G-8 LUNCHEON REVEALS EU, RUSSIAN HESITATIONS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000592

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2027
TAGS: PREL KDEM PGOV UNSC LE
SUBJECT: G-8 LUNCHEON REVEALS EU, RUSSIAN HESITATIONS ON
TRIBUNAL

REF: BEIRUT 576 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).S


1. (C) Summary: A 4/25 luncheon for G-8 ambassadors
revealed a three-way split regarding the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon. Whereas all envoys agreed that Lebanese domestic
approval is all but impossible, only the French and American
ambassadors thought the UN Security Council should consider
Chapter VII in the immediate future. Russian Ambassador
Boukin was at the opposite extreme, expressing hard-line
positions to argue that the international community would be
responsible for destabilizing Lebanon if it moved to secure
UNSC approval for the tribunal. The other envoys were in
between, musing -- as had Prime Minister Siniora earlier
(reftel) -- that the expiration of Lebanon's regular
parliamentary session on May 31 might be a triggering date
for UNSC action. Regarding Lebanon's presidency, the French
and American ambassadors, again, were pushing for similar
positions regarding the ongoing boycott of President Emile
Lahoud and the need to avoid being drawn into constitutional
arguments regarding elections. The others in attendance
expressed a higher tolerance for Lahoud (with German
Ambassador Haas reporting that he would pay a farewell call
on the discredited president and Italian Ambassador Checchia
noting that Lahoud would be invited to Italian National Day)
and concurrence with the March 8 arguments regarding a
special two-thirds parliamentary quorum for presidential
elections. Once again locating himself on the fringes of the
discussion, the Russian ambassador said that Damascus must
approve Lebanon's next president. End summary.


2. (C) German Ambassador Marius Haas, representing the G-8
presidency, hosted a 4/25 luncheon for G-8 ambassadors,
including EU Commission representative Patrick Laurent. The
discussion quickly turned to the question of the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon. With UN Legal Counsel Nicolas Michel
and UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon apparently getting nothing from their
respective trips to Beirut and Damascus, French Ambassador
Emie argued, the international community "will have to decide
very soon to step up to its responsibilities." While
emphasizing that he did not yet have instructions from Paris
regarding timing, Emie "expressing my personal views" thought
that the UN Security Council should begin considering a
Chapter VII resolution immediately after Michel and Ban brief
the Council. Ambassador Feltman agreed, asking the other
envoys whether anyone still believed that it was possible for
the Lebanese to establish the tribunal on their own, using
domestic, constitutional means. Everyone at the table agreed
that the Lebanese process is, and will remain, blocked.


3. (C) But the Italian, German, Canadian, British, and
Japanese Ambassadors, along with the EU representative,
argued in varying intensity that the UNSC should not move
until after May 31. Speaking the most, Italian Ambassador
Checchia echoed PM Siniora's view (reftel) that the UNSC
should not preclude the theoretical possibility of the
Lebanese working out the tribunal for themselves, unlikely as
such an outcome would be. As the regular parliamentary
session will close on May 31, the UNSC should not move before
that date. There is no particular rush to move any more
quickly, Checchia argued, since the UNIIIC investigation into
Rafiq Hariri's death is ongoing. "What difference does a
month make?" Checchia asked. The other envoys responded to
Checchia's position with vigorous nods and some verbal
interventions. Japanese Ambassador Yoshiihisa Kuroda noted
repeatedly his concurrence with Checchia's points.


4. (C) Russian Ambassador Boukin went further. The
international community should not now even consider when it
might be appropriate for the UNSC to act, Boukin argued.
After all, Lebanon's stability is more important than the
tribunal. If the UNSC establishes the tribunal, then the
UNSC and international community will be clearly responsible
for the violence that will inevitably follow. Maybe "some
countries" don't care about the implications of what they are
doing, but Russia does not want to be part of an effort that
will destabilize Lebanon. More generally, Russia does not
understand the rush to action to implement UNSCRs on Lebanon,
especially in light of the fact that, in November, UNSCR 242
will "celebrate its 40th birthday." Boukin noted that "I
would even argue that Lebanon's crisis is due to the Security

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Council." As the other envoys silently looked on,
Ambassadors Emie and Feltman both firmly rejected Boukin's
arguments.


5. (C) Prodded by the German host to move on to a
consideration of Lebanon's presidency, the ambassadors
revealed a similar split regarding the discredited incumbent,
President Emile Lahoud, and autumn presidential elections.
Haas noted that, despite Germany's boycott of Lahoud, he
would "pay the President the courtesy of a farewell call."
Checchia noted that he would extend Lahoud an invitation to
Italian National Day. Even though Lahoud would send a
representative rather than attend himself, such a gesture was
standard diplomatic practice, Checchia argued, to the general
approval of the table. Boukin noted that he had not stopped,
and would not stop, dealing with Lahoud. Ambassadors Emie
and Feltman reviewed the reasons behind their countries'
boycott of Lahoud, reminding the other ambassadors of the
Syrian-imposed conditions under which Lahoud managed to cling
to office. (Of the G-8 envoys, only Ambassadors Feltman and
Boukin were already posted in Beirut at the time of Lahoud's
September 2004 presidential extension.)


6. (C) The G-8 ambassadors spent considerable time
discussing the likelihood of presidential elections occurring
on time to replace Emile Lahoud by the expiration of his term
on November 24. The discussion was largely inconclusive,
with Ambassadors Emie and Feltman arguing that establishment
of the Special Tribunal could be used to make elections more
likely, as March 14 politicians may be more likely to agree
to an acceptable compromise for the presidency in that case.
Emie expressed the view that, as long as Maronite Patriarch
Sfeir concurred with the presidential choice, the successful
candidate would be credible and sufficiently committed to
Lebanon's independence. Boukin said that the only way
presidential elections will take place is if Damascus
approves of the choice of president to be elected. With the
exception of Ambassadors Emie and Feltman, the others around
the table appeared to accept that Syria should be given veto
power but not the sole power of approval.


7. (C) All ambassadors except Emie and Feltman argued in
favor of the arguments by Hizballah and its allies that
parliament needs a special two-thirds quorum to elect a
president. Emie and Feltman commented that, as the
constitution is ambiguous, it is not appropriate for the
international community to comment. Instead, taking a cue
from the Patriarch, the international community should note
the responsibility of all MPs to show up for a responsibility
as important as presidential elections.

FELTMAN