PEDERSEN ON UN/OLA NICOLAS MICHEL VISIT:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000558 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2027 TAGS: PREL UNSC KCRM PGOV LE SY SUBJECT: PEDERSEN ON UN/OLA NICOLAS MICHEL VISIT: PRO-SYRIANS MISSED THEIR CHANCE REF: A. BEIRUT 552 ¶B. STATE 53329 Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Over lunch with the Ambassador on 4/23, UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Geir Pedersen reported that, in his final meetings in Lebanon before departing 4/21, UN/OLA chief Nicolas Michel failed in his last attempts to get the Lebanese to agree to approve the Special Tribunal themselves. Pedersen found the positions of the pro-Syrians -- who refused to reveal their comments on the tribunal to Michel, and who also rejected Michel's suggestion regarding consultations abroad -- to have closed off all options for the tribunal except UNSC approval via Chapter VII. Pedersen mused about whether Hizballah and Parliament Speaker Berri might actually welcome Chapter VII action. He did not expect Michel to make specific recommendations to Secretary-General Ban or to the UNSC, but he urged that the international community start now to work with the Lebanese to evaluate what will be the likely security implications, especially for UNIFIL, should Chapter VII be successfully utilized. Pedersen, who headed to the airport after the lunch to travel to Qatar to meet Ban, commented that the Syrians had until the last minute tried to block both Terje Roed-Larsen and Pedersen from accompanying Ban to his Damascus meetings on 4/24. Pedersen also reported that the Qataris had been working very hard to convince the SYG to meet with Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, currently in Qatar, but that Ban had so far resisted the pressure. End summary. ¶2. (C) Following up on UN/OLA Chief Nicolas Michel's briefing to us on Friday (ref a),UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Geir Pedersen told the Ambassador over lunch on 4/23 that Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, Hizballah, and Lebanon's other pro-Syrian politicians had missed two opportunities to postpone or derail Chapter VII consideration of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. First, Pedersen noted, with the exception of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, the pro-Syrians had failed to share any comments or reservations regarding the tribunal with Michel. Thus, Michel had nothing to work with and could not report to UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon that he might be able to broker a deal among the Lebanese. Michel would �0A;"honestly" note that the pro-Syrians were blocking action inside Lebanon (while also noting that March 14 politicians seem "almost too eager" to go with Chapter VII). ¶3. (C) Second, Pedersen said, the pro-Syrians had cut off discussion of an idea that had emerged out of a brain-storming session between Michel and Berri on Friday afternoon (after our discussion with Michel). A partially formed idea had emerged, Pedersen said, initially floated by Michel that perhaps the Lebanese could be able to agreement on the tribunal if they would meet in a neutral setting, away from local pressures. Berri suggested Geneva as an appropriate setting; he and Michel then discussed modalities. Berri talked about the need for a circle of outside supporters -- including the Syrians -- to be available in Geneva, while Michel emphasized that the Lebanese should meet without any preconditions. Pedersen acknowledged that Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, subsequently briefed by Michel, hated the idea, with Minister of Communications Marwan Hamadeh warning Michel that he was being set up for a process that was designed to delay, not establish, the tribunal. In the end, Pedersen said, Berri, through MP Ali Bazzi, passed word to Michel that, unless the March 14 politicians agreed ahead of time to a 19-11 cabinet split, there would be no Geneva meetings on the tribunal. Unwilling to link the tribunal to political questions, Michel immediately abandoned the idea. ¶4. (C) Pedersen said that he found the Berri/Hizballah position inexplicable: if the pro-Syrians truly fear Chapter VII as much as they insist, Michel's trip provided the perfect opportunity to weaken the case for UNSC action. Had the pro-Syrians shared their comments on the tribunal or agreed to meet unconditionally in Geneva on the issue, then Michel's report to SYG Ban would have given the Russians, Chinese and other skeptics arguments to delay. They could have claimed that they wished to allow a Lebanese-UN process to go forward. By adopting the tactics that they did, the pro-Syrians have essentially ensured that Michel's report will indicate that all domestic Lebanese roads are blocked, Pedersen said. He mused about whether Berri and Hizballah might actually welcome Chapter VII. For Berri, Chapter VII would take a difficult issue off his shoulders. And the more radical pro-Syrians might even welcome the excuse to trigger BEIRUT 00000558 002 OF 002 mayhem and murder in Lebanon. Pedersen spent considerable time on security risks, especially against UNIFIL, urging that the international community start a dialogue now with the Lebanese about how to mitigate such risks in the case of Chapter VII establishment of the tribunal. ¶5. (C) Pedersen said that Michel's report will most likely not make recommendations about how to proceed, as the UNSC members "will have to draw their own conclusions from the facts." The Ambassador noted that Michel's public statements in Beirut pointing out the need to create the tribunal now were quite useful, and he asked how Michel defined "now." Pedersen said that he believed Michel thought the tribunal should be established "within the next four to six weeks," given the time between the legal establishment and the actual operation of the tribunal (approximately a year) and in light of the needs of the UNIIIC investigation. The Ambassador asked whether Michel's report would emphasize the need to move quickly, and Pedersen said that he believed so. ¶6. (C) Pedersen, who received phone calls from the UN throughout the lunch, noted that, until late this morning, it was still unclear what would happen with SYG Ban's planned trip to Damascus on 4/24. The Syrians had greatly annoyed Ban by telling the UN that neither UNSCR 1559 envoy Terje Roed-Larsen nor Pedersen would be permitted in any of the official meetings, at any level. Ban threaten to cancel his trip, which eventually resulted in the Syrians relenting: Pedersen and Larsen could attend all of Ban's meetings except the one with Syrian President Bashar al-Asad, which would be tete-a-tete. ¶7. (C) Pedersen also noted that the Qataris had been making an intense lobbying effort to get Ban to agree to meet Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, currently in Qatar. To the best of Pedersen's knowledge as of the lunch, Ban had resisted the Qatari request. ¶8. (C) Comment: Had Nicolas Michel's brainstorming with Berri about a neutral venue for further consultations been seized upon by the pro-Syrians, we would face additional arguments against UNSC action. The fact that the pro-Syrians tried to condition the proposal to government formation and even Syrian observers, however, can strengthen our case that it is time for the UNSC to move the tribunal forward. We note that even Pedersen, who usually exercises patience with and sympathy for Hizballah's arguments, was visibly frustrated with what he seemed to consider a pro-Syrian snub of Michel. End comment. FELTMAN