LEBANON: BERRI DESCRIBES NEW PLAN TO RESOLVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000349

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE IS SY SA
SUBJECT: LEBANON: BERRI DESCRIBES NEW PLAN TO RESOLVE
CRISIS; SINIORA DISSECTS IT


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. reason: Section 1.4 (b)
.

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Nabih Berri described a "new" plan as the last
opportunity for Lebanon to avoid serious civil disobedience.
He said that all sides (except possibly Michel Aoun) would
emerge with their non-negotiable objectives intact. Under
the Berri plan, the pro-government March 14 and opposition
March 8 alliances would each appoint two representatives to a
committee that would attempt to reach consensus on only two
issues (in sequence): the Special Tribunal, and a new cabinet
based on the straight 19-11 formula. Berri stated that the
opposition's previous demand for early parliamentary
elections has been dropped. If agreement can be reached on
the tribunal and a new cabinet, Berri insists he can
guarantee that opposition cabinet members will not be allowed
to bring down the government or prevent cabinet quorum by
absences. The Ambassador, following his 3/6 meeting with
Berri, discussed the Berri plan with PM Siniora and his
senior advisors. Siniora essentially sees a trap: both
Syria and Hizballah understand that only a fool would accept
11 opposition members in the cabinet, because such a
government, even if it were allowed to keep meeting, would be
permanently deadlocked on any issue of importance. Siniora
understands the risks of rejecting Berri's proposal (he,
March 14, and the U.S. will be accused of blocking progress).
Siniora, therefore, will attempt to exploit Berri's offer in
whatever way he can, without giving in to the 19-11 cabinet.
End summary.


2. (C) The Ambassador met with Speaker Nabih Berri on March
6 at the speaker's offices in Ain el Tine in West Beirut.
Close Berri advisor Ali Hamdan attended the meeting, as did
the Embassy's Special Assistant. Berri had just returned
from a visit to Europe and remarked that as his plane was
arriving last Thursday evening (3/1),SAUDI Arabia's
ambassador to Lebanon Abdulaziz Khoja was about to depart for
Riyadh in response to a summons from King Abdullah. Berri
said he and Khoja were able to exchange views on recent
developments. Berri put a positive spin on the tone of his
meeting with Khoja, and throughout his discussion with the
Ambassador, tried to give the impression that the March 8
opposition genuinely wanted an end to the political impasse
and that Khoja was on board with his ideas. Immediately
following this meeting, the Ambassador and Special Assistant
met with Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and his senior advisors
Mohamed Chatah and Rola Nouraddine in the still-heavily
fortified Grand Serail. Siniora was skeptical, verging on
hostile, to Berri's presentation.

BERRI'S PLAN AND OPTIMISTIC ANALYSIS
--------------


3. (C) Berri explained that no one wanted to wait for the
Arab Summit scheduled for the end of March. He argued that
all the pieces were now in place for a streamlined,
expeditious resolution of Lebanon's stalemate. His most
notable news was that the March 8 opposition forces would be
dropping their demand for early parliamentary elections.
(Berri neglected to mention anything about presidential
elections, constitutionally scheduled for November but under
increasing political threat of somehow being postponed.) In
Berri's scheme, only the Special Tribunal and a new cabinet
would be discussed. The speaker envisions a two-step,
sequenced negotiation that would complete its work in days,
rather than in the weeks that were spent in last year's
ill-fated National Dialogue. He explained that each side
would select two representatives who would conduct their
deliberations in private; first resolving the opposition's
(still unspecified) objections to the UN-GOL tribunal
agreement, and then discussing and agreeing on an equitable
distribution of the seats in the Council of Ministers, using
the much-discussed 19-11 formula.


4. (C) In Berri's rendering, once the four-person committee
(which will be advised on legal issues by specialists,
including well-regarded MOJ jurists Ralph Riachi and Choukri
Sadr who negotiated the tribunal documents with UN/OLA)
reaches consensus on the tribunal and then the new,
30-minister cabinet, the respective agreements will sent to a
larger Dialogue Committee comprising the 14 principal
parliamentary leaders for a simple up/down vote. Berri
assumes that because the agreements will be negotiated by

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trusted representatives of the respective camps, the approval
by the larger Dialogue Committee will be a given. Both deals
will be signed at the same time and once approved by the
cabinet will be sent to President Emile Lahoud for his
signature, which according to Berri is also an (unexplained)
certainty. The decree authorizing the Special Tribunal will
then go to parliament where Berri promises it will be put to
an expedited (no assignment to committee) direct vote by the
delegates, with the final document being immediately
dispatched to the UN Security Council. From start to finish,
Berri confidently predicted would take no more than ten days.

