LEBANON: INDEPENENT SHIA ORGANIZING SLOWLY,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000269

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: INDEPENENT SHIA ORGANIZING SLOWLY,
INDEPENDENTLY OF ONE ANOTHER


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Several Shia leaders in late January and early
February described to Econoff their desire to organize larger
groups to express their frustration with the current Shia
parties as well as the March 14 and March 8 coalitions.
Kafaat Movement leader Ahmed Al-Assad is increasingly visible
in the press as he tries again to launch an independent Shia
party. In contrast, Raed Charafeddine, nephew of Imam Musa
Sadr, is quietly cultivating young leaders and promoting
interfaith dialogue. Shia head of Central Bank Operations
Department Dr. Youssef El-Khalil is organizing a small
network of confessionally diverse professionals focused on a
reform agenda, and he is active in the Shia community through
his NGO. Finally, Dr. Fadi Osseiran, Chairman of
BlomInvestBank, argues that a new electoral law and early
parliamentary elections are the best way to show that
Hizballah has lost ground among the Shia. He recommends
further government and NGO social services outreach to the
Shia to gain their loyalty. Obstacles to the formation of a
viable Shia third way or a cross-confessional party include
continued sectarian tension, a lack of funding, and March
14's unwillingness to recognize or trust independent Shia
leaders. End Summary.

TRYING TO LAUNCH A THIRD WAY
--------------


2. (C) Econoff in late January and early February spoke with
several Shia professionals with political or community
aspirations about their attempts to organize larger groups.
All expressed their frustration with the current Shia parties
and both March 14 and March 8, and noted that Lebanon's
political impasse has encouraged many political aspirants to
start new initiatives. (Note: In prior meetings,
professionals of all sectarian backgrounds have reported
their desire to see new political leaders emerge to
demonstrate change in the Lebanese political arena. End
Note.)


3. (C) Lubnan al-Kafaat ("Lebanon for the Talented") Movement
leader Ahmed Al-Assad is increasingly visible as he tries
again to launch an independent Shia party. Some March 14
politicians believe he has potential as a "third way" Shia
voice and are increasingly giving his criticism of Amal and
Hizballah media coverage. Assad inherits the feudal legacy
of his grandfather and father, both Speakers of the Chamber
of Deputies and leaders of south Lebanon, but he failed in
his bid to win a parliamentary seat in the 2005 election. In
addition to making more frequent press statements since the
election, Assad is building a support base through the Kafaat
NGO network in the south. He runs a recreational center and
library with French funding near a French UNIFIL contingent,
and is opening two more centers, which are funded by and
located near the Italian and Spanish UNIFIL headquarters.


4. (C) Assad is working with several groups and political
figures across the Shia community, including university
professors, journalists, and politicians, to establish a
broader group. "Expect a press release soon," Assad told us.
A core group has been meeting weekly since December,
building trust, and seeking contact anyone who is not 100
percent with Hizballah and might want to cooperate. They do
not yet have a name and need another month to fully form, but
the goal is a "gathering" or an institution which will issue
press releases. They will portray themselves as freeing the
Shia community from oppression. Their strength will depend
on external support -- including March 14 politicians and the
media outlets they control. The gathering will need media
attention, funding, and a proportional election law to
translate its statements into deeds.


5. (C) The gathering will tie in a diverse group with two
common themes: providing benefits for all Lebanese; and
pushing back foreign influence in the Shia community. The
gathering hopes for the equivalent of 20 percent of
Hizballah's USD 600-700 million a year budget in order to
create jobs, and subsidize high quality universities and
hospitals in the south. They will also need funding to
replace the income that clerics will lose when they speak out
against Hizballah. The gathering will seek to some measure
of "religious cover," with sheikhs encouraging a return to

BEIRUT 00000269 002 OF 004


the Lebanese Shia traditions and beliefs predominant before
the Iranian revolution, but the group will be secular. The
group has no funding source yet, and Assad believes overseas
Lebanese are not dependable partners because they are afraid
of Hizballah.


6. (C) Assad doubts that a multi-confessional party is viable
now. Instead, Lebanese need to see a new, broad Shia
coalition opposed to Hizballah. "We can't weaken Hizballah,
without weakening them from within the Shia community," Assad
pointed out, "and after that we can broaden the movement."
Such a coalition can gradually erode Shia fears of speaking
out against Hizballah and being left vulnerable without
Hizballah's protection. One commonality among the Shia
opposed to Hizballah is that they feel Lebanese, and not tied
to any foreign entity. There will be at least one Christian
and one Sunni participant to ensure the movement is seen as
Lebanese and not just Shia.


