverse members. The key objective of his plan would be to
enlist the unambiguous support of Maronite Patriarch Boutros
Sfeir and LAF leadership in reaffirming the primacy of the
constitution and Taif. Coincidentally, Souaid said that
Patriarch Sfeir has recently become noticeably more
supportive of Lebanon's reform movement and argued that this
trend should be encouraged and focused as much as possible.
He suggested that the Vatican, which enjoys considerable
influence with the cleric, should be asked to encourage Sfeir
to be even more outspoken, specifically in defense of the
constitution and the right of the parliamentary majority to
select the country's next president.


4. (C) Souaid, with agreement from Franjieh, also argued it
was necessary to quietly, but firmly, make clear to LAF's
leadership that developments which threatened the
constitution, such as President Emile Lahoud thinly-veiled
threat to name an illegal second government when his term
ends, would not be tolerated. Souaid noted that even though
Lebanon's military leaders -- specifically naming DefMin
Elias Murr, LAF Commander Michel Sleiman and LAF Intelligence
Chief General George Khoury -- could not make public
political declarations, they could effectively support the
Patriarch and the constitutional process behind the scenes.
(Note: Souaid made particular reference to Gen. George
Khoury (who will soon visit Washington) as an influential and
trusted friend of the Patriarch and a person to whom careful
attention should be paid. He described Khoury as an
ambitious, but honest soldier, from a middle class
background, who views himself as a natural successor to Gen.
Sleiman. He also said that although Khoury has stayed
relatively neutral in the political flux of the past two
years, Souaid is quite confident his sympathies are with the

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reform movement. A mitigating factor, however, is that Khoury
hails from a Biqa' Valley town traditionally under heavy
Syrian influence. End note.)

SEARCHING FOR ADDITIONAL SUPPORT
--------------


5. (C) Souaid indicated the second objective of his
strategy is to sway vulnerable Members of Parliament who are
on the margins of the March 8th coalition, namely MP Michel
Murr (Greek Orthodox from the Metn) and MP Elie Skaff
(Catholic from Zahleh),to create anxiety in the opposition's
camp. Both Murr and Skaff have their own popular base of
support, meaning that they are not as heavily reliant on Aoun
as others. Souaid also stated that they would continue to
try to convince moderate Aounists, such as MP Farid el-Khazen
and Ghassan Moukheiber, that their best chance for future
political viability rests with the majority. But he
acknowledged the Aounists, whatever they may say in private,
have maintained notable solidarity in public, and barring a
colossal error by Aoun, does not believe that stance will
change.


6. (C) Finally, echoing suggestions made by the Ambassador
for months, Souaid said he would urge his March 14th
colleagues to finally establish a policy planning cell for
the notoriously disorganized alliance. Franjieh noted that
following March 14th's usual spur-of-the-moment meetings, the
resulting communiques are more often than not hastily drafted
and delivered by a confusing array of disparate
personalities. And then, he admitted with frustration,
nothing is done to maintain either message momentum or
continuity. He acknowledged the up-to-now amateurish
handling of the pro-reform message had to be improved or they
would risk losing the critical support of the electorate.


7. (C) Interestingly, Franjieh stated his firm belief that
March 14th's popular support has increased the past few
months. (Note: This position contradicts the reaction that
the Embassy has heard from numerous non-affiliated, but
pro-democratic Lebanese that there is growing frustration
with the lack of progress on both political and economic
reforms, and a sense that the clear momentum of Paris III may
have been squandered. End note.) Responding to our
skepticism, Franjieh maintained that Lebanon's pro-reform
voters understand the severe challenges posed by Hizballah,
and its allies Michel Aoun and Speaker Nabih Berri, and would
stick with March 14th. But he also admitted the lack of a
clear declaration of principles and an appealing democratic
vision for Lebanon's future is badly needed -- an would be
addressed.


8. (C) In closing, Souaid urged the Ambassador to consult
with Walid Jumblatt, Saad Hariri and PM Siniora to listen to
and heed their advice. Franjieh concurred with his friend
and remarked that Lebanon's future could well be determined
in the next few months -- the anticipated establishment of
the Special Tribunal, the unknown reaction of Syria to that
development, and the outcome of the presidential election
this fall would in large measure settle the question of
Lebanon's identity and sovereignty.
FELTMAN