TWO GUARANTEES
--------------


5. (C) According to Berri, the key to this process
succeeding is the provision of two guarantees to the March 14
alliance. First, opposition members of the cabinet will not
be permitted to use their blocking majority to dissolve the
government, either by resignation or by boycotting (to deny
quorum). Second, the agreed-upon tribunal text would be sent
to the UNSC immediately upon formation of the new government
(after approval of the new cabinet). With regard to the
make-up of the new cabinet, Speaker Berri stated
unequivocally that if March 14 desired, PM Siniora would
remain in his position. The speaker also declared that the
opposition had no objection to any particular current
minister, but that each side would have to make appointments
within the confines of their respective allocation of seats
(i.e., 19-11).


6. (C) Berri claimed that these guarantees should answer
the long-held concerns of March 14 that giving a blocking
minority to the opposition was tantamount to political
suicide. He said these assurances would be made public upon
the establishment of the new government and would implicitly
form a new political contract, which if broken, would render
the government illegitimate.


7. (C) A final point, which would not be part of the core
solution, was that Berri said a commitment should also be
made that once parliament convenes, the cabinet should send
the delegates a draft electoral law that they would debate
and approve as soon as possible. Berri did not indicate
whether passage of such a law would require immediate new
parliamentary elections. (Note: This commitment may reflect
a concession by the opposition to Michel Aoun, who has long
argued that the present parliament does not accurately
represent either the Christian community at large or that of
Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement in particular. There really
isn't much else in this proposal that favors Aoun, beyond
some of the 11 ministerial seats allocated to the opposition
going to Aoun -- something long promised by March 8 and March
14 alike, and hardly something at this point that will excite
the General's followers. End note.)


8. (C) In Berri's fairly impassioned presentation, all the
stars are now aligned for this plan to succeed. He argued
long and hard that Lebanon's citizenry is exhausted from the
political tension that is now approaching two years. Berri
maintained (without a trace of irony) that political unrest,
economic dislocations, and a pervasive sense of uncertainty
make any foray into "civil disobedience" -- which is now
threatened by several opposition leaders -- an extremely
dangerous course for the country. He said the greatest
obstacle to reaching an agreement was the near total absence
of trust between the opposing factions, but he insisted that
those concerns should be met by his proposal. Berri
intimated that he was putting himself at some risk by even
proposing this plan, but claimed that there was now almost no
alternative.


9. (C) Berri earnestly asked for U.S. assistance in
persuading March 14 to consider his proposal seriously, and
said he remained open to modifications if that would move the
endeavor forward. But he did caution that time was short and
that recent momentum from several sources may dissipate
unless the opportunity is seized. We responded that, for the
United States, the heart of the matter was the judicial
integrity of the special tribunal: we wanted a credible
tribunal established, and we looked at everything in that
context.

PM SINIORA VERY SKEPTICAL
--------------


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10. Immediately following this lengthy conversation, the
Ambassador met with Prime Minister Siniora to discuss Berri's
plan. Siniora seemed aware of most of its elements. After
carefully listening to the Ambassador's description, Siniora
paused for several moments before responding. Although the
prime minister admitted Berri had made some interesting
points, he stated flatly that accepting the 19-11 formula was
essentially giving the government and the future of Lebanon
to the opposition -- and that he simply could not agree to
that. He explained that even though 19-11 was exceedingly
close to his own 19-10-1 proposal, acceding to Berri (and
Syria) at this point would set a dangerous precedent that
would almost inevitably destroy Lebanon's struggling
democracy. The government would have "two heads" -- the PM,
as head of the 19, and a shadow PM, as head of the 11. With
regard to Berri's purported "guarantees," Siniora asked how
could he turn over his government and expect a core member of
the opposition to protect a new, seriously weakened reform
government from constant harassment and deadlock.


11. (C) Ambassador Chatah interjected that the negative
"psychological impact" of giving in to intimidation (Berri
himself admitted that the opposition had no intention of
ending its threatening street presence in downtown Beirut
until it was sitting in the cabinet) would be considerable.
Even if the hard-to-believe Berri guarantees turned out to be
genuine, the "perception" of surrendering the Siniora
government to the street would seriously undermine the
vulnerable reform process. The second major flaw in the
concept was its failure to address the pro-Syrian presidency
of Emile Lahoud. Chatah admitted that no one foresaw the
difficulties that Lahoud would cause, from necessary
appointments, to diplomatic embarrassments, to simple
governance issues. Chatah maintained that if Lahoud were
replaced with even a neutral figure, democracy would have a
far better chance for success in Lebanon.


12. (C) Chatah offered two examples of the sorts of
proposals that he thought would make for a more credible
package that also had something for the March 14 side.
First, he said, it should be clear that the reservations on
the tribunal did not include the deal-breaker often cited by
March 8 politicians, that there be no tribunal until the
investigation is complete. Why can't the March 8 politicians
share all of their concerns on the tribunal now,
independently of the rest of the package going forward?
Second, Berri should give assurances that he accepts the
common constitutional interpretation that the presidential
elections in autumn only need the normal one-half-plus-one
quorum. That would signal that Berri accepts presidential
elections on time, even without a consensus candidate
emerging. Instead, Berri has hinted that he thinks
presidential elections require a super-quorum of two-thirds,
giving the opposition the opportunity to boycott any
parliamentary session if the likely successful candidate is
unacceptable to Syria.


