LEBANON: AOUN SKEPTICS ON HIZBALLAH, POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000427 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO:ATACHCO E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2017 TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL PTER LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: AOUN SKEPTICS ON HIZBALLAH, POLITICAL SETTLEMENT REF: BEIRUT 383 Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: 1.4 (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Some of Michel Aoun's closest friends and MPs are unsure about the soundness of his arrangement with Hizballah and his fitness for the office of President. At a 3/21 dinner, they also observed that Hizballah's influence from abroad is incontestable, and that Iran has more control over it than Syria. Iran views Hizballah's policies and actions as in the service of the global struggle of the Shia sect. Hizballah may be making up new excuses to keep its weapons, but the organization is at its weakest since its birth in the 1980's, and Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah may not have full control. Local conspiracy theories hold that instability in Lebanon serves the interests of Israel and of Druse leader Walid Jumblatt. Jumblatt's inflammatory statements the previous day convinced the Aounists and a pro-government MP alike that Jumblatt might be seeking to block a political solution. End Summary. AOUN SKEPTICS WITHIN AND WITHOUT -------------- ¶2. (C) Polchief attended a 3/21 dinner at the home of Dr. Nabil Tawil, longtime friend and confidant of both Michel Aoun and Walid Jumblatt, and personal physician to Aoun. Three MPs were at the dinner, including Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) members Walid Khoury and Farid Khazen, and Bassem Shab, Christian Mustaqbal MP and Aoun skeptic from Sidon. Also present was Colonel Chamel Roukoz, square-jawed and taciturn executive officer for the LAF's Ranger Regiment. Roukoz is Aoun's closest military advisor, a veteran of Aoun's 1990 battles against the Syrians, and rumored fiance of one of Aoun's daughters. Finally, another staunch Aoun supporter, LAU Professor Habib Malik, joined the dinner late and Tawil's son Hadi, an FPM activist, also joined the discussion. JUMBLATT AND CURRENT DIALOGUE -------------- ¶3. (C) The MPs were cautiously optimistic regarding the ongoing dialogue between Chamber of Deputies Speaker Nabih Berri and Mustaqbal Party leader Saad Hariri. They were each greatly encouraged by the friendly and cooperative spirit that reigned the previous day at the Chamber, when majority MPs staging a "sit-in" to protest Berri's refusal to convene a legislative session mingled with opposition MPs, most of whom they had not seen in months. Shab described a warm atmosphere in the Chamber lobby until that atmosphere was shattered by the arrival of Walid Jumblatt (Shab's political ally) who began to attack the Speaker for allegedly violating the constitution. All in the room expressed a fresh rancor toward Jumblatt in the wake of his frank 3/20 statements. Polchief commented that just as March 8 has Suleiman Franjieh to make confrontational statements, March 14 has Walid Jumblatt. ¶4. (C) Dr. Tawil, a school friend of Jumblatt and a friend of Aoun's for decades, had nothing kind to say about either Aoun or Jumblatt. Tawil asked Polchief what motivates the Druse leader, and Polchief answered that his feud with Syria, concern for his security, and need for money to take care of his people are certainly among Jumblatt's current preoccupations, but that following an eventual resolution of Lebanon's political crisis Jumblatt might part ways with other March 14 leaders over many national issues. Khoury said that if Jumblatt is only after financial support, the other parties can accept that and satisfy his needs. Shab agreed, noting that the Druse are government-dependent. ¶5. (C) Tawil went further, and alleged that Jumblatt seeks to create chaos to maintain and augment his and the Druse position as balancers in Lebanon's interconfessional struggles. Khazen noted that there is a rumor that Jumblatt &came away with instructions8 to destabilize Lebanon following his 2006 meeting with Dr. Henry Kissinger, and that that encouragement had been renewed by other (non-USG) BEIRUT 00000427 002 OF 004 parties in Washington with whom Jumblatt met on his February 2007 trip. (Comment: Presumably, this is part and parcel of the conspiracy theories that the USG seeks