LEBANON: THROUGH AOUN'S LOOKING GLASS: ARGUES FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000622

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2017
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: THROUGH AOUN'S LOOKING GLASS: ARGUES FOR
APPEASING SYRIA AND HIZBALLAH, BLAMES SINIORA FOR LEBANON'S
PROBLEMS


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reasons: Section 1.4 (b)
.

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) The Ambassador and Poloff visited General Michel Aoun
and his chief advisor Gebran Bassil on May 2. Aoun's
perceptions continue to be radically different from U.S.
views despite similar stated goals of a free and democratic
Lebanon. Aoun argued that appeasing and building trust with
Syria and Hizballah are the best ways to forestall greater
Syrian involvement and Hizballah's military buildup, and
rejected the argument that -- despite last summer's war and
Hassan Nasrallah's belligerent 4/8 speech, inter alia -- his
memorandum of understanding with Hizballah has failed to
bring the group into the fold. The General continued to
argue that he supports the Special Tribunal for Lebanon,
although he has done little to support its establishment.


2. (C) Looking ahead at potential solutions of the political
stalemate, Aoun was harshly critical of Prime Minister
Siniora's latest initiative and told us he is planning to
launch his own initiative, which will be a compromise between
all parties and will prioritize and set deadlines for needed
reforms. Aoun appears convinced that March 14 leaders, and
specifically Siniora, are the root of Lebanon's problems, and
continues to argue that Lebanon is in deadlock because the
GOL is unwilling to compromise. Aoun insisted that the
current parliamentary majority cannot be permitted to elect
Lebanon's next president. End summary.

DIVERGENT PERCEPTIONS OF THE SAME PROBLEMS:
SYRIA, DISARMAMENT, TRIBUNAL, AND PALESTINIANS
-------------- -


3. (C) General Aoun's perceptions continue to be radically
different from U.S. views, Ambassador Feltman and Poloff
learned when they visited Aoun and his son-in-law and chief
advisor Gebran Bassil on May 2. Last week in an As-Sharq
al-Awsat newspaper article the General condemned foreign
(read U.S.) interference, while arguing that Lebanese
problems with Syria ended with Syria's withdrawal. Asked
about the interview, Aoun clarified that Syria is still a
problem. But to address the problem, Lebanon should appease
Syria and remove any pretext for Syria to move against
Lebanon. That will prove more effective than confronting
Syria, as the U.S. and March 14 prefer. Instead, Aoun is
trying to build enough trust between the two nations to allow
the demarcation of borders and establishment of diplomatic
relations. Syria will always want to control Lebanon, the
General argued, but we can limit the problem and forestall
another direct Syrian intervention by "soothing" its regime.


4. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's argument that in the
year and two months since Aoun's memorandum of understanding
with Hizballah, appeasement has not softened the terrorist
organization or brought its ministers back into the
government, Aoun accused March 14 leaders of baiting
Hizballah and cited Hizballah's refusal to use violence since
the July war despite "provocation" from March 14 as proof
that his approach is working. Building trust and
incorporating Hizballah into the government is a better way
to disarm the group than isolating and confronting it, he
argued. Once the issues of Shebaa Farms and the Lebanese
prisoners held in Israel are resolved and Lebanon makes
progress as part of a regional plan toward normalization or
peace with Israel, Hizballah will have no need or
justification for its weapons. Asked how Aoun interpreted
Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah's belligerent
4/8 address, Aoun blamed Druse leader Walid Jumblatt for
provoking Nasrallah. What do you expect Nasrallah to do,
Aoun asked, when Jumblatt attacks Nasrallah every day.


