LEBANON: JUMBLATT SEES HIZBALLAH AS THREAT TO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000060

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING
STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO:ATACHCO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: JUMBLATT SEES HIZBALLAH AS THREAT TO
DRUZE; TRIBUNAL IS INDISPENSABLE


Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Section 1.4 (d
).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) Druze leader Walid Jumblatt described arms smuggling
from Syria to Hizballah as an elusive problem, and deemed the
LAF incapable of taking on an anti-smuggling role while also
protecting the GOL against demonstrators in the capital.
Talk of divisions among March 8 coalition partners, or of
divisions between Syria and Iran with regard to Lebanon, is
wishful thinking; though the opposition may be stalled, its
parties' goals remain unified and it is not unraveling.
Jumblatt raised the alarm of a vast Hizballah land-purchase
campaign designed to split Druze territory in two and dilute
the population in traditional Druze lands. Jumblatt's grip
on the Druze is safe for now, however, thanks to an infusion
of $10 million from Saudi Arabia three months ago. Sunnis
are beginning to mobilize against resurgent Shiism across the
Middle East, Jumblatt believes, and the specter of Sunni-Shia
conflict in Lebanon has a moderating effect on both Lebanese
and Syrian parties. Meanwhile, Damascus continues to stand
firm against the Special Tribunal and, though the Tribunal's
establishment may be destabilizing and come at a high price
for Lebanon, it is indispensable. Without it, there is no
way to rally Lebanon's Sunnis to the independence cause. End
Summary.


2. (SBU) The Ambassador called on Druze leader Walid Jumblatt
at his Mukhtara residence on January 10. Polchief was
notetaker.

ARMS SMUGGLING
--------------


3. (C) The Ambassador informed Jumblatt that there were
increased reports of arms smuggling from Syria, and that he
had raised this topic with the PM. Siniora had not
questioned the reports, as he usually does, leading the
Ambassador to conclude the GOL is aware of the increasing
smuggling trend; rather, Siniora questioned whether now is
the time for the GOL to be more aggressive against weapons
smuggling, including by moving ahead rapidly on EU support
for border surveillance and security. (The Ambassador had
replied to Siniora that it is.) What had Jumblatt heard, the
Ambassador asked?


4. (C) Jumblatt answered that he was aware of arms smuggling
through many illegal crossings near Anjar, and that the
Surete Generale (the Lebanese security agency charged with
border control and immigration matters, perceived as a
Shia-dominated agency) was turning a blind eye to the
activity. Although the smugglers were crossing Druze
territory, Jumblatt added, he was able to find out very
little because the smugglers "cover their tracks" well.
Jumblatt then handed Polchief what he described as
"intelligence reports" on various related topics. (Note:
The authorship of the documents, in Arabic, is not stated but
presumably is attributable to intelligence operatives of
Jumblatt's Progressive Socialist Party -- PSP. Some of the
topics listed are "Regarding the Entry of Rockets to
Hizballah from Syria," "Illegal Crossings...and Smuggling of
People and Goods," "Information on Tunnels Linking Syria and
Lebanon," and "Information about Illegal Roads." Post will
review these documents and summarize or translate them as
appropriate during the next few days. End Note.)

LEBANESE ARMED FORCES
--------------


5. (C) Jumblatt, when asked about the strength and
determination of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and their
Commander General Michel Sleiman, deemed that Sleiman is
doing all that he presently can (maintaining deployments to
south Lebanon and keeping order in Beirut) and could not take
on additional responsibilities (such as stopping smuggling)
without additional material assistance. Sleiman is becoming
tired, Jumblatt said, but "doing fine." His intelligence
chief, LAF General Georges Khoury, had met with Jumblatt and
also complained about arms smuggling over the border.
Finally, Jumblatt's contact inside the army's top leadership,

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Druze Chief of Staff Shawki Al Masri (second in command in
the LAF) had told Jumblatt that he was concerned about
Shia-Sunni tension within the LAF's ranks.


