LEBANON: MARONITE PATRIARCH ADOPTS SOME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000450

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE IS SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MARONITE PATRIARCH ADOPTS SOME
ILL-CONSIDERED POSITIONS

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b)
.

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
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1. (C) In a 3/26 meeting with the Ambassador, the Maronite
Patriarch conveyed some surprisingly unhelpful positions
regarding Lebanon's political impasse. Patriarch Sfeir,
perhaps in an effort to appear strictly neutral to Lebanon's
warring political factions, has apparently adopted some
convictions that play directly into the hands of the
pro-Syrian alliance. In a near-abdication of the patriarch's
traditional role as trusted political arbiter for Lebanon's
Christians, Sfeir says that he agrees with March 8 leaders
Nabih Berri, Michel Aoun and Hassan Nasrallah that only a
two-thirds quorum would permit parliament to select the next
president. This position would, in effect, give the
anti-government alliance a veto over any future president.
Similarly, Sfeir was almost indifferent to Speaker Berri's
arrogant refusal to allow parliament to convene (because in
Berri's opinion, the Siniora government is illegitimate).
Lastly, Sfeir placed his best hope for a political settlement
of the crisis squarely on this week's Arab Summit in Riyadh.
Whether due to extremely poor (and one-sided) advice, or
simply showing the fatigue of his 87 years, Sfeir appears to
be abandoning his previously well-regarded leadership role in
the pro-reform movement. End summary and comment.


2. (C) Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir met with the
Ambassador and Special Assistant on March 26 at his
headquarters in Bkirki, several miles north of Beirut. The
Patriarch was not accompanied by any aides. Throughout the
meeting, Sfeir generally agreed with the Ambassador's
observations that the situation was serious and required
decisive action. But when he was asked about supporting
certain pro-reform positions, the elderly cleric simply
raised his hands in apparent surrender and stated repeatedly
how "terrible" the situation had become.

AN ANXIOUS LEADER
--------------


3. (C) On a range of subjects from UNSCR 1701, to the
Special Tribunal, to the need for a legitimate presidential
election, Patriarch Sfeir appears to have adopted a
consistently hands-off approach to the challenges facing his
country. Sfeir indicated that he fully understood the
seriousness of issues such as Lebanon's problematic border
security, but offered little besides empathy and
hand-wringing. On the matter of UNSCR 1701 and its
requirement for secure borders, the Patriarch agreed that
continued arms smuggling was a critical issue that could
result in renewed hostilities if not checked. Yet he also
made clear that he would not publicly comment on the matter,
despite the visibility and relative immunity he enjoys as the
most recognizable religious leader in Lebanon.


4. (C) Likewise, his attitude toward the tribunal was
personally sympathetic, but he has remained aloof from the
issue in his public comments. He criticized possible GOL
recourse to Chapter VII action, saying that such an option
could lead to civil strife. Sfeir indicated he would, of
course, welcome a Lebanese solution for the establishment of
the tribunal, and understood that criminal acts of political
violence in Lebanon should not go unpunished. He was clearly
unnerved by the possibility that international action may
actually be necessary to establish the court. He warned that
it would "create discord" between Lebanese, and that Chapter
VII was an admission that Lebanon was a "fallen country"
unable to govern its own affairs. Borrowing a line from PM
Siniora's negotiations toward UNSCR 1701 last summer, he
spoke hazily about the possibility of a "Chapter 6 1/2," but
then voiced deep concern and uncertainty about whether even
that course was desirable. When asked by the Ambassador if
there were any way the Lebanese people could be encouraged to
establish the tribunal, the Patriarch responded, worriedly,
that Syria would simply never allow the court to be
established.

PLACES THE BLAME ON ALL
--------------


5. (C) Sfeir, when asked if he would speak out against the
unconstitutional refusal by Speaker Berri to convene the
country's parliament, apportioned the blame for the country's

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political crisis to all the factions. He said the problem
wasn't just parliament, but also "the president, the
government, and the electoral law." Indicating that his
support for the Siniora government has apparently slipped,
the Patriarch summarized, "We are in need of total change,
otherwise nothing will change."


6. (C) Sfeir then digressed into a discussion of the draft
electoral law, which proposes a mix of large (muhafaza) and
small (qada) districts. As he explained why he felt the
small districting system should be exclusively applied, his
general distrust of the draft law became clear. He completed
his analysis of the draft law, which sounded suspiciously
like it was based on hearing only one side of the issue, with
a return to his belief that all the branches of government --
the president, the cabinet, and parliament, in that order --
needed replacing if Lebanon is to move forward.


7. (C) But probably the most unexpected position was his
previously undisclosed belief that, in the event of a new
presidential election, a two-thirds quorum of the parliament
must be present to elect a new president. When it was
pointed out that such a requirement bestowed veto power to
the March 8-Aoun alliance, the Patriarch simply shrugged and
suggested that perhaps this week's Arab Summit could resolve
the thorny issue. Even the evident irony of having the heads
of foreign states set the rules to choose Lebanon's next
president failed to stir Sfeir from his dispirited view that
things had simply become "too difficult." (Note: Lebanon's
constitution specifies that the parliamentary quorum is a
simple majority. There is no special quorum specified for
presidential elections. But there is a clause that says, to
win on the first ballot, a successful presidential candidate
must have the support of two-thirds of the chamber. The
March 8-Aoun position is based on the argument that the
possibility of a first-ballot victory implies a special
two-thirds quorum is needed for presidential elections. It
is not a coincidence that the March 14 bloc has a simple
majority in the chamber but could not muster a two-thirds
quorum to make an election valid. Thus, the March 14 bloc
concludes -- rightly, we believe -- that the March 8-Aoun
strategy is to prevent a parliamentary session from being
considered valid unless they are assured that the president
to be elected is acceptable to the Syrians. End note.)

