LEBANON: NEA A/S WELCH'S DECEMBER 15 MEETING WITH

S E C R E T BEIRUT 001968 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2027 TAGS: OVIP MASS MOPS PARM PGOV PREL SY LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: NEA A/S WELCH'S DECEMBER 15 MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER MURR REF: BEIRUT 1950 Classified By: CDA William Grant for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a December 15 meeting with NEA Assistant Secretary David Welch, Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Elias Murr alluded to his strong belief that Hizballah and Syria had the most reason to assassinate General Francois Hajj. Murr also said he had positive leads to identify Hajj's killers and asked for USG assistance in the investigation on behalf of the LAF. Murr believes Hizballah and Syria will continue to block Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman's election as president. Murr also mentioned Michel Aoun's plan to use A/S Welch's visit as a propaganda weapon against March 14 and proof of USG interference in internal Lebanese affairs. According to Murr, an economic crisis is the biggest threat to the Siniora government, and the U.S. should publicly and privately emphasize to March 14 and its allies that there are no secret deals between the U.S., Syria, and Iran at the expense of Lebanon. End Summary. MURR SAYS HIZBALLAH HATED HAJJ -------------- ¶2. (C) A/S Welch, Deputy Legal Advisor Jonathan Schwartz, Charge Bill Grant, and PolOff met with Deputy PM and Defense Minister Murr on December 15 at the Minister's residence. A/S Welch began by conveying his condolences for the December 12 murder of LAF G-3 Operations Director Francois al-Hajj. Murr, who survived an assassination attempt himself, said that Hajj was a good, strict, honest, and professional man; not political. ¶3. (C) Murr noted that Hajj was considered the "devil" by Hizballah, which had inquired through its own channels about Hajj's possible succession to LAF Commander should Michel Sleiman be elected president. According to Murr, Hizballah always wanted Hajj removed from his post as head of army operations because they feared him. Murr said Hajj's position on issues such as UNSCR 1701, the Golan Heights, and delineation of the Lebanese/Syrian border were all antithetical to Hizballah's views. Murr also added that Hajj was an anti-Syrian figure whom had faced problems in his professional career during the Syrian occupation of Lebanon, when the Syrians held sway over LAF promotions. ¶4. (C) Murr said Hajj died because he had now emerged as the lead candidate to replace Sleiman. Calling him a "technical" military general with few political aspirations and someone who worked strictly by the book, Murr noted that Hajj, who was born in the southern Lebanon town of Rmeish and had commanded LAF units in the south during the Israeli occupation, made no secret of his desire to rid his native south of Hizballah. Murr believed these positions must have been known by Hizballah. In Murr's view, the assassins believed that Sleiman's election as president would occur relatively quickly in the coming weeks, and that Sleiman would have replaced Hajj as LAF commander soon after his election. It became necessary for Hajj's opponents to act quickly to remove him from the picture. There were likely two secondary goals for the assassination of the head of the operations division, as well: postponement of the presidential elections and destabilization of the LAF. GENERAL HAJJ'S REPLACEMENT WILL BE "WORSE" FOR HIZBALLAH -------------- -------------- ¶5. (S) Murr added that he had chosen General Nabil Karraa, former 1st Brigade Commander, to replace Hajj as head of LAF operations chief. According to Murr, Syria and Hizballah will see Karraa as "their worst choice" to replace Hajj. given his good performance in managing the deployment of the LAF to southern Lebanon in accordance with UNSCR 1701. ¶6. (C) When asked by the Charge whether there was any credence in the rumors that Fatah al-Islam (FAI) was behind Hajj's assassination, Murr returned to his assertion that Hizballah was behind the attack. FAI was a Syrian creation, he said, but it is Hizballah, not Syria, that had the most to lose if the LAF was led by a strong leader such as Hajj. Murr said Hizballah believed the LAF would be badly defeated and humiliated at Nahr al-Barid. However, after witnessing the LAF's courageous stand against FAI and its ultimate victory, Hizballah realized the LAF had the will to stand up and fight. The LAF was now seen as a serious threat to Hizballah, especially with strong officers such as Hajj. UPDATE ON HAJJ ASSASSINATION INVESTIGATION -------------- ¶7. (S) Murr said the assassins purchased the vehicle the day before the assassination and that the assailants placed the vehicle at the murder site around 6:10 a.m. and detonated the vehicle at 7:02 a.m. Murr said (please protect) Lebanese investigators have pictures of the two assailants purchasing the vehicle in the southern city of Sidon, but the quality of the photos was poor. In the coming days he