7. (C) Lebanon can't move on until Hizballah no longer
monopolizes the Shia community, Assad told Econoff, and the
best way to end this monopoly is through a new, proportional
representation electoral law. March 14 refuses to support a
proportional election law because it might cause them to lose
seats in parliament; they don't consider that Hizballah and
Aoun might lose representation as well. Assad believes the
independent Kafaat Movement could gain up to 30 percent of
teh votes in the south and the Biqa', despite Hizballah's
greater funding and weapons. He believes that Shia are ready
for someone who can oppose Hizballah, and for more diverse
Shia representation in Parliament. He believes he gained 12
percent of the Shia vote in the last election, in which many
Christian, Druze, and Sunnis did not vote because they were
unhappy with the election law. His supporters knew that it
was unlikely that Kafaat could win seats under the 2000
election law, but voted despite the low probability of seeing
their candidate win and the high probability of facing
Hizballah retribution. How many more Shia and non-Shia would
vote for an alternative to Hizballah, if they actually
thought their candidate had a real chance to win, Assad asked
rhetorically.


8. (C) Assad told Econoff that people in the south are
unhappy with all politicians, but are afraid of Hizballah,
feel they have no other choice for political representation,
and still hope to get reconstruction money from Hizballah.
Deep inside there is a shift against Hizballah due to the
destruction it brought upon civilian areas as a result of the
summer war, but people are afraid to criticize Hizballah
publicly for fear of retribution or ostracism. This
frustration with Hizballah does not translate into sympathy
for March 14, because March 14 politicians are not
consultative, cooperative partners, and the public feels that
those politicians put their own interests above national
interests. Assad believes Hizballah shot rockets at the
Israelis from his unoccupied house in order to invite Israeli
retribution on his property, following his criticism of
Hizballah. The Israelis bombed the house.

INTERFAITH DIALOGUE,
INTERNATIONAL FUNDING
--------------


9. (C) Raed Charafeddine, nephew of Amal Movement Founder
Imam Musa Sadr, and board member of the Imam Sadr Foundation,
sees leadership development, cross-confessional cooperation,
and Shia community development as the way forward for the
Shia community. In particular, Charafeddine sees himself as
continuing his uncle's and grandfather's interfaith dialogue
efforts.


10. (C) Since the mid-1990s Charafeddine has taught one
leadership course per semester, rotating among the American
University of Beirut, Lebanese American University, and the
University of Balamand. As Assistant General Manager at
Fransabank and an MBA holder, he fosters leadership, critical
thinking, and conflict resolution in the courses he teaches.
He appears to relish his work with MBA students, "Lebanon's
future leaders." He has included segments on "national
change" in his courses via critical thinking skills, conflict
resolution techniques, and role playing. He also previously
worked on a U.S. Institute of Peace-funded Christian-Muslim
dialogue project.


11. (C) As a voluntary board member and chair of the
strategic planning committee at the Imam Sadr Foundation,

BEIRUT 00000269 003 OF 004


Charafeddine promotes interfaith dialogue and international
ties, and raises funds to provide services to Lebanese Shia.
He will travel to Detroit in early spring for the annual
foundation conference, and has already scheduled his routine
visits to Lebanese community centers of all confessional
groups, which he has been building over the years through
reciprocal visits. The Lebanese diaspora in Africa is the
foundation's primary funding source, while U.S. and Gulf
funding are also important. Charefeddine plans to open a
Canadian chapter in addition to existing American and African
branches, to be headed by the Canadian Maronite association
leader.


12. (C) The Foundation uses the funding it receives overseas
to respond to the needs of the Shia community, with
educational programs from kindergarten through vocational
training programs. The Foundation operates mostly in Tyre
but has a campus near the old airport road in the southern
suburbs of Beirut. Its eight medical centers serve southern
villages. Since the Israeli withdrawal from the south in
2000, the Foundation has worked to return orphans and
"hardship cases," or children whose families could not care
for them, to their extended families and take its social
services to the villages through social workers. There is a
new peace-building curriculum and leadership training.