6. (C) Masri also told Jumblatt that the January 8 press
report of a clash between French troops of the UN Interim
Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and Hizballah operatives had arisen
from growing tensions in the south between French troops and
local residents in UNIFIL's Area of Responsibility. French
Leclerc tanks had created traffic disruptions and road damage
and led to a popular backlash against them, and residents
were made "nervous" by the French troops' instructions to
seize any arms found unconcealed. Nevertheless, Jumblatt
said, he strongly disagreed with Hizballah Deputy
Secretary-General Naim Qassem's comments appearing to

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threaten UNIFIL should it step outside what he sees as its
narrow mission. This situation, Jumblatt said, reminded him
of Syrian President Asad's description of UN Security Council
Resolution 1701 as "fragile." Hizballah does not want a
stronger UNIFIL, Jumblatt concluded; it wants a return to the
status quo ante, in which the terrorist group had free rein
in south Lebanon. "I don't like it all," Jumblatt said,
referring to Hizballah's comments on UNIFIL.

HIZBALLAH AND THE MARCH 8 COALITION
--------------


7. (C) The Ambassador asked Jumblatt his opinion on a current
theory according to which the March 8 coalition is a
coalition operating at two speeds: Free Patriotic Movement
leader Michel Aoun, Jumblatt's Druze rival Talal Arslan, and
Marada Party leader Suleiman Franjieh who want rapid,
decisive action to "win" their confrontation with the GOL,
and apart from them, Hizballah and March 8 Sunnis like Omar
Karami who prefer to be patient and develop a long-term
strategy to expand their power in Lebanon. Jumblatt
attributed any change of March 8 tactics not to internal
tension but to the failure of its large-scale demonstrations
thus far to force the government's collapse.


8. (C) Aoun is playing an old game of an alliance of the
minorities, Jumblatt mused, uniting Alawites, Shia and
Maronites. Jumblatt shared with us a report from his school
chum Nabil Tawil, now a well-connected Aounist, who has been
attempting to play the role of go-between between Aoun and
Jumblatt, that Aoun regularly receives "bags of money" --
presumably from Iran. As for Hizballah, Jumblatt believes
that Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah is the most moderate
of the group's senior leaders, and that Wi'am Wahab is the
most dangerous of the pro-Syrian figures.


9. (C) To counter March 8 extremism and resources, Jumblatt
said, the Sunni position in Lebanon needs to be strengthened,
a step requiring lots of money -- "Saudi money or Hariri
money." When asked, Jumblatt characterized the position of
the Lebanon branch of the Sunni extremist group Jemaah
Islamiya as "reasonable."

COMPETING WITH HIZBALLAH FOR LAND, POPULATION AND MONEY
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Jumblatt has frequently complained that Hizballah is
using its enormous Iranian financial resources to buy up land
for its followers, but for the first time he pointed to a
problem close to home -- Hizballah's bid, in his view, to buy
strategically placed plots connecting Jezzine to Souq
al-Gharb to Beirut's southern suburbs in order to cut the
traditional Druze territory in half and install a Shia
population loyal to Hizballah. Calling this move a "military
threat" and agreeing that it could represent a preparation
for civil war, Jumblatt said he would ask Mustaqbal Party
leader Saad Hariri and the Saudi government to counter the
Hizballah purchases with a buying program of their own, a
pitch he planned to give Saudi Ambassador Abdelaziz Khoja at
dinner that evening.


11. (C) The land purchases, Jumblatt said, along with
Hizballah's arms imports, shows that Hizballah has a
long-term strategy. Hizballah now seeks to control three
separate states-within-states: one in the south, one in
former Druze lands in the Biqa and the Hizballah stronghold
of northern Biqa', and another in the southern suburbs of

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Beirut. Asked whether Hizballah would go so far as to start
a civil war, Jumblatt demurred but noted that the group is
already at war in terms of its media campaign and threats to
other figures and forces in Lebanon.