planned to reach out to the USG agencies for help in improving the quality of the photos. Murr would like to compare the photos of the assassins with pictures the LAF intelligence division has in its databanks of Nahr al- Barid fighters, Palestinian refugees, and Sunni extremist fighters from the north. ¶8. (S) Murr said the GOL plans to post the pictures in all Lebanese newspapers with the hope that someone who can identify the killers will come forward. The Charge noted that the FBI had contacted the GOL about offering its services to investigators, but that the offer had been turned down by PM Siniora's office. Murr responded that his request would be on behalf of the LAF's intelligence division and not the Prime Minister's office. A/S Welch replied that the USG is happy to help in any way possible in the investigation. POSSIBLE ELECTION OUTCOMES -------------- ¶9. (C) A/S Welch offered his assessment of the current political situation, outlining three possible outcomes: negotiations could continue and a solution reached on how to proceed with Sleiman's election, the March 14 majority could exercise the "50 percent plus 1" option, or after the fall legislative session ends on December 31, PM Siniora and his cabinet could remain in power and also handle the day to day operations of the presidency. ¶10. (C) Murr replied that he hoped the international community would pressure Syria to tell its March 8 allies to allow Sleiman's election to take place before the December 31 deadline. He was not excited about the "50 percent plus one" option because of the strain it would place upon Sleiman as president. He said the Siniora government could remain in power after December 31, but that international support would be needed for the government to remain viable. ¶11. (C) According to Murr, Hizballah and Syria object to Sleiman because, in their view, he says one thing in public but does something completely different on the ground. Murr added that Hizballah and Syria only trust candidates they can easily control and manipulate, such as Michel Edde and Jean Obeid. ECONOMIC SITUATION COULD BE GOL'S DOWNFALL -------------- ¶12. (C) In terms of the economy, Murr mentioned that the GOL currently has a significant amount of government bonds due to mature between January and May of 2008. According to Murr, the GOL does not have what it needs to pay these obligations. Murr demurred that the economy was in bad shape and that the GOL could face bankruptcy next year. If this happened, Lebanese citizens could become destitute and would begin to protest in the streets. Murr said that people will not question why the economic collapse occurred, but will simply begin to blame the GOL for the crises. Murr noted that majority leader Saad Hariri and PM Siniora were optimistic about the economic situation, but that both men have repeatedly asked him how the LAF would react if there were protests due to an economic collapse, and asked whether the LAF could be relied on to protect parliamentarians and GOL officials. Murr believed the LAF would be paralyzed and unable to stop the violence. AOUN UPSET ABOUT A/S WELCH'S VISIT AND SNUB -------------- ¶13. (C) Murr then turned the conversation over to comments Michel Aoun had made regarding A/S Welch's visit. Murr said the March 8 opposition would more than likely try to use the visit as a sign of U.S. interference in the Lebanese presidential election process. There are some within March 14 who believe that the U.S. is bargaining with Syria at Lebanon's expense, he added. A/S Welch replied that the U.S. had no secret deals with Syria or Iran, it did not intend to return ambassadors to Damascus or Tehran, and there were no secret contacts between the U.S. and Syria, or between the SIPDIS U.S. and Iran. ¶14. (C) Murr said Aoun was being pressured by Hizballah to compromise on Sleiman's election and to hold elections next week. Murr also said Hizballah was using Aoun as cover just to claim Christian representation in their block. Murr said that Aoun was a "stupid, crazy man" who could not be trusted. JUMBLATT MUST BE REASSURED -------------- ¶15. (C) A/S Welch then mentioned to Murr that he would be meeting later with Druse leader Walid Jumblatt. Murr asked A/S Welch to personally reassure Jumblatt that the U.S. would continue its support to the GOL and would not sacrifice it in exchange for rapprochement with Syria. Murr said Jumblatt increasingly believes that the U.S. is negotiating secret deals with Syria and Iran and is willing to sacrifice Lebanon. Unfortunately, Jumblatt has begun to turn his new theory into public statements. Murr added that Jumblatt's psyche can turn 180 degrees when he is in this suspicious type of mood. According to Murr, Jumblatt needed to be personally reassured by A/S Welch that the U.S. continues to support March 14 as much as it did on March 14, 2005. However, Murr cautioned against "exciting" Jumblatt too much with reassurances of U.S. support, saying that Jumblatt has a tendency to become overzealous if too overconfident. ¶16. (U) A/S Welch has not cleared this message. GRANT