instability in Lebanon in order to somehow serve the interests of Israel. End Comment.) HIZBALLAH GOALS -------------- ¶6. (C) Polchief asked each of the MPs what Hizballah,s goals are in this crisis. If Hizballah is not merely following foreign orders, how can its actions in Lebanon be explained? There were some surprising answers. Shab claimed that Hizballah is motivated by two goals. The first, he said, is to rally Lebanon,s Shia behind the Marjayiya in Iran's spiritual center of Qom as the supreme Shia religious authority, something akin to a Shia Vatican. Hizballah is participating in this conflict, which pits Qom against Iraq's Najaf, and Ayatollah Khamenei against Iraqi Ayatollah Sistani, not solely because of Iranian influence but also out of a concern that centering the highest Shia authority in an Arab state would inevitably worsen Sunni-Shia relations, and because Sistani is believed to be dying. ¶7. (C) Shab said that Hizballah,s second goal is the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon. A heart surgeon, he shared with us stories of Hizballah-run hospitals he had seen, in which the most extreme forms of religious adherence are practiced: female staff scrub up in a separate room, he said, lest a man catch a glimpse of an exposed forearm; female nurses are forbidden to see male patients and vice versa. Watch Hizballah MPs in the Chamber of Deputies, he enjoined his MP colleagues; they wear metal or rubber watchbands out of fear that a leather band might come from an animal not slaughtered according to religious practice. ¶8. (C) Khazen had a different take. While he acknowledged that the Hizballah Charter of 1985 has never been repudiated and is still in effect by default, he noted that Hizballah leaders have made statements in the past couple of years appearing to disavow the project of a "Dowlet al-Faqih" (state of religious jurisprudence) as impractical. Rather, Hizballah seeks to increase and preserve its power for its own sake and, possibly, for future deployment in the service of Iran. Khoury believed that Hizballah is out to champion Lebanese Shia first and foremost. The betterment of their circumstances, increase of their power and retention of their loyalty are Hizballah's highest goals. Hizballah's tough line in the current political conflict is part of an effort to polarize the Shia community and force each Shia person to choose sides. HIZBALLAH DISARMAMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Polchief reminded the Aounist MPs that the General had proclaimed that his great achievement in concluding the February 2006 Memorandum of Understanding with Hizballah was to secure Hizballah's agreement to disarm upon the fulfillment of only two conditions: the return of the Shebaa Farms and the return of Lebanese prisoners held in Israel. Since then, Hizballah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and other Hizballah leaders have in their public statements appeared to place additional conditions on disarmament, including the creation of a "clean state" free of corruption and of a "strong state" capable of defending Lebanon. ¶10. (C) Last week Aoun appeared to cave in to Hizballah's new conditions, announcing that he was against any move to disarm Hizballah until Lebanon solves its political crisis and develops the ability to defend itself against Israel. Shab shook his head in disgust, recalling Aoun's announcement. Khoury and Khazen minimized the statement, and appeared unfamiliar with Aoun's "two conditions" argument (which Aoun and his son-in-law Gebran Bassil, the MOU's author, have repeated to us several times). Khazen asserted that to achieve Hizballah's disarmament, the organization must be embraced, not isolated. Hizballah is weaker now than ever before, after a long and steady decline in its capabilities since the 1980's. Losing its freedom of movement in south Lebanon has brought Hizballah to a new nadir. BEIRUT 00000427 003 OF 004 HIZBALLAH LEADERSHIP -------------- ¶11. (C) The conversation turned to the Hizballah leadership. Most believed that Nasrallah is the moderate, and that his lieutenants are the radicals. Nasrallah himself appeared to acknowledge this when he dared Israel to assassinate him, noting that Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem was "in waiting." Shab spent three hours with Nasrallah in 2004 and came away with the impression that he is perhaps not very talented and delegates too much authority. Tawil seconded this, believing that Hizballah's