13. (C) Finally, Siniora asked where exactly would Berri's
proposal lead the country? The type of national unity
government that would likely result from this plan would be
unwieldy and prone to deadlock. At this critical stage,
Siniora argued that it would be far better for the pro-reform
forces to stick to their core beliefs and resist this
superficially attractive opportunity to end the crisis.
Siniora concluded that it would offer a short-term solution,
but would almost assuredly produce serious long-term crisis.


14. (C) PM Siniora agreed with the Ambassador that the
opposition appeared to be writing a script that was a
well-constructed "set-up" that skillfully exploited the very
real fatigue of the Lebanese people. Siniora said they were
already working on a response that would try to take
advantage of the opposition's newly-discovered scruples, but
at the same time preserve the tenuous, but critically
important, hold on democratic power by pro-reform forces.

COMMENT
--------------


15. (C) Neither Berri nor Siniora talked much about the
context in which the Berri proposal has been most discussed
in the past 48 hours: SAUDI Arabian Ambassador Abdulaziz
Khoja explored with several Lebanese politicians the idea of
convening the Lebanese National Dialogue in SAUDI ARABIA to
discuss the tribunal and the cabinet expansion proposals.
Berri clearly hoped that SAUDI ARABIA would have, as a

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condition of the invitation, acceptance of the principle of
the 19-11 cabinet split, which would corner the March 14
politicians: when Lebanese average citizens are so desperate
for a solution to this political crisis, do the March 14
politicians risk appearing rigid and unreasonable by
rejecting an invitation to sit and talk? While we do not
know what SAUDI Arabia's views are of Berri's ideas -- the
Ambassador was scheduled to see Khoja today, but the meeting
was canceled when Khoja was summoned back to the kingdom for
consultations -- Berri has certainly been hinting that his
ideas would provide the framework for the talks in SAUDI
Arabia. This in itself sets up an unhelpful dynamic for
March 14 leaders: would they dare defy their SAUDI hosts,
who presumably would love some kind of Lebanese "Mecca" deal
prior to the Arab summit, by saying no? What really seemed
to annoy Siniora was that the Saudis did not seem to be
demanding a price for admission from the March 8 side --
something along the lines of coming clean now with the
tribunal reservations or removing the tents and sit-in from
central Beirut immediately.


16. (C) In terms of the actual proposal, Berri did a
better-than-usual job of pitching it in terms of March 14
sensibilities. In essence, March 14 has already conceded the
idea of a cabinet split along the lines of 19-10-1 (which
makes it impossible for March 14 alone to push through
government decrees, which require two-thirds for major
decisions or to overturn presidential vetoes). Moreover,
most March 14 leaders have even accepted the idea that the
cabinet can be publicly presented as a 19-11 split, with
quiet guarantees under the table about one of those 11
opposition ministers actually playing a neutral role. So,
even under March 14 ideas, March 8 will be able to claim
publicly that it got its demands met for the cabinet
allocations. What Berri has proposed is to drop the
under-the-table guarantees and trade them for a straight
19-11 split that has public guarantees that would (in theory)
preclude cabinet resignations and boycotts. While he didn't
say this explicitly, the implication of his proposal is that
public guarantees signed by the 14 key participants in the
National Dialogue would ultimately be more valuable than any
private assurances he would offer about how one so-called
neutral minister would operate in what would be publicly
presented as a 19-11 cabinet. Of course, the devil is in the
details, and Berri is a wily fox who will use details to his
advantage.


17. (C) In the meantime, Saad Hariri, working with some of
his advisors and consulting with PM Siniora and Walid
Jumblatt (and perhaps others),has developed a six-page
commentary on the Berri proposals, which we understand Saad
presented to the Saudis early this morning -- and which
presumably prompted the call for Khoja's return for
consultations. We have just received a copy of this
document, which echoes and elaborates on Siniora's
reservations. But it goes further: it makes some proposals
of its own. One we find particularly intriguing is Saad's
proposal to the Saudis that Hizballah commit itself to taking
no unilateral military or security initiatives without
cabinet approval. We will translate and forward this
document septel. In the meantime, we believe that it will
start to dawn on Berri that his great scheme of having the
Saudis accept his ideas as the basis for talks, in which
Berri could corner March 14 politicians into acceptance of
his approach, isn't working. And we are bracing ourselves
for being set up as among those spoiling the deal. We
predict that Walid Jumblatt's consultations in Washington are
about to take on new significance in March 8 circles, as the
pro-Syrians look to assign blame.
FELTMAN