LEBANON: MINISTER HAMADEH DISCUSSES HIS UN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000348

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE IS SY SA
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MINISTER HAMADEH DISCUSSES HIS UN
MEETINGS, FRETS ABOUT SAUDI DIPLOMACY


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b)
.

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a 3/5 meeting with the Ambassador, March 14
leaders Marwan Hamadeh and Ghattas Khoury described their
recent meeting with UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon in New York during
which they argued that Chapter VII action may be the only
realistic way to establish the Special Tribunal. They
promised the SYG that they would exhaust all other
constitutional remedies before resorting to Chapter VII, but
urged the SYG, as well as the French ambassador to the UN, to
prepare for a GOL request in the very near future. They said
the issue of arms smuggling across the Syrian-Lebanese border
came up a number of times during their meeting and indicated
that (unlike themselves) Ban Ki-Moon seemed unconvinced of
the severity of the problem in the absence of compelling
evidence. Concerning the recent swirl of public statements
by opposition leaders hinting at a possible imminent solution
to Lebanon's political impasse, Khoury warned it could all be
a set-up, designed to trap Saad Hariri into accepting a bad
deal or, barring acceptance, portraying the pro-reform
movement as obstructionist. End summary.


2. (U) Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh and
Hariri loyalist MP Ghattas Khoury met the Ambassador and
Special Assistant at the Hamadeh residence in Beirut on March

5. Hamade and Khoury discussed their recent visit to the
U.S., during which they and Druse leader Walid Jumblatt met
with new UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon and his close
advisors in New York, following their meetings with Executive
and Congressional leaders in Washington. Minister Hamadeh
expressed deep appreciation for the generous reception they
received in our capital and were particularly grateful for
the opportunity to discuss Lebanon's situation at length with
the President.


3. (C) Minister Hamadeh believes the time is fast
approaching when Chapter VII action may be required if the
Special Tribunal is to have any chance of seeing the light of
day. He indicated this was the primary message they carried
into their meetings with SYG Ban Ki-Moon, his close advisors,
and representatives from the UN Office of Legal Affairs,
including Nicolas Michel. Hamadeh said he believed the SYG
was well-briefed on the situation in Lebanon, but was still
trying to understand all its dimensions before committing
himself to a specific action. According to Hamadeh,Ban
Ki-Moon wanted to see all of Lebanon's constitutional efforts
exhausted first, before the international community
considered other approaches such as Chapter VII.


4. (C) An interesting side note is that Hamadeh had the
impression from this meeting that Un Secretariat OLA chief
Nicolas Michel is now sympathetic to the use of Chapter VII
and did not want to see the present UN-GOL tribunal documents
modified in any significant way. (Michel: "...it's a good
product....it doesn't politicize the process....and it fits
the situation...") Hamadeh also said that UNIIIC chief Serge
Brammertz has apparently informed his UN superiors that his
commission will not hand over any names or evidence to any
organization except a fully functioning Special Tribunal.
Brammertz reported that witnesses have said that they will
only offer testimony to an international tribunal, as they do
not trust the Lebanese judicial system. According to
Hamadeh, this development has put the UN Security Council in
a difficult position: in the event of continued obstruction
by Syria and others, either it forcibly establishes the
tribunal, or suffer an ignominious diplomatic defeat as the
tribunal fails to materialize because of the Syrian
obstruction.


LEBANON'S CHAPTER VII STRATEGY
--------------


5. (C) Partly to meet the SYG's concerns, but also because
the pro-reform March 14 leadership wants to be seen fully
supporting the constitutional process, Hamadeh said the
following steps would be taken before a final appeal is made
to the UN Security Council. First, PM Siniora would send the
official text of the UN-GOL tribunal documents to Speaker
Nabih Berri in advance of the scheduled March 20 opening of
parliament. This was designed to preclude the
ever-calculating Berri from resorting to a hollow procedural

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device to avoid dealing with the issue: Berri could not
claim that he never receivedi the text. Next, on or about
March 28 (to coincide with the Arab Summit in Riyadh),the
pro-reform majority in parliament (currently 70 members)
would petition the Speaker for a parliamentary session with
the intent to have a simple up/down vote on the tribunal
documents. Additionally, the pro-reform March 14 movement
would give the Arab Summit an opportunity to resolve
Lebanon's political impasse in an acceptable manner.