5. (C) Aoun explained his claim to support Special Tribunal
but failure to act to support its establishment by blaming
the Prime Minister; "Siniora never asked for my help," the
General told us. He reiterated his arguments that a tribunal
would reinforce the justice system and be a deterrent against
future political assassinations. "I can't be against the
tribunal, because I'm afraid too," Aoun confided. However,
he claimed politicization, first by the UNIIIC's first
commissioner Detlev Mehlis and since his departure by March
14 politicians, has diminished popular support for the
tribunal. Furthermore, he explained, no Lebanese politician

BEIRUT 00000622 002 OF 003


has a clear conscience, and the idea that all crimes can be
related to the first can be interpreted in many ways, and
concluded by stating the open-ended nature of the tribunal is
"frightening."


6. (C) On the issue of the Palestinians, the Ambassador
refuted Aoun's recent claims that the U. S. supports giving
Lebanese citizenship to the 400,000 predominantly Sunni
Palestinians in Lebanon. This issue is not under discussion,
the Ambassador insisted; when Israeli-Palestinian talks
progress to the point when refugees can be discussed,
Lebanon's special concerns will be taken into account. Aoun
explained that "intelligence papers" from a 2000 meeting at
Rafiq Hariri's home showed that Hariri's advisors had sought
to naturalize Palestinians in exchange for unspecified debt
forgiveness. Aoun maintained that the only way to end the
deep popular fear of the Palestinians is enabling the
Palestinian Authority to issue passports to Palestinians
resident in Lebanon.

AOUN CRITICIZES SINIORA'S,
BUT TOUTS HIS OWN INITIATIVE
--------------


7. (C) Looking forward at potential exits from the political
deadlock, Aoun was dismissive of Sinora's proposal that
Lebanese parties build on areas of existing national
consensus to build a new "17-13" cabinet. Instead, Aoun
asserted that he was preparing his own initiative, which he
will announce next week and which will be a compromise
between all parties and will prioritize and set deadlines for
needed political changes. (Note: Poloff will follow-up with
Bassil to obtain further details on the plan. End Note.)


8. (C) The Ambassador questioned Aoun's recent call for the
Lebanese to directly elect their next president, rather than
allowing Parliament to do so, as the constitution specifies.
The Ambassador asked how could Aoun expect to pass a
constitutional amendment to change the election rules if the
parliament can't even convene? "If we agree, we'll meet,"
Aoun flatly replied. We cannot let this majority elect a
president, the General argued, because the government lost
its legitimacy by dissolving the constitutional council. Had
the constitutional council been able to hear the challenges
arising from the May-June parliamentary elections, then the
March 14 movement might have found itself in the minority.
(Note: Aoun claimed that 11 MP races were cahllenged. Had
the constitutional council decided seven races in favor of
Aoun and his pro-Syrian allies, then the March 14 movement,
then with 63 MPs, would indeed be in the minority in the
128-seat house. End note.)


9. (C) Aoun appears convinced that uncompromising March 14
leaders, and specifically Siniora, are the root of Lebanon's
problems. A recent FPM website article blamed the GOL for
not settling the Shebaa Farms issue, and Aoun explained that
the GOL has been too aggressive toward Syria and -- repeating
his formula of appeasement -- should instead be creating a
positive atmosphere and a track record of honestly reporting
what promises leaders make and then holding them to their
commitments. (Note: Over lunch with the Ambassador on April
30, Aoun bloc Member of Parliament Farid al-Khazen explained
that Aoun detests Siniora more than Hariri or Jumblatt as a
result of Cabinet formation differnces in July 2005. At that
time, Aoun lunched at Hariri's residence, where he and Saad
allegedly agreed that Aoun would receive four Cabinet
portfolios. Siniora, however, "went behind Saad's back" to
make a deal with Lahoud to bring in four Lahoud appointments
(Elias Murr, Charles Rizk, Tariq Mitri, and Yacoub Sarraf)
instead. Aoun, feeling betrayed by Siniora, has not forgiven
the Prime Minister and believes he is untrustworthy,
according to al-Khazen. Our recollection of the cabinet
formation negotiations is slightly different -- we think Aoun
was only promised two ministries -- but Khazen has provided a
plausible explanation as to why Aoun becomes so venemous when
Siniora's name comes up. End Note.)

