UN ENVOY PEDERSEN DEFENDS 1701 REPORT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000397 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2027 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER LE SY SUBJECT: UN ENVOY PEDERSEN DEFENDS 1701 REPORT Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) On March 15, the Ambassador met with UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Geir Pedersen to review the Secretary General's report on the implementation of UNSCR 1701. The Ambassador noted changes made in the report subsequent to the widely circulated March 8 draft. Objecting to areas where the report had been watered down regarding Hizballah activities and arms smuggling, the Ambassador argued that the language in the earlier draft provided the international community a better basis to insist on an end to the arms smuggling that puts the cessation of hostilities in immediate danger. The changes in two observations, para 62 and 65, are particularly disheartening, the Ambassador said, as the edits strengthen the hands of those who will argue that smuggling does not occur. Pedersen rejected the Ambassador's criticisms and accused the Ambassador of missing the forest for focusing on the trees. The UN has never been so explicit in criticizing Hizballah activities, using in one case (para 15) Hizballah's own assertions to build a case against Hizballah. Pedersen also disputed that the Sheba' Farms statements were inappropriate. There is new information to report, he argued, and the report is clear that primary responsibility for delineating the border remains with Syria and Lebanon. End summary. OUTLINING CONCERNS OVER CHANGES FROM MARCH 8 DRAFT TO FINAL REPORT -------------- ¶2. (C) Meeting with Pedersen, the Ambassador told Pedersen that he was dismayed by what he saw as a considerable weakening of the 1701 report, between the widely circulated March 8 draft and the final report. The clear intent of the edits, the Ambassador argued, is sadly predictable -- to reduce the criticism of Hizballah and Syria. Whereas the March 8 draft reported the issue of arms smuggling across the Syrian-Lebanese border in a fairly straight forward way that the international community could have used to insist on better controls, the cumulative impact of the edits in the final report leaves question marks over the information. As examples, the Ambassador raised the following issues: -- In para 29 of the draft, the Israeli-provided intelligence about how arms shipments are carried out are reported in detail. Since Pedersen himself had told us earlier that he found the Israeli information to be convincing, we do not understand why this descriptive language -- which demonstrates alleged Syrian and Iranian culpability -- is eliminated from the final text. Without these details, the Israeli claims appear less substantive. Given that language criticizing Israeli overflights was beefed up, with more details added, in the final text (para 9),one cannot argue that the details of the Israeli allegations were dropped simply to save space. -- In para 61, the SYG noted in the draft that he is "very concerned by the reported activities of unauthorized armed elements outside of UNIFIL's area of operation." This is a reference to Hizballah's activities north of the Litani River. That statement seemed consistent with what Pedersen himself has told us privately about his own worries. By the final draft, the word "very" had been dropped, a one-word change that moderates the tone considerably. -- Para 62 also deals with the Israeli information on arms smuggling, and the edit between the March 8 draft and the final changes the entire meaning of the observation. In the draft, the paragraph ends with the following statement: "While (the Israeli information) would require independent military assessment, the information provided was persuasive." While that is powerful language, it is fully consistent with what Pedersen told us about the impact of the Israeli intelligence briefing on the UN officials who received it. In the final report, the sentence reads as follows: "While the information was substantial, its authentication would require independent military assessment." In other words, rather than state his view about the quality of the Israeli intelligence -- which we know the UN officials found persuasive -- the SYG now defers comment, pending an independent assessment. This guts the observation of strength. -- Para 65, on Syria's claims to improve border security, BEIRUT 00000397 002 OF 003 poses a similar problem in the final text. The SYG urges all Member States to help with UNSCR 1701 implementation, mentioning Syria and Iran specifically. In the March 8 draft, that paragraph ended with the sentence "I look forward to the Syrian Arab Republic providing the necessary information updating the Security Council on the measures that it has taken to date as regards its border with Lebanon." This suggests that the SYG has some reservations about whether the Syrian assertions about what the SARG has done on the border are accurate. That sentence has been dropped in the final report, leaving the reader with the impression that the SYG accepts what Syria says about its border regime as credible and sufficient. The March 8 text was better, in that it implied clearly that the SYG is looking for Syria to do more. ¶3. Throughout the entire report, the Ambassador concluded, there are smaller changes -- wordsmithing, descriptive