LEBANON: ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER ACCEPTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000238

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE IS SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER ACCEPTS
DEMARCHES; SEES CONTINUED POLITICAL DEADLOCK

REF: A. SECSTATE 17726

B. SECSTATE 14149

C. SECSTATE 17728

D. BEIRUT 00231

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Sections 1.4 (
b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador on 2/13, Acting FM
Mitri accepted three U.S. demarches: a request that Arab
League members take a measured approach to the newly-formed
Palestinian National Unity Government; a request to order
partly GOL-owned Arabsat television to cease broadcasting an
Iraqi program that was inciting radical Sunni insurgents; and
finally; a formal U.S response to Lebanese concerns regarding
the use of cluster munitions during last summer's conflict
between Israel and Hizballah. Minister Mitri had no response
to the demarche concerning the new Palestinian government,
but did express preliminary agreement with the U.S. request
to stop Arabsat programming whose intent was to incite
violence. (The Ambassador has also raised this with Minister
of Information Ghazi Aridi and, twice, with Minister of
Communications Marwan Hamadeh, who represents Lebanon on the
Arabsat board.) The final demarche concerning cluster
munitions drew a lengthy response. While stating that
Lebanon understood the U.S. argument, his government
emphatically expressed disagreement with it. Mitri stated
the GOL continues to request a complete halt on the sale of
cluster munitions to the region. Concerning the ongoing
political crisis in Lebanon, the pro-reform minister said he
saw little hope a solution was imminent. He used the bus
explosions that had occurred just a few hours earlier as
proof that anti-democratic forces were not about to
compromise. He feared a new phase of political violence.
End summary.


2. (C) Acting Foreign Minister Tarek Mitri, a trusted
member of PM Siniora's inner circle, met the Ambassador,
Special Assistant, and visiting NEA/ELA Office Director Gina
Abercrombie-Winstanley at the Grand Serail on February 13, a
day before a massive pro-reform rally was scheduled to be
held in Martyr's Square a few blocks away. As the meeting
started, Lebanese news stations were focused on the two
commuter bus explosions that took place hours earlier in the
Christian suburb of Ain Alaq. Minister Mitri still conducts
most of his official business from the relative safety of the
Grand Serail, but has considered it sufficiently safe to
spend the night at home several days each week. Whether this
morning's incident will result in tighter security for the
March 14th cabinet ministers, which were in effect at the
start of the current crisis in November, is not yet certain.


3. (C) Minister Mitri listened carefully to the U.S.
position regarding the new Palestinian National Unity
Government, particularly our deep concern that Hamas has yet
to announce it will accept the core principles of the
Quartet: renouncing violence, respecting prior agreements,
and recognizing the State of Israel's right to exist. He
expressed relief that the Palestinians appear to have reached
an accord that would stop the recent violence in the
Palestinian territories, but stated he did not have a ready
response to the U.S. request that Lebanon delay engagement
with the new unity government until our concerns have been
answered. Mitri indicated he would discuss the demarche with
the cabinet, but did not give a precise date.


4. (C) Concerning our request that Lebanon use its
influence as part owner of Arabsat television to direct the
station to cease highly inflammatory broadcasts which
originate from a Baathist-controlled television network in
Iraq, Minister Mitri said he was unaware of the broadcasts,
but agreed that if the programming was inciting violence
against the legitimate government of Iraq and coalition
forces, its broadcasts should cease as soon as possible. The
Ambassador informed Mitri that both Minister of
Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh and Minster of Information
Ghazi Aridi had also been informed of the U.S. concern and
request. Mitri indicated he would confirm that the GOL has
the authority to direct the station to cease these broadcasts
and, if so, he was confident the other members of the Siniora
cabinet would support the decision to press for termination.
(Separately, Marwan Hamadeh, who represents Lebanon, one of
26 "shareholders" of Arabsat, told us he would work to see

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al-Zawraa removed.)

STRONG REACTION REGARDING CLUSTER MUNITIONS
--------------


5. (C) Minister Mitri waited until the entire text of the
demarche concerning cluster munitions was read before
responding. He said he appreciated the initial sections
dealing with deep U.S. concern for the continuing casualties
and the provision of more than USD 9 million in funds for
unexploded ordnance (UXO) removal. Mitri also expressed
strong support for U.S. requests to the Government of Israel
for comprehensive locating data of the cluster munitions
employed during last summer's conflict, because this would
significantly improve the efficacy of the multi-national
ordinance removal program.


6. (C) But Minister Mitri expressed strong disagreement
with the U.S. contention that cluster munitions are a
legitimate weapon of war whose use by the Israelis last
summer was understandable due to the intense and unique
nature of that conflict. Mitri maintained that precisely
because the conflict was fought in densely inhabited civilian
areas, Israel should have refrained from such widespread and
massive employment. The minister implied that the continuing
heavy toll of civilian casualties nearly six months after the
cessation of hostilities was irrefutable proof that the
munitions had been used inappropriately and should not be
justified.


