Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BEIRUT465
2007-03-29 14:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: FRANJIEH ADMITS OPPOSITION HOLDING

Tags:  KDEM PGOV PREL PTER LE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000465 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING
STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO:ATACHCO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2017
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL PTER LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: FRANJIEH ADMITS OPPOSITION HOLDING
TRIBUNAL AS BARGAINING CHIP

REF: STATE 36202

Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: 1.4 (d).

SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000465 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO:ATACHCO E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2017 TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL PTER LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: FRANJIEH ADMITS OPPOSITION HOLDING TRIBUNAL AS BARGAINING CHIP REF: STATE 36202 Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: 1.4 (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) On March 23, Suleiman Franjieh treated the Ambassador to a full menu of the opposition leader's controversial positions on Lebanon's political crisis. Franjieh expressed general support for the international tribunal, but warned that the opposition would use it as a bargaining chip to obtain political advantages such as a "toppling minority" in the cabinet. Franjieh insisted that Lebanon's democracy is one in which consensus, not majority rule, is the operative principle. On this basis, he was unapologetic for the damage being done to Lebanon by the opposition's sit-in and other tactics that have idled business in central Beirut, kept the Chamber of Deputies out of session, and stalled the tribunal process. At one point, Franjieh appeared to admit the opposition was facilitating arms smuggling, but was not explicit on this point. He held Sunni extremists, Walid Jumblatt, and Samir Geagea most to blame for the recent arms race and violence in Lebanon. End Summary. NO PROBLEM WITH TRIBUNAL BUT... -------------- ¶2. (C) Marada Party leader and former Health and Interior Minister Suleiman Franjieh invited the Ambassador, Polchief and Poladvisor to lunch at Franjieh's home near the north Lebanon city of Zgharta on March 23. Franjieh was in a pessimistic mood regarding Lebanon's political situation. Ever the feudal lord, Franjieh declared that people in the Zgharta area, "his people," were doing well but that the Lebanese are suffering from Lebanon's protracted political crisis. Franjieh praised Chamber of Deputies Speaker Nabih Berri for his comments of March 20 in which he condemned March 14 for perpetuating the crisis. ¶3. (C) Franjieh volunteered that if Lebanon can get past the issue of the international tribunal (i.e, Special Tribunal for Lebanon),it can get on with political and economic recovery. He said the issue of the presidency was now coming to the fore. Which party would obtain the highest Maronite office in the land? The Ambassador told Franjieh that the USG is not pushing any particular solution to the crisis in Lebanon, but that our bott
om line is the establishment of a tribunal enjoying true independence and integrity. The formation of an enlarged cabinet is not our concern, except as it affects the establishment of the tribunal and arms smuggling. ¶4. (C) March 8 has no problem with the tribunal, Franjieh responded, as long as it does not become a tool for the USG and its allies to attack Syria or Hizballah. The USG enmity against Hizballah is well-known, and Lebanon is not in a position to be used as a launching point for attacks on its larger neighbor. The Ambassador noted that the USG still wants Hizballah to be held accountable for its crimes from the 1980s, but not through the tribunal. The tribunal cannot in any case open cases from previous decades. Franjieh said the problem is that the USG and Prime Minister Siniora appear too confrontational against both Damascus and Hizballah, and that raises suspicions that the court will be used for political purposes. ...WE'LL USE IT AS A BARGAINING CHIP -------------- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador noted that although Damascus insists it supports the tribunal, it makes statements such as one of the day before, in which Damascus said that no Syrian citizen could be tried by the tribunal. He added his suspicion that the reservations of the opposition to the tribunal are not entirely "trivial" as Speaker Berri insists. If they were, then why not make them public? Rony Ariji, a lawyer and Franjieh advisor, answered that confidentiality is part of the opposition's negotiating position. In his direct manner, Franjieh said "give us a committee to study the expansion of the cabinet and the tribunal, and we'll give our comments. Give us a 19-11 national unity cabinet and no more secrets." BEIRUT 00000465 002 OF 004 ¶6. (C) Surely those who drafted the tribunal documents should be part of such a committee, the Ambassador added; these are professional jurists and their help in explaining the structure and details of the tribunal would be invaluable. Franjieh countered that what is needed is a neutral committee, and the tribunal jurists (Ralph Riachy and Chukri Sader) are part of the pro-government camp. They could be present at the committee's proceedings as a resource, he allowed (going further than Berri has),but could not vote. ¶7. (C) If everyone agrees they support the tribunal, the Ambassador continued, why must the two sides wait to discuss it and why should it be considered a gift from one side to the other? Franjieh said enigmatically, "the Devil is in the details" and added, "put everything on the table and we'll agree to the whole package." (Note: Franjieh's way of addressing his Embassy guests made it clear he made no distinction between the USG and the March 14/pro-government side in Lebanon, and at times, he seemed to be addressing us as a negotiating partner. End Note.) Let March 14 say that if we agree to the tribunal, they will give us a 19-11 cabinet, Franjieh summarized. OPPOSITION-GOVERNMENT STANDOFF -------------- ¶8. (C) The Ambassador pointed out that the opposition had already obtained enormous concessions from the pro-government side, including its agreement to reopen and amend the tribunal documents and to bring Michel Aoun into the cabinet. Meanwhile the opposition has kept its "sit-in" in central Beirut and President Lahoud in office, the Chamber of Deputies sits idle, and the threat of civil disobedience is still in the air. What has the opposition side given up? Franjieh responded that Lebanon is a "consensual" democracy, unlike other democratic systems. The country does not have a "democracy of majority and minority," but of