LEBANON: A/S WELCH AND FRENCH CHARGE EXCHANGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001986

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: A/S WELCH AND FRENCH CHARGE EXCHANGE
VIEWS ON NEXT STEPS


BEIRUT 00001986 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires William Grant for Reasons: Section 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) During a visit to Beirut following the December 17
Lebanon Ministerial in Paris, NEA Assistant Secretary David
Welch and Deputy Advisor to the President and National
Security Advisor (DAPNSA) Elliot Abrams discussed Lebanon's
continuing political crisis with French Charge d'Affaires
Andre Parant on December 19. All agreed that the U.S. and
France should do what was necessary to support the Siniora
government, while at the same time avoiding giving the
impression of having given up on the election. Parant viewed
Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun as both a problem
and a pretext for the opposition, and predicted that the
election would occur when the Syrians decided the time was
right. Parant also expressed concerns about UNIFIL security
in the south and skepticism about the German border mission
in the north. End summary.


2. (C) Visiting NEA Assistant Secretary David Welch and
Deputy Advisor to the President and National Security Advisor
(DAPNSA) Elliot Abrams met with French Charge d'Affaires
Andre Parant at his Residence des Pins on December 19.
Charge Bill Grant, Pol/Econ Chief, NEA Staff Assistant, and
Remy Bouallegue (Parant's notetaker) also attended the
meeting. A/S Welch explained to Parant that the purpose of
his visit, the day after the French-hosted Ministerial on
Lebanon in Paris, was to demonstrate U.S. support for March
14 and help overcome the perception that the U.S. and France
were not working together on Lebanon. The Secretary had had
good discussions with FM Bernard Kouchner in Paris, he said,
and the two shared a strong understanding regarding their
goals in Lebanon.

PREPARING FOR THE LONG HAUL
--------------


3. (C) The U.S. was now looking ahead to what it expected to
be a prolonged crisis, A/S Welch continued, with three
possible scenarios. The first, March 14 pursuing the
election of a president with a half plus one majority, seemed
unlikely. The second, the preferred outcome, was that the
majority and opposition would find a solution and elect
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman as a
consensus president, the scenario that was currently in play.
Third, the status quo, with the Siniora government
continuing to exercise the authority of the presidency, would
continue.


4. (C) The U.S. was exploring possible tools to pressure the
Syrians to allow the election to take place, A/S Welch said.
DAPNSA Abrams added that the U.S. also would like to see the
Europeans increase their pressure, but that it did not seem
likely.


5. (C) Parant admitted that the Paris declaration on Lebanon
was not as good as the French would have liked.
Nevertheless, March 14 had told him that, although weak, it
was a good beginning. He told A/S Welch and D/NSA Abrams
that their visit was important. March 14 was "depressed" and
March 8 was confident in its strength and ability to obstruct
the election. The visit was helpful in changing this
perception and boosting March 14's confidence.


6. (C) France had told March 14 it could count on French
support, but should not rely exclusive on external support;
it also needed to do its homework and develop a better
communications strategy, especially to counter March 8's
assertions that the opposition was making all the
concessions. Majority leader Saad Hariri had assumed a low
profile for fear of being attacked (Note: Saad has told us
the same thing. End note.). March 14 needed both a
short-term strategy to avoid appearing on the defensive, and
a long-term strategy to help it win the 2009 parliamentary
elections. March 14 leaders had met the night before and
started to think about this, he said.


7. (C) Parant agreed with the three scenarios outlined by A/S

BEIRUT 00001986 002.2 OF 004


Welch, adding that he did not view December 31 (when the
current legislative session ends) as a deadline for the
election. If there is a political agreement, he said, the
election can occur at any time. Not only did the
constitution prescribe two methods for amendments, but the
parties themselves were discussing ways to elect Sleiman that
would not require an amendment, which France would accept
even though it did not see them as constitutional. "We can't
be more Lebanese than the Lebanese," he said.


8. (C) If Syria and the opposition believe they've obtained
the maximum concessions possible, they may agree to a
compromise, Parant continued, especially if March 14 exhibits
a little more flexibility. However, he did not believe there
would be an election on December 22 (the next scheduled
parliamentary session),and probably not before the end of
they year.

SUPPORTING THE SINIORA GOVERNMENT
--------------


9. (C) It was therefore important that the government
demonstrate that, although it wanted an election and had made
concessions, it also was prepared to take steps to govern,
albeit without provocation. It was important, Parant
stressed, that the Siniora government avoid giving the
opposition any pretext to criticize it, but at the same time
it needed to show it was governing, i.e., by appointing a
minister to replace assassinated Industry Minister Pierre
Gemayel and resuming Council of Minister meetings. March 14
needed to communicate to explain why it was taking these
actions, explaining that it had tried everything possible to
hold the election, but in the meantime it could not leave the
country without leadership.


10. (C) A/S Welch suggested that the U.S. and France should
work on a common agenda of discourse with the Siniora
government, aimed at boosting GOL institutions. Defending
the Siniora government against attacks that the Christians
were not properly represented without a president was key.
Parant, noting that this was Free Patriotic Movement leader
Michel Aoun's argument, agreed that the government should
immediately replace Gemayel, and also appoint a minister to
replace resigned opposition minister Yaacoub Sarraf. Another
possibility was to expand the current government by ten,
adding five Christians and five Muslims.


