LEBANON: SAMIR GEAGEA HOLDS SCANT HOPE FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000384 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE IS SY SUBJECT: LEBANON: SAMIR GEAGEA HOLDS SCANT HOPE FOR BERRI-HARIRI TALKS; URGES CHAPTER VII ASAP Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b ). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a 3/12 meeting, Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea supported the current Berri-Hariri talks aimed at solving Lebanon's political crisis as a "useful" endeavor, but was also certain they would ultimately fail. No matter how reasonable or constructive Berri appears, he cannot compromise Syria's primary objective: the elimination or emasculation of the Special Tribunal. In Geagea's view, this Syrian implacability dooms the initiative. He asked the U.S. to move forward with Chapter VII preparations and promised that the Siniora government would do its part to generate international support. Despite his unequivocal support for Chapter VII, Geagea fully expected that Syria-initiated violence would result and would be directed straight at the country's Christian community -- principally to avoid blame for exacerbating Shia-Sunni tensions. The former militia leader urged the international community to be prepared for a response to the expected Syrian violence, going so far as to recommend a Kosovo-type military response of targeted bombing. Finally, expressing a sentiment that is now a preoccupation of Lebanon's political and pundit class, Geagea directly inquired whether last week's Baghdad conference foreshadowed a change in U.S. policy toward Lebanon. End summary. ¶2. (C) March 14th and Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea met the Ambassador and Special Assistant on March 12 at his temporary headquarters in the mountain village of Bzoummar, a Lebanese Forces (LF) stronghold located 15 kms northeast of Beirut. Senior LF advisors Joseph Nehme and Elie Khoury also attended the meeting. Geagea indicated that he has been in close contact with fellow March 14th leader Saad Hariri. He rebutted rumors that Hariri is being unduly influenced by Saudi leadership, and as a result, may accept a political deal that was inimicable to the pro-democratic movement. Geagea insisted that Hariri knows of the pitfalls in the 19-11 cabinet formulation, and the persistent March 8th demand for undefined changes in the tribunal. GEAGEA IS CERTAIN SYRIA WILL NEVER BUDGE -------------- ¶3. (C) As for Saad Hariri's counter-proposal to Nabih Berri last week, aimed at breaking the four-month political stalemate, Samir Geagea remarked that it was a well-conceived document. In normal circumstances, this document would likely result in progress. He particularly commended Hariri's attempt to put Hizballah's arms back on the agenda, as well as his emphasis on the negative impact of President Emile Lahoud on Lebanon's political system. Geagea spoke positively of Berri's willingness to discuss issues in a constructive manner, and refrain from irresponsible criticism in the press. But for Geagea, nothing will change or be resolved as long as Damascus is calling the shots, which he firmly believes to be the case, despite Iran's obvious leverage with the Syrian regime. ¶4. (C) The Lebanese Forces leader stated that, unfortunately, the entire Berri-Hariri negotiation is "simply a Syrian maneuver," designed to buy time and disarm opponents. In typical fashion, the Syrians are playing at several levels, all of which are designed to turn back the clock and pave the way for a re-assertion of Syrian dominance over Lebanon. Among the reasons the Syrians have allowed Berri to proceed are: a disingenuous attempt to convince the Saudis that Syria is serious about a resolution; an attempt to trap the pro-reform March 14 alliance in a bad deal by using public pressure as a prod; a maneuver to see if a wedge can be driven between March 14 factions; a semi-honest attempt to lower Shia-Sunni tensions, and lastly and perhaps most interestingly, an attempt "to snatch away" Saad Hariri from the pro-reform movement, using the tribunal as difficult-to-resist bait. ¶5. (C) Therefore, continued Geagea, even though the Syrians appear to allow Speaker Berri to pursue a possible solution, in reality, the entire exercise is futile. If the Syrian regime, which is well aware of what would be uncovered in a genuine trial, allowed a resolution to the crisis that resulted in a Special Tribunal, its dream of once again controlling Lebanon would be finished. But even worse, the BEIRUT 00000384 002 OF 003 very survival of the minority regime would be placed in grave jeopardy. Given the stakes, Bashar al-Asad will never permit Berri to do more than he has already. "There is no way out of this mess," he concluded, and cautioned that Siniora and the international community that supports democracy in Lebanon have to be ready for imminent violence and a focused Syrian campaign to destabilize and destroy Lebanon. URGES THAT CHAPTER VII BE PREPARED NOW -------------- ¶6. (C) Since Geagea believes that barring a collapse of the March 14th position, the initiative will die sooner rather than later, he emphatically urged the U.S. to lay the groundwork for Chapter VII action as soon as possible. He is confident that Siniora's government, once confronted with the reality of the failed talks (and no other recourse available as Berri continues to bar the doors of parliament),will petition the UN Security Council to save the tribunal. Geagea acknowledged it is important that Siniora exhaust all legal remedies before seeking Chapter VII, but insisted that if the international community is genuine in its support of the tribunal, decisive action must be taken within weeks. ¶7. (C) The former militia leader also conceded that the pro-reform forces have serious responsibilities if this course is pursued, foremost being a concerted diplomatic effort to rally support among UNSC members for the measure. Geagea indicated that this effort would commence immediately after March 20, the date on which Speaker Berri was supposed to convene parliament. By that date, he fatalistically concluded, the Berri-Hariri initiative would have the same status as last year's National Dialogue -- a well-intentioned, but (due to Syrian intransigence) ultimately impossible-to-succeed effort. "SYRIA WILL STRIKE HARD AND FAST" -------------- ¶8. (C) Assuming a Chapter VII resolution is adopted, Geagea said he expects Syria will react swiftly and violently....and almost exclusively against Christian targets in Lebanon. In his analysis, the Syrian regime, which is still seeking to return to the good graces of Saudi Arabia, will studiously avoid attacking Sunni targets, even though al-Asad despises Siniora, Hariri, and the Sunni-dominated Future Movement, because it does not want to incur the wrath of the Sunni Arab world. Geagea predicted the resulting political violence would considerably exceed the levels seen thus far. ¶9. (C) In the event this scenario unfolds, Geagea challenged the international community, which professes unalloyed support for a democratic Lebanon, to develop an effective response to possibly imminent Syrian aggression. He argued that diplomatic niceties will not dissuade an angry Syria that is poised to lash out at an isolated community it perceives as one its primary tormentors. ¶10. (C) Although he conceded his recommendation was severe, Geagea earnestly asked the West to consider a focused military response against select Syrian military targets, along the lines of NATO's action in Kosovo that forced an aggressive Serbia to retreat. He realizes such advice will give pause, as it should, but he emphasized that unless the international community discussed such portentous contingencies now, it would be woefully unprepared if Syrian aggression resulted in a rapid unraveling of Lebanon's security situation. Unless such important decisions were made now, he warned that the West would reap the whirlwind and Syria will succeed. INQUIRY REGARDING THE BAGHDAD CONFERENCE -------------- ¶11. (C) Echoing a concern expressed by numerous members of the pro-democracy movement, up to and including the prime minister, Geagea asked whether the March 10 conference in Baghdad signaled a change in U.S. policy toward Lebanon. When informed that the meeting was focused exclusively on Iraq, Samir Geagea indicated wary acceptance. He aid he was quite sure the U.S. was fully aware of the true nature of the Syrian regime, but reiterated an earlier warning that Syria always demanded payment for any "assistance" it rendered in other spheres. It was clear that Geagea viewed Syria not only as a lethal threat to democratic Lebanon, but as a serious negative force for the region as well. BEIRUT 00000384 003 OF 003 FELTMAN