participation. We will establish the tribunal by the whole country's agreement, he insisted, but the international community is trying to force us. The USG wants the majority to rule over the minority, he accused. We (the opposition) are just demanding what we have a right to. We demanded our rights before the "sit-in" and were dismissed by the government side. After all the democratic steps had failed, we took to the streets. ¶9. (C) The Ambassador noted that we have queried opposition leaders many times why they insist on a 19-11 cabinet formula rather than the 19 10 1 formula originally proposed by the Arab League and accepted by March 14. Both formulas give the opposition veto power over any cabinet measure. (Note: In this Arab League-proposed formula, the "independent" minister would pledge not to vote in any matter not enjoying the cabinet's consensus. He therefore could not force any majority decision over the opposition's objection. The key difference between the two formulas is that under the opposition formula, the 11 opposition ministers could resign at any time, which under the provisions of the Lebanese constitution would result in the cabinet being considered dissolved. This is unacceptable to March 14 of course, and March 8 leaders have responded that they are willing to extend "guarantees" that no mass resignation would take place. End Note.) The Ambassador reported to Franjieh that we have never received more than a vague answer from opposition leaders on why they insist on a "toppling minority" in the cabinet (which they would guarantee not to use to topple the governnment),as opposed to a mere "blocking minority." ¶10. (C) Franjieh responded that it is a matter of trust. Even with an overwhelming cabinet majority in the hands of the government, without trust, the country will be stalled. With trust, even with the cabinet split 50/50, the government will operate well. (Comment: The opposition position demanding a "toppling minority" makes more sense when viewed in the context of the looming battle over the selection of Lebanon's next president. Under the Lebanese constitution, if the Chamber of Deputies is unable to vote in a new president on time -- Lahoud's term ends in November -- the cabinet governs the country alone until a settlement is reached. This outcome, rule by a BEIRUT 00000465 003 OF 004 Siniora/Hariri/Jumblatt/Geagea cabinet, would be anathema to the opposition, which needs a way to topple the cabinet if such an outcome seems likely. End Comment.) DEFYING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY -------------- ¶11. (C) The Ambassador noted that Nabih Berri's blocking of the Chamber of Deputies and the opposition's refusal to disclose its amendments to the tribunal have begun to change the international community's stance on the situation in Lebanon. Lebanon's friends were not being outspoken before about the political dispute, but now that is changing. Franjieh said that the opposition's demands were clear from the beginning of the dispute. "I want normal elections, not ministers in the cabinet or the presidency." Franjieh concluded. ¶12. (C) When the Ambassador told Franjieh that the opposition appears to be defying the international community, he answered "the situation is becoming suicidal. Either we'll be hanged or we'll hang ourselves." The Ambassador noted that there are 15 cases of diplomatic credentials that Lahoud has refused to accept, and Franjieh responded jokingly, "I like him more and more! When they ask me why I like Lahoud, I tell them, 'just to spite them.'" Asked later about the process for replacing Lahoud, Franjieh said that he supported having presidential elections on time, and he did not mention any intermediary steps like parliamentary elections. ARMS SMUGGLING -------------- ¶13. (C) Bearing in mind the recent approach to European capitals over arms smuggling in Lebanon (reftel),the Ambassador expressed the international community's continuing concern over the issue. Franjieh seemed uninterested and said that, "you'll probably get the tribunal, but at least we need some price in return." Perhaps realizing he had said something outrageous by even his standards, Franjieh then backtracked and noted the demand of Lebanese Christians for electoral law reform. The Ambassador pressed Franjieh on arms smuggling, noting that tensions with Israel could result in a conflict. Franjieh agreed that smuggling exists, but insisted that the new weapons coming into Lebanon's black market are not coming from Syria. He explained that M-16 and M-4 rifles are on the streets in such quantity that their prices have dropped lately. Those US-origin weapons could not have come from Syria, he reasoned. ¶14. (C) Meanwhile, Franjieh continued, Sunni groups and March 14 coalition members continue to arm themselves. Saad Hariri's Mustaqbal Party has organized private security firms with over 5,000 armed personnel, he alleged. Franjieh welcomed the attention of Lebanese security services toward the Sunni extremist group Fatah-al-Islam, accused of organizing the Ain Alaq bus bombings, but insisted Syria had nothing to do with the group. Walid Jumblatt is rearming a Druse militia and has appeared on television with weapons, he alleged. Finally, Franjieh stuck to his accusations against Samir Geagea's Lebanese Forces (LF),including the allegation that former LF operative Tony Obeid returned from his exile in Australia to mastermind the assassination of Minister Pierre Gemayel. He added to his earlier claim the observation that Obeid had appeared in a television interview but that the interview location could not be determined, suggesting that Obeid may have been in Lebanon. RIGHT OF RESISTANCE -------------- ¶15. (C) It is disconcerting that groups are arming themselves, the Ambassador countered, given the uncertain climate in Lebanon and the open admissions by Hizballah that it is violating UNSCR 1701. Franjieh defended Hizballah's "right of resistance" against Israel. He claimed he had nevertheless told Hizballah's television station, al-Manar, that he was against the goal of "removing" Israel, because he could not countenance the "removal" of any population. Furthermore, it can be discussed, he said, whether Hizballah should have the right to determine war and peace for Lebanon. BEIRUT 00000465 004 OF 004 COMMENT -------------- ¶16. (C) The Ambassador and Emboffs are constantly badgered by opposition figures and even some so-called neutral observers to be "more open" to opposition points of view, to listen to what opposition poilticians have to say. It is simplistic and wrong to lump all March 8-Aoun politicians into the pro-Syrian camp, they argue. Well, lunch with Franjieh is a reminder that some opposition leaders do indeed hold views that are polar opposite to the international consensus on Lebanon. FELTMAN

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