LEBANON: LEBANESE FORCES' GEAGEA BELIEVES CIVIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000229 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE SY IS SUBJECT: LEBANON: LEBANESE FORCES' GEAGEA BELIEVES CIVIL WAR IS CLOSE REF: BEIRUT 126 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a 2/9 meeting with the Ambassador and emboff, leader of the Lebanese Forces (LF),Dr. Samir Geagea, stated that civil war is inevitable and there is no choice but to make appropriate preparations. He said U.S. help to the LF is the same as help to the Lebanese state, given that the LF wants to save the state institutions against those who wish to destroy them. The problem with the Lebanese Armerd Forces (LAF) was its commander, General Michel Sleiman, not the army itself. He said timely steps taken by the LF on the day of the opposition-led strike (January 23) averted an escalation of violence. He said a decision had been taken by the March 14 movement to hold a large memorial on the two-year anniversary of the assassination of former PM Hariri, Feb 14. He also voiced his belief that Hizballah, probably using Sunni proxies, will attack UNIFIL at some point. End summary. CIVIL WAR INEVITABLE -------------- ¶2. (C) Geagea started the meeting, his first with the Ambassador since Jan 23, with a message that he reiterated several times: "Things are heading in the wrong direction and we have to prepare. You must inform the Administration." While be believes that Hizballah does not want a civil war, Hizballah still seems unaware that this is exactly where things are heading because of Hizballah's action. Hizballah is creating the conditions for civil war that Hizballah does not seek. If Hizballah had continued the strike into Jan 24, a civil war would have started already. Hizballah thinks it, acting with Aoun, is pushing the Siniora government to resign, but is actually pushing the country toward civil war. Its mistake is that it thinks it has the ability to control things at all times. Geaga said he had even thought of going to Nasrallah and saying, "Where are you going? You are going to a civil war!" ¶3. (C) Geagea said the Christian community is tired of all the political conflict and does not want to fight within itself. In an oblique swipe at Michel Aoun, he also doubted that any Christians will fight alongside Hizballah. He repeated, "Things cannot stay this way." A civil war could happen within weeks or months. The LAF could take care of internal strife if it were not commanded by Gen. Sleiman. Since the state institutions are not up to the job, the LF has to take security actions itself, at least temporarily. Geagea said the actions of the LF on Jan 23 actually supported the state by opening up blocked roads. He thought that Hizballah would eventually attack the LF, and said that Hizballah has the means to do. SOLUTIONS -------------- ¶4. (C) The LF leader said he was convinced that the LAF cannot be relied upon with Sleiman as its commander. Sleiman isn,t a coward, but he is playing his own game. Geagea said Sleiman has submitted a request for a three-month leave of absence to Minister of Defense Murr (reftel). Murr can allow Sleiman to start this leave at any time, at which moment the Chief of Staff of the Army would become Acting Commander. Unfortunately, Geagea commented, the Chief of Staff, while a Druse allied with Waild Jumblatt, isn,t much better than Sleiman; General Shawki Masri is too weak to be effective, especially in the wake of the January 23 riots. Geagea liked the idea of finding a replacement for Sleiman as an option -- he (unlike other contacts) insisted the cabinet could treat the appointment like a decree and thus overcome President Lahoud's objections -- but the choices are limited. He tossed out a few names, such as LAF head of Military Intelligence Georges Khoury, whom he considers better than Sleiman, but still incompetent. ¶5. (C) Having a strong LAF commander is critical, but at this point, Geagea said that he does not see the LAF splitting apart. A huge army is not needed; 20,000 troops would be enough. The army is composed of 25 percent Shia, 39 percent Christian, 5-6 percent Druse and the remainder Sunni. If some of the Shia leave, it's not the end of the world. BEIRUT 00000229 002 OF 003 Geagea initially proposed that the Ambassador work with him to find a suitable replacement, but then thought better of this ida and agreed with the Ambassador that changing the LAF commander now could provoke even more instability. Still grasping at ideas, he suggested a deal in which Sleiman would become president, but then admitted that six more years of "someone like that" would be a bad idea. Then again, such deal with Sleiman would be better then making a deal in which Free Patriotic Movement leader General Michel Aoun became president. Sleiman,s loyalties, Geagea said, are not with Hizballah, while Aoun,s definitely are. ¶6. (U) Geagea believed that this past week,s LAF seizure of a truck loaded with weapons and ammunitions allegedly destined for Hizballah was a positive step. He was confident that the confiscated arms would remain with the LAF and not be transported to the south for Hizballah,s use. He stressed the "strong administrative" capacities of the LAF. LF SAVES THE DAY -------------- ¶7. (C) Geagea, in his account of the LF actions taken in the hours