PSP KILLINGS
--------------


10. (C) In passing, Aoun criticized rumors that Hizballah
might have used the Chammas family, accused of killing two
youths whose families were affiliated with Walid Jumblatt's
Progressive Socialist Party last week, to avenge the murder
of a Hizballah supporter in the January 25 clashes between

BEIRUT 00000622 003 OF 003


government supporters and the opposition. Instead, Aoun
claimed the Chammas family is not sympathetic to Hizballah,
and implied that an unspecified intelligence service was
responsible for the killings. When the Ambassador tried to
press him on which intelligence service -- given Aoun's
implication in the As-Sharq al-Awsat interview that it might
have been the U.S. or Israel (as Aoun linked the murders to
those who allegedly want to settle Palestinians permanently
in Lebanon) -- Aoun demurred. We must wait for the
investigation, he said.

BASSIL BACK AT WORK
--------------


11. (C) Aoun's son-in-law and chief advisor Gebran Bassil has
recovered from a serious car accident in Nigeria in February
and is back at work, perhaps partially explaining the upbeat
if divergent tone of the meeting. Aoun and Bassil noted that
"all parties except one" -- the Lebanese Forces -- had called
to express concern and offer support after the accident.
Saad Hariri offered to fly Gebran home on his private plane,
and the accident precipitated a resumption of contact between
the General and Amine Gemayel for the first time since the
assassination of Pierre Gemayel.

COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) At a personal level, Aoun was friendlier than
usual. But, setting aside Hizballah's Islamic revolutionary
rhetoric, it is difficult to imagine a strategy for the way
forward in Lebanon that is more at odds with our own vision
than Aoun's: the General advocates appeasing Syria and
Hizballah, while battling Siniora and the March 14 majority
in what Aoun seems to see as an existential confrontation.
We are always struck by the sharp discrepancy between what
his followers and MPs tell us privately -- that Aoun is
pro-American and a figure of moderation -- and what Aoun
himself says. The Aoun we meet in person is a far different,
and more frightening, character than the one described to us
by MPs Ibrahim Kanaan, Ghassan Moukheiber, and Farid
al-Khazen. We have seen no signs of the potentially
constructive role that the MPs report hopefully (and with
increasing shrillness) that Aoun allegedly wants to play.


13. (C) Aoun's insistence that "the so-called majority"
cannot elect a president, combined with his public call for
direct elections of the president, is an ominous indication
that he willingly accepts chaos when President Emile Lahoud's
term ends in November. Putting aside the substance of the
issue, at a practical level, it is impossible to imagine how
Aoun's two solutions (either early legislative elections
under a new, "fair" election law -- his previous preference
-- or, now, a constitutional amendment to allow a one-time
popular vote for the presidency) could be implemented.
Either option would require cabinet approval of legislative
measures followed by parliamentary ratification. Aoun and
his pro-Syrian allies do not recognize the cabinet, Speaker
Berri won't call the parliament to session, and Aoun doesn't
have the votes in parliament to approve his initiative.
(Many Christians fear Aoun's proposal, which would have the
practical impact of permitting Lebanon's Muslims to elect its
Christian president. And many Muslims dislike Aoun's
proposal because it would make the Christian president,
elected by the people, an unusually strong figure in
Lebanon's delicate confessional balance. One of the results
of Lebanon's civil war settlement was a dilution of the power
of the presidency, a Taif reform Aoun's initiative would
reverse.)


14. (C) One would like to think that, by advocating an
impossible-to-implement initiative, Aoun is simply
positioning himself to be in a stronger spot for the eventual
compromise over the presidency that will come. But that
would indicate that Aoun learned his lesson in 1988-90 that
uncertainty regarding the presidential succession is
disastrous for Lebanon and for Aoun personally. We doubt
that is the case. Our working assumption at this point is
that Aoun still prefers chaos to any scenario by which he is
denied the presidency. We can only hope that his MPs and
advisors begin to realize the dangerous course the General is
steering.
FELTMAN