LEBANON: MODERATE SHIA LEADER DISCUSSES STATUS OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000219 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER CASC LE SY IR SUBJECT: LEBANON: MODERATE SHIA LEADER DISCUSSES STATUS OF HIZBALLAH IN BAALBEK Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b) . SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a 2/7 meeting with the Ambassador, Dureid Yaghi, a moderate, secular Shia who is Deputy Secretary of Walid Jumblatt's Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) in the Hizballah-stronghold of Baalbek, confirmed other reporting sources that Hizballah has re-established itself as the de facto government in Baalbek and its surrounding villages after a near evacuation of the city during last summer's conflict with Israel. What was unexpected was Mr. Yaghi's assertion that the Siniora government is missing a genuine opportunity to reassert government presence in underserved sectors in Baalbek, specifically in HEALTH services and education, where the population, according to Yaghi, would warmly welcome government presence. With unemployment exceeding 80 percent and faltering agricultural production, the area around Baalbek is now economically depressed and the population has not responded well to the victory claims of the returning Hizballah hierarchy. Finally, a slight opening may have appeared in the long-standing issue of abducted U.S. minor Kelsey Klotz, when Mr. Yaghi acknowledged he has heard of the young girl (last known to be in Baalbek, but reportedly evacuated during last summer's conflict) and would ask his contacts to try to obtain information on the child's present condition and location. End summary. ¶2. (C) Dureid Yaghi, long known to the Embassy as a reasonable, honest interlocutor from an area that is difficult to access, described the Baalbek district as a region acutely suffering from lack of economic activity. He recollected with some derision the pell-mell evacuation of Baalbek by Hizballah's hierarchy last July when the city became a high-value target for IDF air assets, and with even greater disdain their "victorious" return after the conflict, with their "hollow claims" of victory. He also recalled the IDF helicopter-borne raid to Baalbek late in the war that left the inhabitants "aghast" by the temporary sight of IDF soldiers in the streets, ransacking Hizballah headquarters, from which they removed significant quantities of documents. His overall assessment was that Hizballah though flush with money and once again in firm control of the city and its environs, is no longer held in the same high esteem it previously enjoyed. ¶3. (C) Mr. Yaghi, whose family has deep roots in Baalbek, explained that Hizballah cadres fully control security in the city and patrol openly with weapons, despite the presence of a large LAF contingent. The LAF essentially minds its own business and, in the absence of orders to the contrary, allows Hizballah forces a free reign to operate roadblocks and transport supplies/personnel throughout the district. All Hizballah personnel are reportedly well paid and therefore constitute the principal economic force in an otherwise destitute region. ¶4. (C) The veteran politician was forthright when he recounted that many families in the area benefited significantly from a once-flourishing opium and hashish trade, but when this illicit economic activity was shut down many years ago, with no serious attempt to introduce substitute crops, the local economy never recovered. He said marginally profitable agricultural activity was possible, but with few alternative means to earn a livelihood, it was relatively easy for Hizballah to establish near complete economic and political control. ¶5. (C) Despite Hizballah's dominant position, Yaghi insisted genuine opportunities existed for the government to offer services, particularly in the HEALTH and education sectors, that would be well received by the surprisingly diverse local population. Mr. Yaghi indicated he has discussed this idea with his political mentor Walid Jumblatt, as well as pertinent government ministers, but reportedly received not much more than good intentions. He expressed frustration that the government remains boresighted on Beirut to the severe detriment of the country's outlying regions, when in fact, relatively modest expenditure of resources could produce significant increases in support for the government. He remarked with some exasperation that the politicians in parliament and the cabinet have to remember that, "Lebanon is not just Beirut and the Mountain" (i.e., Mount Lebanon with its traditional Maronite and Druse BEIRUT 00000219 002 OF 003 