preceding and during the Jan 23 strike, emphasized the LF's role in clearing the roads and stemming further confrontations. This was not accomplished, however, without loss. One LF member was killed and 25 injured. Also, another 25 LF members were still being held in detention. He believed that President Lahoud may be behind the detentions. Meanwhile, Geagea said he was sure that none of March 8th leader Suleiman Franjieh,s people had been called in for questioning or were detained. Geagea admitted that Franjieh,s people did not do much on January 23, and certainly Franjieh did not try to rally mass support. Still, he said, some of Franjieh,s men shot at the LF, but from a distance. ¶8. (C) Geagea reported that at about 1800 hrs. local on the night before the strike, the March 14th group began discussing options in the event that the LAF did nothing to control the strikers and permitted them to block roads. March 14th leaders had information that the Ministry of Defense did have an operational plan for opening the roads, but if the plan were never put into effect, March 14th leaders agreed that the LF should respond. The LF started mobilizing its members. At 0500 hrs. local on January 23, the opposition was already gathering and blocking roads. At 0600 hrs. local, Geagea spoke with LAF Commander General Sleiman, and then Defense Minister Murr, and understood from both that the LAF would not take the necessary steps to stop the protesters from closing the roads. At that point, Sleiman said, "I am sick and I want to leave." At 0800 hrs. local, the crowd at one intersection had grown to 150 and by 1000 hrs. local it was over 300. At this point, Geagea told the LF to start moving in, because if they waited any longer, the situation could have gone out of control and the roads might have stayed closed for days. Geagea believed that inside the LAF, everyone was asking Sleiman to take some action, which he characterized as "huge pressure on Sleiman." When the LF arrived at roadblocks, there were Aounists blocking the roads, and the LAF were merely observing them. The LF then clashed with the LAF and the Aounists fled. At some intersections, such as Sayyad Circle in Hazmieh, not enough of the Aounists showed up to block the roads, and they had to be reinforced with Hizballah forces. When the LF went in, the Aounists fled, and more Hizballah supporters arrived to replace them. Geagea,s assessment was that Aounists were not used to fighting, in contrast to the LF supporters. The Aounists,he said, "are simply bourgeoisie." The LF are street fighters and organized. AOUN: A GREEK TRAGEDY -------------- ¶9. (C) According to Geagea, Aoun can now go in either of two directions: one is to dialogue without street action; the other is to arm his people. Syria is telling Aoun that they could provide him the arms and officers to train and fight alongside his people. Aoun is inclined to stick to the first choice of dialogue, but will ask the GOL for a license for his supporters to carry arms. Aoun is said to have gathered his people after January 23 and to have told them they did not do their job adequately in rallying the masses. He then replaced a few of his top lieutenants, moving out some and putting in their places former military officers. Geagea described Aoun as uncompromising, uwilling to listen BEIRUT 00000229 003 OF 003 to his close advisors, and acting only on what he thinks will take him closer to his goal of becoming president. Aoun finds himself in the midst of his own Greek tragedy: he knows he will not become the next president, and yet is spending all his efforts in trying to reverse the current situation in a last-ditch effort to become president. ¶10. (C) Meanwhile, the popular mood of Saad Hariri's Future Movement is "way ahead" of the opposition, but they too are are now arming themselves. One thing that Future Movement people fear is that in a possible conflict, given their location in western and southern Beirut, they could be encircled by the Shia. FEBRUARY 14 COMMEMORATION -------------- ¶11. (C) Geagea said that Saad Hariri told him he has guarantees from Hizballah, Amal, and others that they will not do anything on the two-year anniversary of Rafiq Hariri's assassination to disrupt the commemorations. The Ambassador told Geagea that Berri said the opposition tents could come done before the 14th, if there were some give and take in the political dialogue. The response was, "Don,t believe him and don,t rely on him." During the meeting, Geagea placed a call to see if a decision had been made by March 14 on the size of the commemoration. March 14th had decided to go with a large memorial deonstration at the site of the assassination. He said the Sunnis pushed Hariri to have a big event and he was pushing Hariri to make sure he has guarantees from the opposition and from Syria that the commemoration will proceed smoothly. SPECIAL TRIBUNAL -------------- ¶12. (C) Geagea believed that establishment of the Special Tribunal would be a major political triumph, and encouraged the U.S. to do whatever it takes to make this happen. But he cautioned that political events in France, where strong Hariri supporter President Chirac is due to leave office, may result in a serious loss of momentum. In parting, he stressed how bleak the way forward looks, again mentioning a possible civil war. FELTMAN