LEBANON: PM SINIORA SEES PAUSE WHILE PARTIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000260

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2027
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE IS SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: PM SINIORA SEES PAUSE WHILE PARTIES
RECALIBRATE


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Sections 1.4 (
b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a 2/15 meeting, PM Siniora indicated only slight
progress toward resolution of the country's political
impasse. On the negative side, the Saudis "have stepped
back," the Iranians are being opaque, Amre Moussa does not
plan to return to Beirut anytime soon, and Speaker Berri will
probably not convene parliament in mid-March. But despite
this hiatus in activity, Siniora claimed good news both in
the broadly-based turnout at yesterday's "civilized" February
14 rally, and the gradual reduction in pressure from the
opposition's dwindling street presence. When informed that
moderate advisors to Michel Aoun were extending feelers to
re-open substantive discussions, Siniora expressed open
skepticism, but directed his closest advisor, Mohamed Chatah,
to re-engage with Aounist MP Ibrahim Kanaan. Concerning
border issues, PM Siniora acknowledged that the frontier with
Syria is a serious problem, but once again urged patience to
allow the LAF to carry out its mission and avoid provoking
the opposition into new escalation. A request at this time
to place UNIFIL or other foreign forces along the border
would create serious dissension and instability. Siniora
urged the U.S. to understand that he is attempting to wring
almost 30 years of Syrian influence out of the system. This
is a slow, tedious process, but it is starting to pay off,
particularly in Lebanon's security forces. End summary.


2. (U) Prime Minister Siniora met the Ambassador, Special
Assistant, and visiting NEA/ELA Office Director Gina
Abercrombie-Winstanley at the Grand Serail on February 15.
Senior advisors to the Prime Minister, Mohamed Chatah and
Rola Nouraddine, also attended the meeting. As the
Ambassador's motorcade approached the Serail, one could see
that the opposition's tattered tent city in Riad Solh Square
had not fared well in the previous evening's winter storm,
with many tents flattened (and few signs of life anywhere).

PERSPECTIVE ON 2/14 RALLY
--------------


3. (C) While the Prime Minister was upbeat over the
previous day's impressive and peaceful commemoration in
Martyr's Square, he indicated the Lebanese had hit a holding
pattern concerning resolution of the political impasse. He
expressed some annoyance that Arab League SYG Amre Moussa has
decided to stay away from Beirut for the time being, but
admitted the lack of substantive communication among the
various parties had made it difficult for Moussa to achieve
progress on his most recent visit.


4. (C) Siniora also indicated the Saudis may have let up
somewhat in their diplomatic efforts, perhaps in reaction to
apparent indecision in Iran over whether to continue
supporting Syria's heavy-handed destabilizing campaign, or to
recalibrate their Lebanese strategy toward a negotiated
resolution. Despite these developments, Siniora remained
cautiously optimistic, primarily because the opposition's
plan to topple his government through the street is fraying
badly around the edges. Siniora felt Wednesday's
pro-government rally demonstrated that the majority of the
Lebanese people still support pro-reform measures, but he did
concede that March 14th has to show results soon. He implied
that March 14th was at a critical juncture: it had weathered
a concerted effort by the opposition to drive the government
from office. It had also survived serious spikes in
political violence, specifically, Pierre Gemayel's
assassination, Christian-on-Christian clashes of 1/23,
Shia-on-Sunni clashes of 1/25, and finally, the terrorist
acts of 2/13 that left 3 dead and 23 injured.


5. (C) The Prime Minister averred that it has been a
difficult period, but the pro-reform forces had emerged with
several important achievements (Paris III, UNSC approval of
the Tribunal documents, and the massive, peaceful presence in
Martyr's Square on 2/14),while the opposition appears to
have run out of some steam. Siniora quickly added he was
well aware that the most difficult phase still lay ahead, but
it was evident that the embattled Prime Minster took
satisfaction in the resilience and survival skills of the GOL
and March 14 alliance.

THE TERRIBLE TWOS: BERRI AND AOUN

BEIRUT 00000260 002 OF 003


--------------


6. (C) PM Siniora stated that his relations with erratic
Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri are as tenuous as always.
The recently established four-person committee empowered to
discuss possible solutions to the political stalemate
continues to meet. He trusts in the abilities of his two
representatives, Co-Chairman of the Islamic-Christian
Dialogue Committee Mohammed Sammak and Saad Hariri's
long-time advisor MP Ghattas Khoury, but acknowledged that
dealing with Berri is always difficult. He described Berri
as an individual who even as he accepts a position, appears
to pull away. Siniora, despite Berri's assertion to the
contrary, does not believe the speaker will convene
parliament in mid-March. "It creates too many uncertainties
for him," he remarked.


7. (C) Once parliament is back in session, the pro-reform
majority can raise numerous issues that would be difficult
for Berri to control, even though Lebanon's constitution and
the arcane rules of procedure for that body grant extremely
broad latitude to the speaker. In Siniora's estimation,
Berri is more likely to keep the legislative body in recess
and use "dialogue committees," or intermediaries like Amre
Moussa, to deal with the political crisis -- mainly because
they allow the pro-Syrian Berri to play various sides off
each other. Once parliament opens, Berri will be under
tremendous pressure to deal with the tribunal, a topic he
wants to avoid despite his vows of support.