constituencies). Moreover, in his considered view, the people of Baalbek are not enamored of Hizballah's one-dimensional administration and are fertile ground for an pro-active central government dedicated to serving its constituents. ¶6. (C) The moderate Shia politician asked the Ambassador to use his influence with PM Siniora to impress upon him the political advantage to be gained by paying more attention to Lebanon's hinterlands. He emphasized that the need for government services is great and if the Siniora's reform government could meet even a modest level of health, education, and security needs, they would gain broad, valuable support that they could use to hold off anti-democratic forces. He summarized, "With the international assistance now being offered, ask Siniora to devote what resources he can to hospitals, schools and police services, particularly in the long-neglected countryside." BAALBEK MORE POLITICALLY DIVERSE THAN THOUGHT -------------- ¶7. (C) According to Mr. Yaghi, the population of the Baalbek region is approximately 15 percent Sunni and 15 percent Christian (a majority support Samir Geagea and a lesser number, Michel Aoun),with the remaining Shia. However, the large Shia community in the north Biqa Valley is not politically monolithic, such as ONE would find in south Lebanon or the southern suburbs of Beirut. He estimated that roughly 10 percent of the citizenry support the maverick former SYG of Hizballah, Sobhi Tufayli (who has recently begun attacking his successor, Hassan Nasrallah, as an Iranian puppet),while another 10-15 percent are secular Shia who are looking for an alternative. ONE local issue that has generated considerable anti-Hizballah sentiment, and might form a rallying point for organized opposition, is that organization's politically crude attempt to annex more than one million square meters of municipal land for Hizballah supporters. ¶8. (C) Perhaps exhibiting the electoral optimism of all politicians, Yaghi stated he was confident a combination of Sunnis, Christians, and Shia not affiliated with Hizballah, was strong enough to win a municipal election in Baalbek, a feat they had actually achieved in 1998. He acknowledged that a political alliance with the notorious Tufayli (who is still wanted on felony murder charges from a botched violent protest several years ago by his supporters and was head of Hizballah when the organization blew up the Marine barracks and two U.S. embassies in the mid-1980s) was not exactly what one would normally brag about. But he insisted the non-Hizballah voter bloc was large enough to produce a major electoral surprise in a region most Lebanese have written off as hopelessly under the control of Hassan Nasrallah. AMAL CHAFFS UNDER HIZBALLAH'S CONTROL -------------- ¶9. (C) Turning to larger issues in Lebanon's Shia community, the PSP Deputy Secretary maintained that although Amal and Hizballah are on the surface nearly inseparable, Amal leader Nabih Berri and most of his supporters would like nothing better than a return to the days when they pursued their own independent policies. He recalled the violent Amal-Hizballah clashes of Lebanon's civil war and emphasized that veteran Amal members have not forgotten the thousands that were killed. ¶10. (C) Mr. Yaghi also pointed out the violent clashes of January 25 not only highlighted the traditional Shia-Sunni rift, but also demonstrated that while Amal agitators followed a script written in Damascus designed to produce crisis, the more patient Hizballah forces were striving to adhere to the more nuanced dictates of Tehran. He remarked that in the long term, this division was potentially more important than the Shia-Sunni schism everyone seems to emphasize. U.S. CITIZEN KELSEY MARGARET KLOTZ -------------- ¶11. (SBU) In light of his extensive knowledge of Hizballah's activities in the Biqa Valley, the Ambassador asked Mr. Yaghi if he was aware of the Kelsey Klotz case. Yaghi said indeed he was familiar with the matter and in fact, had also heard of the Shia family who reportedly holds BEIRUT 00000219 003 OF 003 her (Kelsey Klotz, a ten-year old U.S. citizen was abducted by her mother in February 2004 and was illegally transported to Lebanon). He believes that the family, which is affiliated with Hizballah, departed Baalbek during last summer's conflict, but could have returned along with other Hizballah supporters in the intervening period. At the Ambassador's request, Mr. Yaghi said he would make inquiries of his contacts in the area to see if he can obtain more recent information. He assured the Ambassador he would pass on any resulting information. Embassy Beirut will follow this lead closely. FELTMAN