6. (C) If, however, the situation remains unchanged (no
mutually acceptable resolution),the Siniora government would
send an official request to the SYG outlining what the
Lebanese had done and requesting that the UN establish the
already-sanctioned Special Tribunal by Chapter VII authority.
At the same time, the GOL would launch an intensive
diplomatic effort, especially with the current non-permanent
members of the Security Council, to explain the
non-sustainable situation in Lebanon and ask for the support
of those countries in a council vote. Their principal
argument would be that without the Special Tribunal, Lebanon
will likely drift toward civil war. Whereas the Syrians
claim that the Special Tribunal will lead to civil war in
Lebanon, the March 14/GOL argument will take the opposite
approach, that the lack of a Special Tribunal is what risks
provoking a civil war. Hamadeh, for one, is cautiously
optimistic that this diplomatic effort would be successful.


7. (C) Regarding the permanent members of the Security
Council, Hamadeh referred to Walid Jumblatt's meeting on 3/2
with the French ambassador to the UN, which was held
immediately following his delegation's meeting with the SYG.
Hamadeh reported that the French remain unconvinced a Chapter
VII effort would succeed. And they gave a dire warning to
the Lebanese: if a Chapter VII resolution is introduced and
it goes down in flames, it would be extremely difficult for
the pro-reform government to survive.

FEAR OF AN UNSATISFACTORY SAUDI COMPROMISE
--------------


8. (C) Looking at the larger political picture, both
Hamadeh and Khoury cautioned the Ambassador that there were
several indications the Saudi regime may be listening to the
siren's call of the 19-11 formula in order to achieve the
establishment of the tribunal. They also fear that Saad
Hariri, who has been summoned a number of times in the past
few weeks to Riyadh to patiently wait for the results of
Saudi-Iranian diplomacy, may not have the strength to
withstand Saudi pressure to conform -- even if the final deal
is clearly an unsatisfactory one.


9. (C) Khoury believes the just-completed visit of President
Ahmadinejad to Riyadh and the opaqueness of the now six-week
old negotiations between Iran and Saudi Arabia are clearly
worrisome. Similarly, both Nabih Berri and the leadership of
Hizballah have raised popular Lebanese expectations over the
past few days that a solution to the crisis may be just
around the corner. Khoury argued these actions increase the
pressure on March 14 to accept an agreement, even if it means
all the concessions come from them. Even Hamadeh, who
usually takes the long view and is less prone to nervousness,
is concerned that King Abdullah may agree to a poor deal in
order to preserve Sunni-Shia amity at the expense of a
democratic Lebanon.


10. (C) Both Hamadeh and Khoury asked if the U.S. could use
its good offices with Saudi Arabia to warn them of the
possible trap being laid by Iran and Syria. They promised on
their end to buttress Saad Hariri and to the greatest degree
possible, stay close by him to offer advice as the pressure
increases, which they expect will occur as the important Arab
Summit approaches. The Ambassador did warn them, however,
that the pro-reform movement has to do more than just block
bad initiatives. Sooner rather than later, March 14 has to
take the lead and clearly explain what is at stake to an
increasingly anxious (and tired) Lebanese people.

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) A few hours after our meeting with Hamadeh and
Khoury, their paranoia about a Saudi deal with the pro-Syrian
March 8 movement at the expense of the March 14/GOL soared to
even higher peaks: Hamadeh was summoned to Saudi Arabian
Ambassador Abdulaziz Khoja's house, where Khoja, explaining

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that he was meeting with a number of Lebanese political
leaders, floated the idea of convening Lebanon's national
dialogue in Saudi Arabia to forge an understanding on the
special tribunal and an expanded cabinet. Hamadeh told us by
phone that he was convinced that Khoja, if not his
government, had been so entranced by the idea of having a
Lebanese "Mecca" deal in advance of the Arab summit that he
simply accepted Nabih Berri's 19-11 cabinet proposal without
question, putting the March 14 movement in the spoiler role.
Khoja, according to Hamadeh, used Nabih Berri's points to
explain the Saudi invitation, almost to suggest that
acceptance of Berri's ideas was the price of admission.


12. (C) Fearful of what Khoja might be up to, Hamadeh and
other March 14 leaders were thus sparked to action, providing
Saad Hariri (still in Saudi Arabia) with arguments to use
with the Saudis overnight against Berri's approach. By this
morning (3/6),Khoja had been called back to Saudi Arabia for
further consultations, and the March 14/GOL fear of Saudi
acceptance of the March 8 arguments seems to have receded.
(We expect that the Saudis were never as fully naive about
Berri's ideas as Hamadeh and Ghattas feared.) We expect
that, as it becomes clear that the "deal" hinted at by Berri
and Hizballah over the past few days is not in fact coming
together, the pro-Syrians will point their fingers at the
United States for "blocking" what will be called by the
pro-Syrians as a reasonable way forward. We saw both
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and PM Fouad Siniora today,
and we will report septel their differing approaches to how
to address the current political crisis. End comment.
FELTMAN