LEBANON: FORMER AMAL PARTY INSIDER SAYS SYRIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001987 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: FORMER AMAL PARTY INSIDER SAYS SYRIA FAVORS GENERAL SLEIMAN REF: BEIRUT 1950 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires William Grant for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Former Amal member Mohamed Obeid believes the pro-government March 14 bloc has thus far mishandled the presidential election crisis. He claims the matter is now hinging on secret talks between Druse leader Walid Jumblatt and Parliament Speaker Berri, who would have to get Hizballah approval of any deals with the majority. Obeid, who has good contacts in Syrian leadership circles, said Syria was in favor of Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman becoming President. According to Obeid, the Syrians see Sleiman as someone who could deal with Sunni extremism, as well as limit the excessive recruitment of Sunnis into the Internal Security Forces (ISF). ¶2. (C) As for anti-Hizballah Shia, Obeid does not believe even the most respected and well-known independent Shia have a chance of drawing people away from Hizballah. However, he claimed an accommodation with Hizballah could be reached via the mediation of the Shia-dominated Amal party led by Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri. Obeid said that Hizballah flourishes only because of Lebanon's instability, its big draw being the symbol of resistance to Israel. According to Obeid, the December 12 assassination of LAF Chief of Operations General Francois al-Hajj (reftel) was Saudi retaliation for al-Hajj's hardline approach in last summer's LAF operation against Fatah al-Islam militants. End of summary. BERRI-JUMBLATT TALKS REMEDY HARIRI'S BUNGLING -------------- ¶3. (C) In a December 17 meeting with Poloff, former Amal member Mohamed Obeid said Saad Hariri's clumsy handling of his talks with Berri led to the constitutional amendment impasse. Obeid claimed Hariri thought he could win Berri over to March 14's side by making him promises. In reality, Berri, who has no base among the Shia masses, cannot cut deals without Hizballah approval. Hizballah, for its part, owes Aoun for his support during the July 2006 war, and sees in Aoun a valuable ally who, according to Obeid, enjoys the support of well over 50 percent of Lebanese Christians. Obeid, stressing the importance of Aoun's role, indicating that the Christians participating in the cabinet of PM Siniora were not seen as prominent in the Christian community and so did not help Siniora's image with Christians. He mentioned Acting Foreign Minister Tareq Mitri and Justice Minister Charles Rizk in this regard. ¶4. (C) Obeid noted that deteriorating relations between Berri and Aoun had been mended through Hizballah mediation and emphasized that Aoun's stubbornness, not Syria or Iran, was holding up the election of Sleiman. As for majority and opposition differences, Obeid said Berri and Jumblatt were working on ways to facilitate the election, as well as other issues, such as formation of a government and revamping the electoral law. Obeid noted that a planned December 16 Berri-Jumblatt meeting had been canceled, but that Berri's advisors had dissuaded him from holding an anti-Saad Hariri press conference on the same day. SYRIA THUMBS-UP FOR A SLEIMAN PRESIDENCY -------------- ¶5. (C) Obeid, who regularly travels to Damascus to confer with President Asad's Lebanese affairs advisor Mohamed Nassif (AKA Abu Wael),claimed the Syrians support a Sleiman presidency. According to Obeid, the Syrians believe Sleiman will play a good balancing act between them and the U.S. He added that the Syrians are willing to settle for less than what they lost two years ago and realize that their interests outside of Lebanon are more important. In the Syrian view, Sleiman is capable of effectively countering Lebanese Islamic extremism, which has links to Islamists in the Syrian cities of Aleppo and Homs. Obeid added that Syria believes Sleiman could also control the ongoing excessive recruitment of Sunnis into the Internal Security Forces (ISF) intelligence directorate. Obeid claimed Maronite Patriarch Sfeir confided his concern about this supposed Sunni influx to a mutual BEIRUT 00001987 002 OF 002 friend. INDEPENDENT SHIA DON'T STAND A CHANCE -------------- ¶6. (C) Obeid acknowledged that some Shia do not like Hizballah as a "cultural phenomenon," but asserted that Hizballah SYG Hassan Nasrallah is unassailable as leader of Lebanon's Shia. Obeid noted that respected Shia cleric Sayyed Hani Fahas, his father-in-law, has realized the futility of confronting Hizballah. Obeid added that Fahas also does not want to complicate his relations with Iranian and Iraqi Shia circles by trying to compete with Hizballah. As for outspoken Hizballah critic Sayyed Ali al-Amine, Mufti of Tyre, Obeid said he is isolated and only exploited by the government when convenient. ¶7. (C) Obeid stressed that Shia do not necessarily support Hizballah on domestic issues, but that resistance to Israel trumps other concerns, and noted that before the July 2006 war there were about 50 Hizballah fighters in his native village; now there are 250. Obeid claimed that the only hope for anti-Hizballah Shia to gain more political clout would be through the good offices of Berri, a Shia, who would be able to work out an "arrangement" with Hizballah. Obeid added that Hizballah had learned a lot about the concerns of other confessions through its relationship with Aoun. AL-HAJJ VICTIM OF SAUDI RETALIATION -------------- ¶8. (C) Obeid claimed that during last summer's LAF assault on Fatah al-Islam (FAI) militants in the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp, army operations chief Francois al-Hajj was determined to eliminate FAI, while others in the GOL, including Minister of Defense Elias Murr and majority leader Saad Hariri, tended toward the possibility of negotiations with FAI. According to Obeid, LAF Commander Sleiman fence sat and al-Hajj ultimately won out. Obeid said Hariri saw FAI as a necessary counterbalance to Hizballah forces, and asserted that Saudi financing had built up FAI. The assassination of al-Hajj was Saudi payback for defeating FAI. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Some of Obeid's claims seem, at best, unique -- blaming the Saudis for al-Hajj's assassination is one we have not heard before. We believe Obeid wants to convey Syrian views, give them a positive slant, and emphasize Syrian flexibility. He frequently confers with President Asad advisor Mohamed Nassif to sound out Syria's position on matters Lebanese, as well as to convey messages between Berri and the Syrians. (Note: In A/S Welch's December 19 meeting with majority leader Saad Hariri, Hariri mentioned Nassif as someone who was directing Berri's every move in dealing with the current election impasse. End note.) ¶10. (C) Although Obeid is, in effect, working for Berri, he made comments belittling Berri's role similar to those we have heard from other Shia not close to Berri. Obeid was forced to resign as Director General of the Ministry of Information on corruption charges in the late 1990's and left Amal because he did not think Berri defended him forcefully enough. Obeid contested the charges, was later acquitted in court, and has since mended relations with Berri. End comment. GRANT