8. (C) Turning to the ever-challenging General Aoun, the
Prime Minister, with noticeable skepticism, listened to the
news that several of the more moderate advisors to the
General were asking for dialogue and insisting that Michel
Aoun's position on the Tribunal was actually closer to the
government than to Hizballah. Ambassador Chatah interjected
and asked if these advisors were from Aoun's inner circle
(presumably Gibran Bassil). When advised they were not, he
indicated the message was welcome, but perhaps somewhat
irrelevant.


9. (C) Nevertheless, Siniora instructed Chatah to engage
once again with MP Kanaan (who was involved in a farcical
heated argument over the weekend with an Hariri loyalist,
that ended with his bodyguard firing several rounds into the
ceiling of a posh ski resort hotel over the heads of
collagen-lipped socialites). It was clear Siniora was not
expecting much from the invitation, but he also did not want
to give currency to the notion that his government was
continually rebuffing the Aoun camp. The Prime Minister did
agree with the Ambassador that at the very least, Chatah
could test the Aounists, who privately say they desire
genuine dialogue, while their public statements continue to
rip the government as incompetent and not worthy of
engagement.

SYRIAN-LEBANESE BORDER
--------------


10. (C) PM Siniora agreed with the Ambassador's grave
assessment that Lebanon's border with Syria was still a
critical issue that had to be addressed expeditiously.
Siniora acknowledged the LAF was far from perfect, but he
maintained that Lebanon's security services were steadily
improving. As he has in other discussions, the Prime
Minister urged the international community to be patient and
allow Lebanon to meet the challenge with its own forces,
because in the long run such an approach would greatly
strengthen the concept of national sovereignty, which is the
greatest political weapon against Syria. It is hard to ask
for international help, as such a request would certainly
mobilize the opposition and provoke them into action, just as
they are starting to lose some steam.


11. (C) Similar to a request made last week, Siniora asked
if the U.S. could provide his government with releasable
proof that illicit shipments were taking place across the
Lebanese-Syrian border. He emphasized that this request was
not intended to express doubt about U.S. claims, but would
rather give him stronger arguments to convince others in
Lebanon's difficult consensual system of governance that
stronger steps were required.


12. (C) In closing, PM Siniora asked the Ambassador whether
he had any knowledge of information that seemed to indicate
some of the weaponry that was seized by the LAF (in a

BEIRUT 00000260 003 OF 003


February 8 intercept of a shipment that appeared to be headed
for Hizballah forces) may have been of U.S. manufacture.
Upon request, he supplied the Ambassador with photographs of
the pertinent ammunition cases and asked if the U.S. could
make a determination of their actual origin. (Note: Embassy
DAO, based upon preliminary consultations with Washington,
believes the cases of 120mm mortar shells may actually be of
Iranian origin, but has asked the GOL for more detailed
information before a final determination is offered. End
note.)

COMMENT
--------------


13. (C) The PM was somewhat subdued during the meeting but
not in the black mood we had expected to encounter. Yet some
of the people closest to Siniora insist that the PM is
suffering from a severe case of the blues. Jumblatt has
asked us to help cheer Siniora up (and Jumblatt has driven
down from Mukhtara, at considerable risk to himself, to dine
with Siniora twice this week, "even though the food at the
Serail is practically inedible and he won't serve alcohol").
Mohammed Chatah and Marwan Hamadeh have ascribed Siniora's
reportedly downbeat mood to the combination of a variety of
factors: sadness around the anniversary of the murder of his
long-term friend and mentor Rafiq Hariri, a sense of futility
about the never-ending political impasse, the shift of
limelight and action away from the Grand Serail to Saad
Hariri's Qoreitem house (with the Berri-Hariri initiative),
the complete boycott of him by opposition figures, the bunker
mentality of his Grand Serail imprisonment, and -- last but
certainly not least -- the shockingly shoddy treatment by the
Hariri family of their long-time loyal retainer.


14. (C) We can certainly attest to the latter. As an
example of Hariri family childishness, someone from Saad's
inner circle called the Ambassador to cackle gleefully --
shamelessly, we would say -- that Saad had refused to take
Siniora's phone call on 2/14, to teach the PM a lesson. The
embattled and threatened PM's alleged misdeed? He did not
rush immediately from the Grand Serail to Qoreitem to embrace
Saad when the latter returned to Lebanon after a six-week
absence (during which time Siniora had to deal with countless
challenges). In addition, many sources report that Saad
vetoed Siniora's participation in the official rally
commemorating Rafiq Hariri's death. Using her widow's grief
to sow dissension, Nazek Hariri has called friends to weep
hysterically that Houda Siniora had no right to accompany her
husband Fouad to pray at Rafiq Hariri's tomb.


15. (C) But even as the Hariri family treats Siniora
abysmally and Syria shows its displeasure at his resilience
and prominence by ordering its allies not to engage him at
all, Siniora remains well-liked and respected by a remarkably
diverse cross-confessional spectrum of Lebanese society
(minus most of the Shia, of course). No one could have
predicted that Lebanon's detested long-term finance minister
-- the person who was once destined for eternal infamy for
introducing VAT taxes to Lebanon -- would one day have his
portrait displayed proudly on buses and posters ferrying
people to mass rallies, as happened on 2/14. No doubt adding
to apparent Hariri family jealousies, there's even a joke
going around town: How does one know Syrian President Bashar
al-Asad is actually a deity? He performs miracles, such as
making Fouad Siniora popular and Walid Jumblatt pro-American.
FELTMAN