SYRIAN INFLUENCE
--------------


8. (C) Patriarch Sfeir mused that the alliance of FPM
leader Michel Aoun with Hizballah had made the situation
"more difficult" in Lebanon. He blandly remarked that
General Aoun was under the control of Syria, just as much as
the overtly pro-Syrian President Lahoud. He spoke of traits
that a pro-reform president would require: independence,
freedom from corrupt influences, the ability to win the
respect of all Lebanon's communities, and most importantly,
distance from both the March 14 and March 8-Aoun alliances.
But when asked to name individuals who could fit this bill,
he again shrugged and bemoaned the current state of "severe
polarization" and political stalemate. The Ambassador urged
Sfeir to look a the principles March 14 and March 8 stand
for: March 14 stands for an independent Lebanon, free from
Syrian intererence; March 8 wants to hand Lebanon back to
Syria. Surely, the Ambassador said, the Patriarch does not
see those two positions as being equally valid.


9. (C) Sfeir acknowledged that both Hassan Nasrallah and
Nabih Berri want a weak president. He noted that Berri has
stated that he would support any candidate the Patriarch
would put forth, knowing full well that with the current
fractures in the Christian community, that would be
impossible. And when confronted with the possibility that
anti-reform forces might even create a second government in
November to further destabilize the country, the elderly
cleric merely stated that such a development would be
"shameful." In closing, the Patriarch said he was convinced
that Syria would never permit the tribunal to be established
and that "some other way" must be found to defuse the current
crisis. He assured the Ambassador that he continues to
support the tribunal concept, but barring some surprising
grand solution at the Arab Summit, he was at a loss on how to
get to the tribunal.

COMMENT
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10. (C) Our distress over Patriarch Sfeir's drift into
inaction is shared with others. Minister of Social Affairs
Nayla Mouawad, suggesting that Sfeir is abdicating the
traditional leadership position for himself as well as his
fellow Christians, told the Ambassador a few days ago that
"the Patriarch is acting like we are Copts, forgetting that
we are Maronites!" French Ambassador Emie, stopping by to
see the Ambassador after visiting Bkirke, said that he
discovered, for the first time, "a confused and lost old
man."


11. (C) The most common analysis is that the March 8-Aoun
crowd has successfully enveloped Sfeir in an anti-March 14
bubble, by surrounding him with March 8-Aoun visitors and
utilizing the pro-Aoun and pro-Syria part of the Maronite
clergy. According to this analysis, Sfeir has started to
accept the argument that he has to choose between the
tribunal and Lebanon and that a simple majority for
presidential elections would be harmful to the Christians
(when in fact, of course, the two-thirds quorum is promoted
by March 8-Aoun forces to give Nabih Berri, Hizballah, and
Syria veto power). While he never criticized PM Siniora
explicitly, we also sensed a new anti-Siniora bias this time,
when Sfeir lumped the government and president together as
almost equivalent problems. Mohamed Chatah, Siniora's senior
advisor, told the Ambassador that he suspects Sfeir has
listened to too many tales of civil service appointments
where Maronite views were not taken into account. Asked if
there was accuracy in such tales, Chatah said that many
positions are now vacant, unfilled because of the cabinet
crisis; the Maronites are now disadvantaged more than other
groups. But the appointment of the technically well
qualified Kamal Shehadeh -- a Protestant -- as head of the
potentially powerful Telecommunications Regulatory Authority
has been exploited by March 8 and Aoun forces, Chatah said,
as Shehadeh took what would normally be the Maronite seat in
an executive body.


12. (C) The March 14 supporters recognize that, to counter
what seems to amount to a March 8-Aoun sit-in in Bkirke,
they, too, must deploy visitors to sit with the Patriarch and
explain their views. Time is of the essence: if the
Patriarch goes public with his two-thirds quorum requirement
for presidential elections or criticism of Siniora over civil
service appointments, then the March 14 arguments are greatly
weakened in the Christian community. The Patriarch's
interpretation on the constitution, for example, would be
seen as impossible to criticize. The trouble is the security
environment: March 14 cabinet ministers and MPs believe that
they are under severe threat and thus do not move as freely
as the March 8-Aoun crowd (not counting the Nabih Berri,
Hassan Nasrallah, and Michel Aoun).


13. (C) We suggest that, to the extent that we can promote
contacts with the Patriarch from the Vatican and from others,
we emphasize the principles of Lebanese sovereignty and
independence. We need to remind the Patriarch constantly the
March 14 and March 8 are not simply political movements in
Lebanon. They stand for something much greater. One
promotes Lebanese sovereignty and independence, while the
other hopes to usher back Syrian hegemony and violates UN
Security Council resolutions with impunity. That is the best
argument, we believe, for waking the Patriarch out of his
March 8-Aoun induced stupor. His current position is less
than simply unhelpful; he is on the threshold of causing real
harm.
FELTMAN