11. (C) DAPNSA Abrams suggested that the Siniora government
also needed to take economic steps. Parant agreed, adding
that an assessment should be done of the debt situation.
France, he said, would sign a Euro 375 million budget support
agreement in January, to be disbursed in three tranches:
Euro 155 as soon as the end of January, with a second tranche
in the second half of 2008. A/S Welch noted that Saad was
pressing for a big deposit from Saudi Arabia.

THE AOUN FACTOR
--------------


12. (C) Parant agreed that Free Patriotic Movement (FPM)
leader Michel Aoun, whom he planned to see the next day, was
a real problem for Hizballah. The FPM provided Christian
cover for the Shia group, as well as a pretext for Hizballah
to extract more concessions from the opposition. But, Parant
argued, Hizballah also had the capacity to tell Aoun that,
while it supported him, it was time to make a deal on the
presidency.


13. (C) We need to understand to what extent Aoun is a real
problem and to what extent he is only a pretext for
Hizballah, Parant said. DAPNSA Abrams agreed that Aoun had a
useful purpose, noting that at the Paris ministerial,
whenever Syria or Iran was blamed, Arab League SYG Amr Moussa
would protest, fingering Aoun as the real culprit. Parant
cautioned that it was not easy to pressure Aoun, who loved to
appear as a martyr. If you victimize him, he'll use it to
increase his own importance. Unfortunately, Parant said,
France did not have the tools at its disposal to impose
sanctions like the U.S.


13. (C) Aoun's popularity had decreased in the past year,

BEIRUT 00001986 003.2 OF 004


Parant continued (i.e., following his 2006 MOU with
Hizballah),but he was still important, and Saad's refusal to
deal him Aoun was "really childish." The Christians were
divided between Aoun and Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea.
Aounists have concluded that Aoun will not become president,
and Aoun himself is prepared to accept that, Parant said, but
he continues to hope that if the election is delayed until
the 2009 parliamentary elections, he will have an opportunity
then. March 14 should work on his supporters, Parant
suggested, who will be eager to jump ship if it appears his
chances are sinking, while the U.S. should target its
sanctions at his immediate circle.

OPPOSITION SEATS IN CABINET
--------------


14. (C) Parant, confirming that Saad talked to Hizballah
through MP Mohamad Raad, argued that Hizballah should be in
the next cabinet, perhaps with Salloukh staying on as Foreign
Minister. It is better that Hizballah be in the government
that outside criticizing it, he explained.


15. (C) The real problem, he said, would be allocation of the
"sovereign" ministries between the majority and the
opposition. March 14 should keep the Ministries of Justice
(because of the Special Tribunal) and Interior (for internal
security purposes and election issues). March 8 would then
get Finance and Foreign Affairs, with the President receiving
Defense. But how to convince Saad to give up Finance, he
asked? (Note: Saad has told us he learned from his father
long ago that he who pays has the control. He said he would
give the portfolio to a weak minister, but retain effective
control it himself. Finance is considered one of the four
"sovereign" ministries, while Justice is sometimes considered
the fifth. End note.)

SYRIANS IN NO HURRY TO SEE A PRESIDENT
--------------


16. (C) Parant said he sensed the Syrians had lost confidence
in their ability to influence events in Lebanon and believed
U.S. influence was now stronger than theirs. March 14's
nomination of LAF Commander Michel Sleiman had caught them by
surprise, and "there's nothing the Syrians hate more than
being surprised," he said. The assassination of Lebanese
Armed Forces (LAF) General Francois al-Hajj was a clear
message to Sleiman, Parant believed, adding that Saad had
told him he spoke to Sleiman the day after the assassination,
and Sleiman reportedly confided that he felt personally
targeted.


17. (C) The Syrians are not in a hurry, Parant continued;
they deal according to their agenda. When it is in their
interests, there will be an election, he predicted. Sleiman
doesn't need Syria's support to be president, he said, and is
therefore less easy to manipulate, although of course he has
lots of links to Syria. Unlike a Michel Edde, who needs
Syria to make him king. Nor, Parant argued, would Sleiman be
a puppet of Hizballah. Sleiman had told Parant that he knew
Hizballah's capacity and would not attack it ("I'm not
crazy!" he reportedly said),but at the same time would not
be complacent. "I'm someone who can say no," Sleiman said to
Parant.

TENUOUS UNIFIL, BORDER SECURITY
--------------


18. (C) Welch asked about the current risk to UNIFIL, where
France has a large contingent of troops. Parant described it
as high, adding that it could go higher, especially if there
was a confrontation with Syria -- even a political one, he
said. It was therefore important to engage in dialogue with
Syria to decrease UNIFIL's exposure to risk. Parant did not
believe the risk would come from Israel, nor from Hizballah,
which had learned its lesson from the 2006 war and was busy
reconstituting its capacity and restoring its bruised public
image. Hizballah would want to keep its capacity for
important causes, Parant argued, and not waste them on an
operation that could provoke major Israeli reaction.


19. (C) However, Parant did not rule out the possibility of a

BEIRUT 00001986 004.2 OF 004


Palestinian group, possibly manipulated by Hizballah or
operating with Hizballah's consent, attacking UNIFIL. To
avoid such a scenario, Parant confirmed that France regularly
sends messages to Hizballah not to touch UNIFIL or France
will hold Hizballah responsible.


20. (C) Parant was not optimistic about the utility of the
German border pilot project. Without the political
willingness to control the border from both sides, Parant did
not think France could provide much assistance. Furthermore,
he said, PM Siniora was right: how can we believe the
Syrians are serious when the PFLP-GC is on their border?


21. (U) A/S Welch has not cleared this cable.
GRANT