Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BEIRUT1
2007-01-03 06:57:00
SECRET
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

SAUDI AMBASSADOR ON HIZBALLAH VISIT, BERRI

Tags:  PREL PTER LE SY SA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7632
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #0001/01 0030657
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 030657Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7018
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0690
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000001 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2027
TAGS: PREL PTER LE SY SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI AMBASSADOR ON HIZBALLAH VISIT, BERRI
INITIATIVE

REF: A. BEIRUT 3908


B. BEIRUT 3913

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000001

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2027
TAGS: PREL PTER LE SY SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI AMBASSADOR ON HIZBALLAH VISIT, BERRI
INITIATIVE

REF: A. BEIRUT 3908


B. BEIRUT 3913

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) Saudi Ambassador Abdulaziz Khoja, meeting with
Ambassador Feltman on 12/30, said that Hizballah members
Na'im Qassim and Mohammed Fneish would not have been
reassured by their 12/27 audience with King Abdullah.
Abdullah rebuffed their attempts to encourage a Saudi-Syrian
dialogue, insisting that Hizballah work with the other
Lebanese to find solutions to Lebanon's problems. Critical
of the ongoing street protests in Beirut, Abdullah also
strongly defended PM Siniora and Saad Hariri against Qassim's
attacks and underscored Saudi Arabia's commitment to the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Khoja claimed not to be
familiar with specific threat information the Hizballah
visitors shared later with intelligence chief Prince Muqrin
regarding the Hajj. Khoja and the Ambassador agreed that
Speaker Berri's initiative (ref a) was a non-starter (and,
indeed, later that day Berri informed both that he was
dropping his idea). Khoja said that, while Saudi Arabia
remained open to the idea of hosting Lebanon's political
leaders, he did not see much promise of success for the
moment. End summary.

QASSIM, FNEISH CALL
ON SAUDI KING ABDULLAH
--------------


2. (S) Receiving the Ambassador at his apartment on the
first day of 'Eid al-Adha, Khoja confirmed the account (ref
b) by Minister of Information Ghazi Aridi that Hizballah
second-in-command Qassim and (resigned) Minister of Energy
and Water Fneish had met with King Abdullah the previous
Wednesday (12/27). When Hizballah had requested the meeting
through intermediaries in Riyadh, Abdullah insisted that
Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah issue a
communique first -- which Nasrallah did -- calling on Hajj
pilgrims to be peaceful. Without going into detail, Khoja
said that Saudi Arabia had information suggesting that Iran
hoped to use Hizballah pilgrims to disrupt the Hajj.


3. (S) On the Saudi side, Abdullah included Foreign

Minister Saud al-Faisal, intelligence chief Prince Muqrin bin
Abdulaziz, and Khoja. The Hizballah visitors, Khoja claimed,
were unhappy at Khoja's presence, having been annoyed at the
Saudi envoy ever since his forceful intervention to stop a
potential December 1 Hizballah-Aoun attack on the Grand
Serail government compound. While being customarily polite,
Abdullah made it clear that Khoja enjoys the king's
confidence. Qassim, while responding with predictable
flowery praise for Khoja, hinted that Khoja should maintain a
more neutral posture. Abdullah responded that others in
Lebanon complained that Khoja had been too sympathetic to
Hizballah, suggesting to the king that Khoja was behaving
appropriately.

HIZBALLAH URGES SAUDI-SYRIAN
RAPPROCHEMENT TO SOLVE LEBANON'S ILLS
--------------


4. (S) According to Khoja, encouraging a Saudi-Syrian
rapprochement seemed to be the primary Hizballah message.
Qassim, who did most of the talking, told Abdullah that Saudi
Arabia and Syria, working together, could easily solve
Lebanon's problems. Abdullah could not resist making a
"little joke," Khoja said; maybe, the king said, he could
talk to Syrian President Bashar al-Asad once the king again
became a "full man" (a reference to Asad's notorious August
speech referring to the "half-men" of the Arab world). But
for the most part, Abdullah did not address the question of
Syria directly, even though Qassim kept trying it from
different angles. Instead, he responded by telling Qassim
and Fneish that the Lebanese had to work out their problems
on their own. Rather than talk to him, the Lebanese should
be talking to each other. Specifically, Hizballah needed to
sit down with Siniora, Hariri, and Walid Jumblatt.

