LEBANON: MARCH 14 RESPONDS TO BOMBINGS AND WEAPONS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000237

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING
STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO:ATACHCO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MARCH 14 RESPONDS TO BOMBINGS AND WEAPONS
FIRMLY


Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: 1.4 (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) In response to the morning's bus bombings,
Communications Minister Hamadeh told us on February 13 that
the March 14 group planned to stiffen its line on the
tribunal and forge ahead with plans for a robust turnout on
the two-year commemoration of Rafiq Hariri's assassination.
The bombings may have had as much to do with the previous
week's confiscation of Amal or Hizballah weapons as with the
upcoming commemoration. Planning for February 14 includes
addresses by prominent Shia figures as well as the Sunni,
Christian and Druse leadership of March 14. Talks between
the two feuding political groups had broken down over details
regarding the expansion of the cabinet and the confiscated
weapons. Meanwhile, an increasingly active March 14 hopes to
mobilize Saudi money, multilateral diplomacy and European
public support to combat Syria and its Lebanese proxies. End
Summary.

BUS BOMBINGS: A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY
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2. (S) The Ambassador and NEA/ELA Office Director Gina
Abercrombie-Winstanley called on Communications Minister and
Walid Jumblatt ally Marwan Hamadeh February 13. Polchief
attended as notetaker. Hamadeh entered the meeting late,
having just returned from a March 14 strategy meeting in
response to the morning's bomb attacks against two buses in
the north Metn area of Ain Alaq. Asked how March 14 would
respond to the attacks, Hamadeh told us the group would
announce publicly its intention to add back the provision on
"Crimes Against Humanity" to its working draft for the
international tribunal. Not only would that provision extend
the tribunal's prosecutorial reach (in theory) but it would
signal a toughening of the March 14 line and a raising of the
stakes in the battle over the establishment of the tribunal.
Those who oppose the tribunal might start to look at the
current draft as the better option if they see the
possibility of a tougher draft emerging.


3. (S) Despite the fact the bombing appeared to target March
14 supporters on their way to the commemoration of Rafiq
Hariri's assassination, Hamadeh linked the event more
directly to the previous week's tug-of-war over weapons
confiscated from a Hizballah convoy by the Lebanese Armed
Forces (LAF). He noted that one of the buses had been rented
by Defense Minister Elias Murr, who publicly defied Hizballah
when the terrorist group demanded the return of its weapons,
and that the February 14 commemoration plans included
activities in Murr's home village (where the doomed buses
began their daily commuter run). Hamadeh suggested that the
fact the bombings occurred the day before the Hariri
commemoration was, at least in part, a "coincidence." When
asked, Hamadeh called security officials to confirm that the
Internal Security Forces (ISF) has used USG-trained explosive
investigation teams to investigate the bus bombings.

FEBRUARY 14 PLANS
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4. (C) While Hamadeh admitted that no final decisions had
been taken as yet, he said that the emergency morning meeting
from which he had just returned had concluded that March 14
leaders should carry on with their plans for the following
day. The leaders would reconvene at 5:00 PM at Saad Hariri's
Qureitem residence and then have a final planning meeting
later at Kata'eb Headquarters. Hamadeh promised us a readout
from the Qureitem meeting.


5. (C) Apart from the top Sunni and Druse March 14 leaders,
the February 14 commemoration will include addresses by
Christian leaders including independent former MP Nassib
Lahoud, journalist Ghassan Tueni, Minister Nayla Mouawad,
Minister of State Michel Pharaon, Lebanese Forces leader
Samir Geagea, and former President Amine Gemayel. The lineup
will also include Shia leaders Ahmad Al-Assad, son of former
Parliament Speaker Kamel al-Assad and assassination attempt
survivor; Tyre Mufti Ali al-Amin; and former MP Bassam Saaba,
who exposed Hizballah financial crimes and, according to

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Hamadeh, was threatened by Rustom Ghazali with a bomb attack
similar to that directed at Hamadeh. When the Ambassador
raised questions about the planned inclusion of a Jama'
Islamiyya speaker, Hamadeh said that it was important to show
that Lebanon's Sunnis were united.

DIALOGUE STALLED
--------------


6. (C) Hamadeh reported to us that March 14 negotiator
Ghattas Khoury's talks with Amal MP Ali Hassan Khalil had
deadlocked. The March 8 side had insisted the two sides'
joint declaration publicly proclaim a 19 11 cabinet formula,
even though their private talks had agreed the March 14 side
could retain its interpretation of a 19 10 1 formula, which
would guarantee the cabinet could not be toppled by another
March 8 walkout.


7. (C) Also ruining the deal was last week's arms seizure.
Khoury pointed out to Khalil (phrasing it as a rumor) that
the confiscated weapons were, by their nature and apparent
destination, intended to arm Amal fighters for street
fighting in Beirut, not for liberation of the Shebaa Farms.
Khoury made it clear to Khalil that the March 14 side knew
the arms were destined for Amal and that March 14 would not
hesitate to rearm also.


8. (S) Finally, Khoury warned Khalil that the GOL's rump
cabinet might reconsider the July 2005 Ministerial
Declaration, which enshrined Hizballah's right to bear and
use heavy weapons as part of a "national resistance" to
Israeli occupation of the Farms. Khalil, apparently stunned,
warned March 14 not to pursue the arsenals of Amal and
Hizballah. The Ministerial Declaration is indeed in play as
a "chess piece we are advancing up the board," Hamadeh
elaborated. March 14 would agree to no change in the cabinet
without a revision of the Declaration, he insisted.

MARCH 14 STRATEGY
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9. (S) In the wake of the dialogue's failure and increasing
confrontation, Hamadeh met with March 14 leaders Saad Hariri,
Walid Jumblatt, and Samir Geagea at Qureitem on February 11
to discuss the coalition's strategy for the coming weeks.
The group met for five hours and decided to proceed along
three "dimensions" including (a) restoring the balance of
power between March 14 and March 8, which Hamadeh explained
includes Hariri's calling on Saudi financial help, but which
may also have been intended to redress the arms gap between
the two sides; (b) political maneuvering to realize the
establishment of the tribunal, including a March 20 deadline
to Berri for parliamentary approval or, failing that, an
appeal for a Chapter 7 resolution from the UN Security
Council; and (c) the launch of a series of new initiatives at
the Hariri commemoration February 14.


10. (C) Never far from the group's mind, Hamadeh said, is the
problem of Syria. Multilateral Iran sanctions have been more
effective than those on Syria, he noted, but predicted (along
with, he noted, Jacques Chirac, with whom Hamadeh had a
private conversation in Paris on January 25) that Europe may
be coming around to a realization that it must confront Syria
and impose a cost for Damascus' behavior. Hamadeh had been
nominated by March 14 to write an open letter to French
presidential candidates advising them to reconsider Segolene
Royal's appeal to broaden engagement with Syria and Iran.
Syria might moderate its behavior in the leadup to the March
Arab Summit, the Ambassador suggested; but Hamadeh noted that
Damascus had boycotted the Summit before.


11. (S) March 14 would no longer merely hold the line,
Hamadeh claimed, but the group would switch to offense. The
Prime Minister is strong, he said, and communication between
him and Saad Hariri is robust since the latter's return to
Lebanon last weekend.
FELTMAN