Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BEIRUT320
2007-03-01 17:12:00
SECRET
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: UN MISSION TO LEBANON AND ISRAEL ON

Tags:  PREL PTER MARR LE SY SI 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2175
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #0320/01 0601712
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 011712Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7564
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000320 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER MARR LE SY SI
SUBJECT: LEBANON: UN MISSION TO LEBANON AND ISRAEL ON
UNSCR 1701 IMPLEMENTATION


Classified By: DCM Christopher W. Murray. Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) an
d(d).

SUMMARY
--------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000320

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER MARR LE SY SI
SUBJECT: LEBANON: UN MISSION TO LEBANON AND ISRAEL ON
UNSCR 1701 IMPLEMENTATION


Classified By: DCM Christopher W. Murray. Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) an
d(d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) UN Senior Advisor Michael Williams visited Beirut
February 27-March 1 to prepare a report to the SYG on
implementation of UNSCR 1701. Williams remarks on his
preceding visit to Israel were mostly negative. He was
concerned at Israel's refusal to accept the visit of a UN
cartographer to study the Sheba'a Farms issue, and more
broadly, he did not see how the hardening Israeli attitudes
that he witnessed would contribute to regional stability.
DCM urged that the Lebanese be pressed to assert firmer
control over the border with Syria; Williams took the point
and added that it would help if the Israelis could provide
more specific evidence of alleged cross-border arms smuggling
to Hizballah. In Beirut, Williams met with the Prime
Minister, other senior GOL figures, and Hizballah former
minister Mohamed Fneish. He said he pressed Fneish to ensure
that there are no further Hizballah provocations, which would
serve neither Hizballah's nor Lebanon's interests. Williams
was unclear about the various plans to resolve Lebanon's
internal political impasse. End Summary.

READ-OUT FROM TEL AVIV
--------------


2. (C) On February 28 French Ambassador Bernard Emie hosted
a luncheon for visiting UN SYG Senior Advisor Michael
Williams, which was also attended by UN SYG Representative
for Lebanon Geir Pedersen and DCM. Williams had come to
Lebanon to prepare his report on UNSCR 1701 implementation,
due in New York on March 16.


3. (C) Williams and his team had just returned from Israel.
They were concerned about increasingly aggressive Israeli
rhetoric with respect to Lebanon, Israel,s refusal to allow
a UN Secretariat cartographer to visit Israel in connection
with a study of the Sheba'a Farms, and a conspicuous lack of
Israeli concern about domestic developments in Lebanon.
Williams said he detected no Israeli interest in moving from

a cessation of hostilities, as it exists under UNSCR 1701, to
a cease-fire.


4. (C) Williams said Israel has a real interest in the
survival and effectiveness of the Siniora government. But
instead, Israeli officials are not just indifferent to
domestic developments in Lebanon, they are uninterested.
Williams described Israeli attitudes on Sheba'a Farms as
especially dug-in, with Israeli FM Livni refusing to engage
on the subject, much less discuss the possibility of
compromise, such as putting Sheba'a under UN custody. At one
point, both Williams and French Ambassador Emie lamented
together that Israel,s behavior in the wake of UNSCR 1701
has done little to promote stability in Lebanon, support the
Siniora government, or promote stability between Lebanon and
Israel.

LEBANON PROGRAM
--------------


4. (C) Williams had a full schedule in Beirut that included
meetings with the Prime Minister, Ministers of Defense and of
the Interior, the head of the Internal Security Forces, the
commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF),and the
recently-resigned Hizballah minister Mohamed Fneish.
Williams said he was firm in telling Fneish that Hizballah
should do nothing provocative with respect to Israel as well
as within Lebanon itself; such action would not be in
Lebanon,s interest. Fneish was apparently amiable and
accepting throughout the meeting. (Note: One of Williams'
UN staff members called us on March 1 to regret the
"embarrassing" press photos that implied overly warm
relations between the Williams delegation and Fneish. End
Note.)


5. (C) As for the ongoing political impasse in Lebanon,
Williams and Emie agreed that the Taif Process that began in
1989 is now dead in the water. Nobody knows what should
replace it. During a review of the various proposals to
resolve the current crisis, it emerged that no one, not even
Prime Minister Siniora, has a clear picture of what is on the
table. The issues include formation of a new Lebanese
cabinet, approval of the Special Tribunal to try suspects in

BEIRUT 00000320 002 OF 002


the Hariri assassination, a new election law, parliamentary
elections, and election of a new president.

ARMS SMUGGLING
--------------


6. (S) DCM commented that arms smuggling and Lebanese
control over its border with Syria are a high U.S. concern.
Williams responded that more intelligence is needed to
substantiate accusations of systemic arms smuggling to
Hizballah. He reported that the Israelis had provided to him
only one convincing case, which took place in January, of
arms smuggling from Syria to Hizballah. It was based, he
said, "on more than just humint. (Comment: In a March 1
meeting with the Ambassador and DCM, Defense Minister Murr
reported to us that Williams told him the Israelis had shown
him a photo of a truck, located in the Biqa' Valley, that was
allegedly bringing arms to Hizballah from Syria. Murr said
he asked Williams how one could know that this photo did not
date from the summer war, and that in fact the truck was
carrying weapons transported from Syria. End Comment.)


7. (C) UN SYG Representative for Lebanon Geir Pedersen
suggested that the Israelis might do with the Lebanese what
they have done with the Palestinians: provide some timely
and actionable intelligence to the Lebanese on pending or
recent arms smuggling, and then test the Lebanese by seeing
if they will act on it. Apart from this possibility, both
Williams and Emie worried about the prospect that Israel may
strike targets in Lebanon, such as trucks in the Biqa'
Valley, to make a point about the need for better control
over arms smuggling to Hizballah. On the issue of Israel
providing substantiated evidence of weapons smuggling,
Williams reported that Israeli BG Baidetz had confirmed to
him in Israel that he would visit New York next week to
confer with the UN and UNSC delegations about arms smuggling
across the Syrian-Lebanese border.


8. (C) Williams also confirmed that a UN DPKO mission is
presently assessing border controls along Lebanon,s
frontiers. He expected that the team would report that
border controls are much more secure where UNIFIL is present,
but that problems remain elsewhere, in the north and along
Lebanon's eastern border with Syria. The DPKO team, he said,
is being led by the same individual who had headed the border
assessment study done in advance of the December 2006 UNSCR
1701 implementation report.


9. (C) French Embassy officers present at the luncheon
noted German efforts to help the Lebanese on border controls.
They had sensed some internal German problems in moving
forward on a pilot project for northern Lebanon. Emie was
interested in getting the EU involved, but his French
colleagues said that the EU was unenthusiastic about border
help, probably for legal, bureaucratic, and budget reasons.


UNIFIL
--------------


10. (C) Williams reported that Hizballah's Mohamed Fneish
was positive about Hizballah's relations in the south with
UNIFIL. Willimas suspected that Fneish may have been ordered
to convey such an attitude, including public remarks that
UNIFIL is a friendly force. Williams was told that Hizballah
figures were favorably inclined toward the French UNIFIL
contingent, but less so toward the Spanish, and somewhere in
between on the Italians. Part of the poor relations with the
Spanish derived from a December 5 incident when Spanish
soldiers confronted several possible Hizballah operatives who
were walking along a road. When the Spaniards asked the
individuals to show them the contents of a bag they were
carrying, the Spanish soldiers found weapons, which they
confiscated. Several booby trapped explosives were found in
the area the following day, as an apparent warning to the
Spanish UNIFIL contingent.
FELTMAN