12. (S) The Saudis had come through with a USD 10 million
cash injection to Jumblatt himself three months ago, he told
us openly. Jumblatt, who employs a legion of retainers and
security personnel and is obligated by his quasi-feudal
position in Druze society not only to spread cash around but
to outdo the patronage of his Druze rivals, had nearly run
out of money in mid-late 2006. The new Saudi money, he said,
would last him for "a couple of years only." (Comment: The
revelation that Jumblatt had just received a cash lifeline
might explain a number of observations about his recent
behavior. Not only had he seemed calmer and more confident
in the last few months but bolder, assailing Hizballah in
public with allegations of involvement in Rafiq Hariri's
assassination and the attempt on Marwan Hamadeh's life.
Jumblatt told us in earlier meetings that Rafiq Hariri used
to give him about $3 million a year to keep Druse loyalty on
his side. End Comment.) Jumblatt said that he would visit
Saudi Arabia following the Prime Minister's next visit.


13. (SBU) Jumblatt is concerned about low birth rates among
Druze (whose religion severely restricts intermarriage with
other faiths) and their migration to other parts of Lebanon,
and noted that the Chouf's "theoretical" population is
150,000 but that its current population is closer to 30,000.
In an attempt to reverse the trend, Jumblatt launched, in
conjunction with the new Sheikh al-Akl (whom Jumblatt
installed over the objections of March 8 Druze) a program to
assist Druze families having more than one child, a program
made possible by his new Saudi financing.

SUNNI/SHIA TENSION
--------------


14. (C) Jumblatt hailed as a "good trend" the denunciation of
Hamas by Muslim Brotherhood parliamentarians in Egypt for
Hamas' ties to Iran. The Brotherhood in Jordan had made a
similar statement, he said, suggesting that Sunni
organizations across the region may be becoming more active
in the face of rising Shia movements. Even in Damascus --
surrounding the Shia pilgrimage site at Sitt Zeineb -- "they
are preaching Shiism."


15. (C) Nevertheless the specter of a Sunni-Shia conflict in
Lebanon is exerting a moderating influence in the current
crisis. Not only do the various Lebanese sides fear a return
to civil war, but Syrian Sunnis could threaten the Damascus
regime in such a case. At present, those Sunnis cannot act
as long as Arab states do nothing to help them, he added.
The only leader concerned with their fate is King Abdullah,
while by contrast, Algeria, Libya and Morocco are supporting
Asad.


16. (C) As for analyses that Iran and Syria are beginning to
demonstrate conflicting agendas in Lebanon, Jumblatt said he
"doesn't buy it." Syria, he said, is blocking the Hariri
tribunal because of its possible links to Hariri's
assassination. Iran is blocking the tribunal because of the
court's potential to address other crimes.

RUSSIAN ROLE
--------------


17. (C) The Ambassador noted that almost the whole
international community is behind the Siniora government,
with the exceptions of Iran, Syria and anti-American powers
like Venezuela who possess little influence here. Oddly, the
Russian role in Lebanon remains a mystery. Jumblatt agreed,
and told us he had tried to maintain frequent contact with
Russian Ambassador Sergei Bukin to learn more about Moscow's
Lebanon policy. When Jumblatt told Bukin that the tribunal
could "counterbalance" Syrian terror in Lebanon, Bukin said
that the tribunal would bring more, not less terror.
Jumblatt told us the Prime Minister would seek to win Russian
support for a Chapter VII resolution to bring the tribunal
into being, but he doubted Siniora would succeed in winning
the Russians over.


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TRIBUNAL
--------------


18. (C) Jumblatt told us that Charles Rizk was prepared to
make important compromises to establish the tribunal,
including dropping Article 3, which makes superiors culpable
for the acts of their subordinates. Jumblatt wondered out
loud "can we drop the tribunal?" -- for a moment, he seemed
to seriously consider it -- and concluded "no, we cannot!
The tribunal is a psychological tool to rally the Sunni
masses; how else can it be done?" Asked for suggestions as
to what the international community can do to help, Jumblatt
shrugged and said simply, "There has not been enough pressure
on Syria."
FELTMAN