LEBANON: A/S WELCH AND DAPNSA ABRAMS WITH PM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001982 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2027 TAGS: OVIP PARM PGOV PREL PTER FR LE SY SUBJECT: LEBANON: A/S WELCH AND DAPNSA ABRAMS WITH PM SINIORA Classified By: Charge d'Affairs William Grant for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) NEA Assistant Secretary David Welch and Deputy Advisor to the President and National Security Advisor (DAPNSA) Elliott Abrams updated PM Siniora on December 18 on the December 17 Paris meetings regarding the Palestinians and on Lebanon. A/S Welch informed Siniora about a potential Arab League emergency meeting focusing on Syria and its involvement in Lebanon. Siniora accepted the idea of a special meeting, but called the Arab League "impotent" in its dealings with Syria. Siniora also advised the U.S. to deal with Syria in a firm but quiet manner, as Turkey was doing with Syria over the issue of Kurdish terrorists based in Syria. Siniora also provided possible solutions on how to deal with March 8, and stressed that the key to March 14's survival would be unambiguous international support. End Summary. RESULTS FROM PARIS DONORS' MEETING -------------- ¶2. (C) Visiting NEA A/S David Welch and DAPNSA Elliott Abrams met with Prime Minister Fouad Siniora at the Grand Serail on December 18. Charge Bill Grant, Pol/Econ Chief, Poloff, and Siniora advisors Mohamad Chatah and Rola Noureddine also attended. A/S Welch began by giving Siniora a synopsis of what occurred at the December 17 Paris donors' meeting to support the Palestinian Authority (PA),and the subsequent Ministerial meeting on Lebanon. ¶3. (C) Welch said that fundraising for the PA was exceptional and a good outcome for the Palestinian people. He believed the U.S., as well as the international community, achieved the goals of the conference. Siniora replied that this was a good result for the PA and that now the donors must follow through with what they pledged. He noted that President Mahmoud Abbas must ensure that corruption is nonexistent in the management of these donations. Bad bureaucracy and mismanagement of funds can be worse than stealing the money. International donors should not place many conditions on how the money is appropriated, he added. ¶4. (C) Welch commended French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner who realized the mistake of the French initiative on Lebanon. Welch said the French initiative on Lebanon would have been dead long ago, had it been up to Kouchner. Abrams noted that Kouchner had particularly harsh words for Syria and its involvement in derailing the French initiative. The only country Kouchner was harder on than Syria was his own, he said. ¶5. (C) A/S Welch said UNSYG Ban Ki Moon conveyed to him that the Special Tribunal should be up and running by early next year. Fundraising for the Tribunal went exceptionally well during the conference, with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) pledging around USD 15 million. A/S Welch added that donors seemed quite generous in offering donations, and the amount raised could have been even higher if the UN had been more aggressive in its fundraising efforts. The UAE had been especially helpful, he said. ARAB LEAGUE "IMPOTENT" TO DEAL WITH SYRIA -------------- ¶6. (C) Arab League SYG Amr Moussa told A/S Welch in Paris he planned to have the Arabs get involved in the Lebanese political crisis in the near future. Secretary Rice had told her Arab League colleagues they needed to be more forceful with Syria, to stop it from playing a destabilizing role in Lebanon. ¶7. (C) Welch said the Arab League should hold a meeting on how to deal with Syria and the U.S. should follow up to ensure that the meeting occurs and that the Arab League follows through with whatever actions it decides to take against Syria. Siniora was dismissive, saying that the comments Moussa made while in Paris were "the right words, BEIRUT 00001982 002 OF 003 but they have no legs to stand on." ¶8. (C) Siniora said that Syria is accustomed to the threats of international pressure and sanctions and that this is not the answer. Asking the Arab League to convene a special session on dealing with Syria is a fine step, but Moussa's communique will only collect dust and will be ignored by Syria, if nothing comes of it, Siniora said. He believes that the Arab League will get caught up in its bureaucratic and diplomatic wrangling that will produce a result that says a lot, but means nothing and "has not teeth", which he believes will display to Syria the "impotence" of the Arab League and the international community. Siniora said that in discussions he had this earlier in the week, he was told by Moussa that a plan had not been developed yet on how to deal with Syria. He also was not fully convinced that an Arab League meeting was the right solution. Syria would be relieved when the Arab League develops weak punitive actions against it, he said. THE TURKISH WAY OF DEALING WITH SYRIA -------------- ¶9. (C) Siniora reiterated his desire to see the U.S. refrain from taking punitive actions, such as travel restrictions, against individuals seen as undermining Lebanese sovereignty, arguing that U.S. sanctions have become a badge of honor for Syrian officials. According to Siniora, the Syrians react better to quiet diplomacy, as opposed to public threats and comments. Regimes such as the Syrians cannot be seen as "losing