G-8 LUNCHEON REVEALS EU, RUSSIAN HESITATIONS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000592 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2027 TAGS: PREL KDEM PGOV UNSC LE SUBJECT: G-8 LUNCHEON REVEALS EU, RUSSIAN HESITATIONS ON TRIBUNAL REF: BEIRUT 576 (NOTAL) Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).S ¶1. (C) Summary: A 4/25 luncheon for G-8 ambassadors revealed a three-way split regarding the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Whereas all envoys agreed that Lebanese domestic approval is all but impossible, only the French and American ambassadors thought the UN Security Council should consider Chapter VII in the immediate future. Russian Ambassador Boukin was at the opposite extreme, expressing hard-line positions to argue that the international community would be responsible for destabilizing Lebanon if it moved to secure UNSC approval for the tribunal. The other envoys were in between, musing -- as had Prime Minister Siniora earlier (reftel) -- that the expiration of Lebanon's regular parliamentary session on May 31 might be a triggering date for UNSC action. Regarding Lebanon's presidency, the French and American ambassadors, again, were pushing for similar positions regarding the ongoing boycott of President Emile Lahoud and the need to avoid being drawn into constitutional arguments regarding elections. The others in attendance expressed a higher tolerance for Lahoud (with German Ambassador Haas reporting that he would pay a farewell call on the discredited president and Italian Ambassador Checchia noting that Lahoud would be invited to Italian National Day) and concurrence with the March 8 arguments regarding a special two-thirds parliamentary quorum for presidential elections. Once again locating himself on the fringes of the discussion, the Russian ambassador said that Damascus must approve Lebanon's next president. End summary. ¶2. (C) German Ambassador Marius Haas, representing the G-8 presidency, hosted a 4/25 luncheon for G-8 ambassadors, including EU Commission representative Patrick Laurent. The discussion quickly turned to the question of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. With UN Legal Counsel Nicolas Michel and UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon apparently getting nothing from their respective trips to Beirut and Damascus, French Ambassador Emie argued, the international community "will have to decide very soon to step up to its responsibilities." While emphasizing that he did not yet have instructions from Paris regarding timing, Emie "expressing my personal views" thought that the UN Security Council should begin considering a Chapter VII resolution immediately after Michel and Ban brief the Council. Ambassador Feltman agreed, asking the other envoys whether anyone still believed that it was possible for the Lebanese to establish the tribunal on their own, using domestic, constitutional means. Everyone at the table agreed that the Lebanese process is, and will remain, blocked. ¶3. (C) But the Italian, German, Canadian, British, and Japanese Ambassadors, along with the EU representative, argued in varying intensity that the UNSC should not move until after May 31. Speaking the most, Italian Ambassador Checchia echoed PM Siniora's view (reftel) that the UNSC should not preclude the theoretical possibility of the Lebanese working out the tribunal for themselves, unlikely as such an outcome would be. As the regular parliamentary session will close on May 31, the UNSC should not move before that date. There is no particular rush to move any more quickly, Checchia argued, since the UNIIIC investigation into Rafiq Hariri's death is ongoing. "What difference does a month make?" Checchia asked. The other envoys responded to Checchia's position with vigorous nods and some verbal interventions. Japanese Ambassador Yoshiihisa Kuroda noted repeatedly his concurrence with Checchia's points. ¶4. (C) Russian Ambassador Boukin went further. The international community should not now even consider when it might be appropriate for the UNSC to act, Boukin argued. After all, Lebanon's stability is more important than the tribunal. If the UNSC establishes the tribunal, then the UNSC and international community will be clearly responsible for the violence that will inevitably follow. Maybe "some countries" don't care about the implications of what they are doing, but Russia does not want to be part of an effort that will destabilize Lebanon. More generally, Russia does not understand the rush to action to implement UNSCRs on Lebanon, especially in light of the fact that, in November, UNSCR 242 will "celebrate its 40th birthday." Boukin noted that "I would even argue that Lebanon's crisis is due to the Security BEIRUT 00000592 002 OF 002 Council." As the other envoys silently looked on, Ambassadors Emie and Feltman both firmly rejected Boukin's arguments. ¶5. (C) Prodded by the German host to move on to a consideration of Lebanon's presidency, the ambassadors revealed a similar split regarding the discredited incumbent, President Emile Lahoud, and autumn presidential elections. Haas noted that, despite Germany's boycott of Lahoud, he would "pay the President the courtesy of a farewell call." Checchia noted that he would extend Lahoud an invitation to Italian National Day. Even though Lahoud would send a representative rather than attend himself, such a gesture was standard diplomatic practice, Checchia argued, to the general approval of the table. Boukin noted that he had not stopped, and would not stop, dealing with Lahoud. Ambassadors Emie and Feltman reviewed the reasons behind their countries' boycott of Lahoud, reminding the other ambassadors of the Syrian-imposed conditions under which Lahoud managed to cling to office. (Of the G-8 envoys, only Ambassadors Feltman and Boukin were already posted in Beirut at the time of Lahoud's September 2004 presidential extension.) ¶6. (C) The G-8 ambassadors spent considerable time discussing the likelihood of presidential elections occurring on time to replace Emile Lahoud by the expiration of his term on November 24. The discussion was largely inconclusive, with Ambassadors Emie and Feltman arguing that establishment of the Special Tribunal could be used to make elections more likely, as March 14 politicians may be more likely to agree to an acceptable compromise for the presidency in that case. Emie expressed the view that, as long as Maronite Patriarch Sfeir concurred with the presidential choice, the successful candidate would be credible and sufficiently committed to Lebanon's independence. Boukin said that the only way presidential elections will take place is if Damascus approves of the choice of president to be elected. With the exception of Ambassadors Emie and Feltman, the others around the table appeared to accept that Syria should be given veto power but not the sole power of approval. ¶7. (C) All ambassadors except Emie and Feltman argued in favor of the arguments by Hizballah and its allies that parliament needs a special two-thirds quorum to elect a president. Emie and Feltman commented that, as the constitution is ambiguous, it is not appropriate for the international community to comment. Instead, taking a cue from the Patriarch, the international community should note the responsibility of all MPs to show up for a responsibility as important as presidential elections. FELTMAN