7. (C) Mitri said the Siniora government understands that
Hizballah, and some NGOs who are sympathetic to the
organization, have cynically used the issue for political
gain, but that fact does not excuse their use last summer.
He was also aware that Hizballah themselves had employed the
weapon in an indiscriminate manner against northern Israel.
(Note: According to Mitri, a soon-to-be-released report on
the 2006 conflict by the controversial UN Human Rights
Council in Geneva would not be the one-sided document those
skeptical of the HRC would expect: both IDF and Hizballah
would be cited for numerous violations. He said this
knowledge was causing profound discomfort in Hizballah, which
had been anticipating a propaganda windfall when the report
is issued. End note.) Minister Mitri asked the U.S. to
recall that in 1982, the then U.S. President had pushed back
against heavy pressure and issued a ban on the sale of all
cluster munitions to the region, a directive that remained in
effect for almost six years.


8. (C) In closing discussion of the issue, Mitri stated the
Siniora government genuinely appreciated the expeditious and
comprehensive response to their expression of deep concern
regarding Israel's pervasive use of cluster munitions. He
indicated he understood our arguments, but completely
disagreed with them. He wondered why the U.S. would make
itself so vulnerable to unrelenting criticism by continued
support of such an indiscriminate weapon. He cautioned that
the government of Lebanon, along with Ireland and several
Scandinavian countries, would press the issue hard in Oslo on
2/22 and publicly demand the U.S. to immediately cease such
transfers.

FEBRUARY 13 BUS ATTACKS
--------------


9. (C) Reflecting on the disappointing return of violence
to Beirut with that morning's explosions on two commuter
buses, Minister Mitri expressed his frustration with both the
intractable political stalemate and the disregard for life
that Syria and its proxies hold. He ruefully remarked,
"Unfortunately, violence such as these bombings is easy to
carry out in Lebanon." Mitri surmised the Syrians were
trying to make yet another "brutal statement," but then
again, almost any of a number of violent groups also had the
capacity to attack unarmed civilians. The Foreign Minister
said he would be asking the Prime Minister if the government
would make a request for technical assistance to the U.S.
similar to the FBI team offered after the attack on
journalist May Chidiac in September 2005. Mitri believed PM
Siniora would do so, but cautioned that the political
controversy created by the Chidiac case, where Hizballah
accused the government of opening Lebanon to U.S.
intelligence services, may influence any final decision. The
Ambassador emphasized the U.S. would be ready to consider any
request to help and that an early request would probably
result in a more effective investigation of the crime. Mitri

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promised to get back to the Ambassador as soon as possible.
(Note: In a follow-up phone conversation later in the day,
Mitri said that Siniora -- mindful of the political backlash
from the pro-Syrians after the FBI help with the Chidiac
investigation -- decided to ask the UNIIIC for help instead.
But Siniora also told the UNIIIC that it, in turn, may wish
to approach experienced institutions like the FBI for help.
We will inform Washington immediately if the UNIIIC asks us
for help. End note.)

IMMEDIATE POLITICAL OUTLOOK -- MORE OF THE SAME
-------------- --


10. (C) Mitri acknowledged that the Lebanese people, and
particularly the Christian community, have grown exceedingly
weary of the never-ending political tension and recurring
spikes of violence. In their fatigue, Mitri admitted that
Lebanon's citizenry might soon opt for any solution that
would end the uncertainty. Because Hassan Nasrallah and
Michel Aoun were deliberately playing on this fear, there was
a danger for the pro-reform movement that despite its promise
of a far better future, the people of Lebanon may simply
throw in the towel. He agreed with the Ambassador that March
14th had to offer a pro-active and near-term solution for the
political crisis, instead of just responding to the barrage
of criticism from the opposition. Mitri stated he would try
to convince Siniora, Saad Hariri, and the other March 14th
leaders to use the 2/14 rally for this exact purpose, but was
not sure if he would be heard.


11. (C) Commenting on the still-developing Saudi-Iranian
talks (described by Saad Hariri in ref D),Mitri acknowledged
that he was not optimistic. The Foreign Minister expressed
gratitude that the U.S. has refrained from expressing
(deserved) skepticism about any plan that involved the
Iranian regime, but agreed it was difficult to believe the
Iranians would seriously try to resolve a crisis they
themselves had worked so hard to create. Mitri said the
Saudi argument is that Iran is fearful they have released the
genie of Shia-on-Sunni violence and are trying desperately to
replace the cork. He said this theory sounds all well and
good, but personally he felt Iran would stick with its
notoriously ruthless Syrian ally, and continue its relentless
campaign of destabilizing the only genuine democracy in the
Arab world. He summarized, "Syria simply cannot live with
the establishment of the Special Tribunal. Its crimes would
be uncovered and the regime would fall. They will destroy
Lebanon before that happens."
FELTMAN