face"; therefore, he stressed the need for the U.S. to send a strong, but quiet, message to Damascus. ¶10. (C) Siniora provided as an example the way Turkey dealt with Syria regarding Kurdish terrorists being given safe-haven inside Syria. Until 1998 the Kurdish terrorist leader Abdullah Ocalan was based in Syria. As fighting between the GOT and Kurdish rebels in Syria intensified, the GOT amassed Turkish troops along the Turkey-Syria border and sent a message to Damascus threatening Syria with a full scale military invasion, if the Syrians did not hand over Ocalan and shut down all Kurdish training camps in its territory. As a result, Syria forced Ocalan to leave the country, closed all Kurdish terrorist camps in Syria, and allowed GOT officials to inspect the sites for confirmation. This, Siniora said, is an example for the U.S. on how to deal with Syria in a firm, but quiet, way. HOW TO DEAL WITH MARCH 8 -------------- ¶11. (C) Siniora displayed his anger with what has become the ninth postponement of the conveying of parliament in order to elect a president. He called Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri's most recent proposal to overcome the constitutional obstacle to electing a sitting high-level government official a "disgrace." The proposal violates the constitution, and would put Michel Sleiman under the constant threat of intimidation, because at any moment any parliamentarian can threaten to challenge Sleiman's legitimacy, making Sleiman susceptible to challenge. (Comment: Although Siniora did not mention him by name, he probably had Free Patriotic Movement Leader Michel Aoun in mind. Aoun, who still contests 11 seats from the 2005 parliamentary election, publicly would seize the opportunity to challenge Sleiman's legitimacy to advance his own presidential aspirations. End Comment.) ¶12. (C) According to Siniora, there are three solutions to the current political crisis. March 14 must 1) maintain its solidarity and not collapse; 2) make it clear what principles it is willing to stand up and fight for and decide what it will not compromise on; and 3) decide what it is willing to offer to the opposition, which Siniora deemed necessary at some level to reduce the tension and the threat of violence. ¶14. (C) Siniora said the majority must avoid getting in petty arguments with March 8, because he believes that the majority should focus on acquiring economic support and security sector support from the international community, instead of engaging the opposition in petty squabbling. He said if BEIRUT 00001982 003 OF 003 there is no clear support from the international community, Syria will continue its strategy of assassinations to break March 14 down until it has lost its majority. Therefore, the U.S. must be willing to provide political and economic support to March 14, in order to show Syria and Iran that March 14 and its allies are serious. He added that pressure from Arab capitals on March 8 will have to be clearly indicated. ¶15. (C) Siniora said the solution to Lebanon's political problems does not lie in Lebanon totally and part of the problem is with Damascus and Tehran. He displayed his frustration at what he believes is Lebanon's position as a battleground for other nations' battles, referring to problems between the U.S. and Syria and between the U.S. and Iran. He added that Lebanon is paying the price for its "virtues" as a democracy and liberal society, which is allowing others to manipulate Lebanon. Siniora also said that the critical period for Lebanon will be the dates between December 22 and December 31. He believed this period must be utilized efficiently by the international community with the theme being increased pressure on Syria and the opposition to allow elections before the end of the year. He said that March 14 will meet in the coming days to decide on its strategy for how to act during this period. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT IS IMPORTANT FOR MARCH 14'S SURVIVAL -------------- -------------- ¶16. (C) Siniora believed that the March 14 majority went too far in extending its hand to the opposition. March 14 compromised too many of its core principles; i.e. accepting Michel Sleiman as a compromise candidate, agreeing on a constitutional amendment, and showing its willingness to establish a national unity government. He said that if March 14 compromises too much, Lebanon will end up like Afghanistan, where tribal chiefs exchange control of government ministries to one another as a form of deal-making. This type of process would kill Lebanon's democracy. ¶17. (C) Siniora also believed that unambiguous political support for March 14 is needed from the international community and that Lebanon could serve as a model of democracy in an undemocratic region. He added that March 14 is willing to fight at the ballot box and with its words, and "not with violence, like others are willing to do." The only ammunition that March 14 needs is genuine international support, according to Siniora. He offered as an example his willingness to resign as prime minister and dissolve his cabinet "the minute that a president is elected and sworn in." (Note: As Siniora is aware, the prime minister and his cabinet are automatically considered to be resigned upon election of the president. End Note.) Siniora said democratic principles and a spirit of moderation is what are important in Lebanon. ¶18. (U) A/S Welch has not cleared this cable. GRANT