DISAGREEING OVER SINIORA, HARIRI
--------------


5. (S) Emphasizing that everything was cloaked in

BEIRUT 00000001 002 OF 003


diplomatic language that failed to mask a frank exchange,
Khoja reported that Qassim and Fneish accused Siniora,
Hariri, and Jumblatt of perfidy. While Jumblatt was beyond
hope of redemption, their experience in dealing with Siniora
and Hariri in particular was not good. Something is agreed
upon, and then they receive orders from their U.S. masters to
break the deal. Siniora receives instructions directly from
the U.S. Ambassador and cannot be trusted. Abdullah "shut
them up," Khoja said, by praising effusively Siniora as a
Lebanese patriot and Saad Hariri "as a brother and son of
Saudi Arabia." Saudi Arabia fully supports both. The king
again argued that the Lebanese have to learn to deal with
each other and not rely on foreigners to solve their
problems. The king expressed confidence that Siniora and
Hariri would always work for Lebanon's best interests.

. . . AND OVER THE TRIBUNAL
--------------


6. (S) Abdullah asked his Hizballah visitors pointedly why
they were blocking the establishment of the Special Tribunal
for Lebanon, which he described as a high priority for the
kingdom. Qassim claimed that Hizballah, per the decision of
the March 2 session of the National Dialogue, fully supported
the principle of the tribunal. But there were some
constitutional and legal concerns with the current draft he
claimed. Abdullah again urged Hizballah to sit down with
others to make the concerns clear. If the concerns were
minor, then surely the Lebanese could collectively agree to
address them. But Saudi Arabia did not want the tribunal to
be stripped of effective authority. The king also told his
visitors that one of the reasons they face difficulties with
Saad Hariri is the tribunal, since Hizballah is perceived as
trying to derail something that is a top priority for Hariri
and the Sunnis.

SIT DOWN TOGETHER, RATHER
THAN CONTINUE SIT-INS
--------------


7. (S) According to Khoja, Abdullah also asked Hizballah,
in reference to the ongoing sit-in demonstrations, "why do
you want to destroy your country?" Told by Qassim that
Hizballah is merely trying to exercise freedom of expression
and assembly in order to have a more effective voice within
the GOL, Abdullah repeated his earlier counsel: Hizballah
should sit down and talk directly with the others. Abdullah
made it clear that he did not support using the street to
change the government. When Qassim tried to raise concerns
about Sunni-Shia tensions, Abdullah responded that Lebanon
also had Druse, Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Armenians, and
others. Don't talk of Sunni-Shia tensions; you are all
Lebanese and should work together for solutions, the King
urged.


8. (S) As for the security information they carried, Qassim
and Fneish, immediately after their meeting with Abdullah,
met privately with intelligence chief Prince Muqrin bin
Abdulaziz. Khoja claimed that he had not yet received a
read-out of that meeting and thus did not know what specific
security information the Hizballah delegation shared.

BERRI INITIATIVE: DOA
--------------


9. (S) The Ambassador and Khoja then compared notes on the
"National Salvation Government" initiative proposed by
Parliament Speaker Berri (ref a). Both agreed that the
proposed cabinet formation would be unacceptable to the March
14 forces, who would be reduced to having only three out of
ten ministers. (Later that day, during an 'Eid call with the
Ambassador, Berri said that he was dropping his proposal, a
message he also passed to Khoja. "It seems no one likes my
idea," Berri said.)

SAUDI DIPLOMACY
--------------


10. (S) The Ambassador asked Khoja whether Saudi Arabia was
still interested in hosting Lebanon's political leaders in a
dialogue session. Making some veiled criticism of Arab
League Secretary General Amr Moussa's initiative, Khoja said
that, indeed, Saudi Arabia would welcome playing a
constructive role, as long as the Lebanese were making the
actual decisions among themselves. But, he said, the
enthusiasm for some kind of Saudi-hosted meeting is waning

BEIRUT 00000001 003 OF 003


slightly compared to ten days ago, for there does not seem to
be much chance of success at the moment. Having a
Saudi-sponsored meeting now would probably raise expectations
that could not be fulfilled, Khoja said, making things worse,
not better. Questioned explicitly by the Ambassador, Khoja
said that there is no Saudi initiative currently on the table.
FELTMAN