July attack on Israel was carried out by Hizballah's southern commander without full authorization. Shab speculated that Nasrallah found out about it by surprise, noting that Nasrallah appeared unprepared to explain the action, and confused over what had happened, in a press conference shortly thereafter. No one in the room believed that Iran or Syria had ordered the attack. CONSPIRACY THEORY -------------- ¶12. (C) Another longstanding conspiracy theory in Lebanon holds that Israel has sought to keep Hizballah strong and active to sow chaos in Lebanon and justify military incursions there. Tawil and his son Hadi advanced this theory and found some support around the table. Khazen alleged that Israel had used Hizballah in the past and had forgone opportunities to finish the group off, and that Israel's failure to mobilize reserves early in the 2006 Israeli-Hizballah War indicated a lack of interest in achieving a decisive victory. Col. Roukoz asserted that had the Israelis been serious about cutting off and wiping out Hizballah in 2006, they would have staged an invasion from the Golan Heights/Shebaa Farms area into the southern Beqaa, severing Hizballah's supply lines and splitting its forces in two. Finally, several were incredulous that Israel would have exchanged hundreds of prisoners in 2004 in exchange for the bodies of three IDF soldiers, had Israel not intended to hand Hizballah a victory. Khoury dissented, believing that Israel had done the swap in response to domestic pressure from the soldiers' families. (Khazen said the freed prisoners were treated by Hizballah and Palestinian rejectionist groups as pariahs following their release, out of fear the prisoners had somehow been wired for surveillance or recruited as spies.) Shab also differed with the conspiracy theory, asserting that Israel's failures in the 2006 war were easily explained by ordinary blunders, unpreparedness and inefficiency. IRAN AND SYRIA ENGAGEMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) Khazen and others expressed deep concern over the possibility of USG military action against Iran. Shab noted that Tehran miscalculates if it believes the United States could not attack Iran because it is too deeply mired in Iraq. Khazen said that any USG attack on Iran would result in Iranian retaliation against the Gulf states and that, in the absence of functioning Lebanese institutions, the resulting Sunni-Shia conflagration would spread quickly to Lebanon. The LAF alone could not stop a full-blown Sunni-Shia conflict. Neither Khazen nor Khoury were familiar with the recent Wiam Wahab declaration that Hizballah would not enter a U.S.-Iran conflict, a declaration for which General Aoun took credit when we dined with him March 12 (reftel). ¶14. (C) Walid Khoury asked, &is there really a zero percent chance that the USG would ever negotiate directly with Syria?8 Polchief answered that direct negotiations with Syria on the subject of Lebanon are indeed inconceivable. The academic Khazen interjected with his support, adding that Syria has nothing to offer the USG in direct negotiations. It is a weak state that can only cause trouble; Iran is the true &superpower8 in the Middle East. Polchief added that direct USG interaction with Iran is more likely, given public USG statements that we would meet face-to-face with Iran if it abandons its uranium enrichment activities. However, making deals over Lebanon is not in the cards. AOUN FOR PRESIDENT? BEIRUT 00000427 004 OF 004 -------------- ¶15. (C) Inevitably, the conversation turned to Aoun's presidential ambitions. Tawil, perhaps Aoun's closest friend in the room, rejected Aoun as unfit for the office. Shab noted Aoun has an inflammatory personality, a point on which no one disagreed and which Tawil amplified. Aoun brooks no criticism or advice, Tawil noted, and does not understand the need for reconsideration of actions and changes of course. Shab added that as a Lebanese Christian (he is Protestant) he could not accept as president a leader who had made a deal with Hizballah. When asked, neither of Aoun's MPs could say for sure that Aoun was currently a candidate for the presidency. However, interestingly, the only figure in the room who appeared to back Aoun for the presidency was Khazen, normally considered the free-thinking intellectual in Aoun's camp. Khazen declared that non-Christian leaders have no right to veto Aoun who, as the most popular Christian leader, should be the logical choice for the office. FELTMAN