language dropped, clauses removed -- that, overall, reduce the criticisms of Hizballah and underplay the problems along the Syrian-Lebanese border. Also, the Ambassador noted, the UN missed an opportunity to put to rest one pernicious claim by the Lebanese that Israel had laid new landmines during the summer war. The cluster munitions problem is real and described in detail in the report, the Ambassador said. Yet para 39, besides renewing the request to the GOI to provide information on the cluster munitions locations, also made reference to Israel's provisions of landmine maps. At that point, the UN could easily have put to rest the Lebanese claims that Israel placed new landmines, information that Pedersen has confirmed before. It should be the UN's goal to eliminate as many false claims as possible, and the "new landmine" claim should have been eliminated once and for all in this report. PEDERSEN CLAIMS "BALANCE" IN EDITS -------------- ¶4. (C) Pedersen, who bristled throughout the briefing, asked first for clarification of the point on para 65, asking to read the final and the draft. He seemed genuinely surprised by the omission of the language calling on Syria to update the UNSC on its border controls. But for the rest, he insisted that there was considerable debate among UN staff and that the final product did not include edits only as one-sided as the Ambassador suggested. Pedersen gave two specific cases to bolster his argument that the edits were balanced. First, he urged, look at how the language contrasting Israeli treatment of Lebanese detainees and Hizballah's secrecy regarding the abducted IDF soldiers is handled. In para 42 of the final, additional language is inserted that shows Israel's attitudes in a positive light. Second, para 13 in the final included language on newly laid boobytraps in the south. While the reference does not link the boobytraps to Hizballah ("for we really don't know"),it is clear evidence of some kind of illicit activity happening south of the Litani. It is an extremely understated reference, the Ambassador retorted, whereas it should have been given more prominence. REPORT MORE CRITICAL OF HIZBALLAH THAN ANY PREVIOUS UN PRODUCT -------------- ¶5. (C) Pedersen accused the Ambassador of missing the point, of focusing on the details at the expense of the overall balance and impact of the report. It is simply unfair to use the March 8 uncleared draft as the basis for judging the final report, as the Ambassador should never have received a copy of the draft. (Pedersen could not explain why the draft was so widely available.) Had the Ambassador not seen the March 8 report, he would have warmly welcomed the final, Pedersen argued. After all, the UN has never been on record with such criticism of Hizballah activities. Pedersen noted in particular para 15, where the SYG uses Nasrallah's own language about Hizballah rebuilding its capacity to criticize the organization: "These statements are an open admission of activities that constitute a direct violation of relevant provisions of resolution 1701 (2006), which were accepted by Hizballah last year." There is much in the report that can be cited by the UNSC and others in trying to get the Lebanese and Syrians to build an effective border regime and to ask help in doing so, he argued. SHEBA LANGUAGE APPROPRIATE -------------- BEIRUT 00000397 003 OF 003 ¶6. (C) On Sheba' Farms, Pedersen rejected the assertion that the language in the report suggests that the cartographer has exceeded his 1701 mandate. Reading from the report, Pedersen noted that the first substantive line on Sheba' repeats international policy and precedent on borders: "A permanent solution of this issue remains contingent upon the delineation of the border between the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon. . ." Everything else on Sheba' Farms falls under that basic principle. Pedersen described it as "unfair" to criticize a report for including references to new information, both regarding maps and Syrian assertions. There has been progress made on the Sheba' Farms issue, Pedersen said, and he can only conclude from the Ambassador's statements that "the U.S. doesn't want this issue solved," an assertion the Ambassador rejected. The Ambassador asked Pedersen if he really thought the international community would support the precedent implied in para 48 that a country can simply, and unilaterally, claim that its 1920 boundary was drawn incorrectly, and how unfortunate it is that this "mistake" has been perpetuated in numerous treaties and resolutions throughout the decades. ¶7. (C) Pedersen closed the meeting on a note of bitterness. The Ambassador truly missed the value of the 1701 report, Pedersen claimed. He should be welcoming its unprecedented language on Hizballah, not criticizing it. But maybe U.S. criticism, if the USG shares the Ambassador's disappointment, isn't such a bad thing: it will enhance the credibility of the report in others' eyes. The Ambassador acknowledged that there is much to welcome in the report, particularly in comparison to the worthless, initial 1701 report 30 days after the resolution passed. But there are important opportunities missed needlessly in the final report. The Ambassador urged that, in the oral briefing to the UNSC, some of the impressions from the March 8 be conveyed, particularly that the information about arms smuggling persuaded the UN officials who received the Israeli briefing. FELTMAN