MOVING LEBANESE POLITICS
BEYOND CONFESSIONALISM...
--------------


13. (C) Dr. Youssef El-Khalil, the Shia head of the Lebanese
Central Bank's Operations Department, told Econoff that the
time is ripe to move politics beyond confessionalism, and the
Shia are especially open to that idea. Shia of all income
levels are increasing their criticism of Hizballah, while the
March 14 and March 8 coalitions have both lost credibility as
their media outlets fuel confessional problems and
politicians retrench in their positions rather than seek
agreement. While confessional tensions make a Shia "third
way" less viable, Shia and other Lebanese are ready for a
multi-confessional group with a substantive platform that can
run a slate around the country. While many Shia are
interested, the cross-confessional initiative can't come from
a Shia and must be an alternative Lebanese movement, not an
alternative Shia movement.


14. (C) Khalil is organizing a small network of
confessionally and regionally diverse people. Group members
focus on their professional identity and political agenda as
well as their ties to villages to ensure support from
multiple social strata. The organization is well positioned,
but has only been active for 1-2 months, gathering to eat
together. Many people hurt their reputations by their
stances during the conflict.


15. (C) Khalil is simultaneously active within the Shia
community, promoting economic development across the south
through his NGO, the Association for Assistance to Rural
Development (AARD). Khalil argues that AARD is one of the
largest development groups in that region, with a geographic
outreach and a breadth of services rivaled only by Hizballah
and Amal social service networks. AARD has been active in
the post-war reconstruction effort.

LOOKING FOR ELECTORAL REFORM TO
REFLECT SHIA FRUSTRATION WITH HIZBALLAH
--------------


16. (C) Dr. Fadi Osseiran of BlomInvestBank believes that
early elections would prove that support for Hizballah has
weakened, but would set a destructive precedent for easily
calling early elections. Instead, the passage of a new,
proportional representation election law would encourage
formation of a multi-confessional group. It would be
difficult for an all-Shia third party to garner support from
professionals, because educated Shia prefer to be seen as
Lebanese and have little in common with rural or religiously
conservative Shia.


17. (C) It would also help to "fight Hizballah with its own
weapon, money." Even the Shia who are with Hizballah and
critical of the government are not anti-Hariri because Hariri
spent so much money on scholarships, Osseiran told Econoff.
Hizballah would be threatened by another Shia with a
patronage network, so such networks must look neutral as they
are building their political base. Building a stronger state

BEIRUT 00000269 004 OF 004


that provides for all groups is also essential.


18. (C) Dr. Osseiran said he has observed a clear increase in
the number of Shia journalists, entrepreneurs, intellectuals,
and aspiring politicians publicly speaking out against
Hizballah. But he notes that the citizens are still more apt
to express their criticism among friends rather than in
public. Criticism of Hizballah focuses on the group's
unproductive attack on the government, statements about
fighting a proxy war with the U.S. in Lebanon, the
persistence of a "state within a state," and Hizballah's
constant provocation of violence. People just want to live
and are tired of Hizballah getting in the way of families'
need to educate their kids and work. Nevertheless the "state
of fear" of sectarian conflict, Israeli aggression, and a
history of respect for Hizballah's integrity and
accomplishments keep many secular, well-educated Shia with
Hizballah.

COMMENT: DECK STACKED
AGAINST INDEPENDENT SHIA
--------------


19. (C) Despite clear indications that many Shia are unhappy
with their limited choice in political representation,
several obstacles to organization of a third party remain.
Many Shia fear that alternative Shia entities will not
protect Shia interests from other confessions. While Shia
may criticize their confessional leaders privately, they seem
unwilling to risk ostracism or violence or the perception
that they are breaking with the rest of the sect. The Shia
who are prone not to ally with Hizballah or Amal are largely
secular and looking for a cross-confessional alternative
movement, rather than a third Shia party. Control of the
media by confessional and political leaders prevents
independent politicians from getting media coverage while
Hizballah and Nabih Berri have their own news channels. Lack
of funding to replace the income that keeps many Shia loyal
to Hizballah is another obstacle, and to date there appear to
be no Shia with the money to rival Berri's and Hizballah's
patronage networks. March 14th's tendency to regard the Shia
and Hizballah as a single entity has also contributed to the
failure of several prior attempts to launch a third Shia
party. End Comment.
FELTMAN