LEBANON: PM SINIORA BLAMES REGIONAL ISSUES FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001945 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: PM SINIORA BLAMES REGIONAL ISSUES FOR FAILURE TO ELECT PRESIDENT REF: BEIRUT 1936 BEIRUT 00001945 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) PM Siniora believes Syria's attempt to use Lebanon as a pawn in its efforts to secure regional recognition is the primary reason for the opposition's obstacles to electing Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman as president. Urging strong international support for Lebanon, he stressed that March 14 already had made many concessions, yet the opposition continued to demand more. March 14 would not yield, Siniora confirmed, but the situation would become increasingly difficult as time passed. Siniora also revealed his own way out of the crisis (please protect): enlarging the cabinet to bring in more Shia ministers as a way to overcome the opposition's objections to including the government in the process for amending the constitution. End summary. LEBANON IS HOSTAGE TO SYRIA'S REGIONAL GOALS -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by DCM and Pol/Econ Chief, met with PM Fouad Siniora and advisor Rola Noureddine at his office in the Grand Serail on December 11. Siniora cited regional issues as the primary reason for the opposition's blocking of the election. Syria is using Lebanon as a hostage to extract concessions from the Saudis and Egyptians, he explained, whom it worries will not attend the Arab League Summit in Damascus in March. The Syrians had asked the Jordanians to arrange a visit of President Asad to Saudi Arabia, and the answer was no, he said. Saudi FM al-Faisal reportedly told Siniora the day before that Syria's strategy was not working. ¶3. (C) The Jordanians themselves did not understand the nuances of the situation, Siniora warned, and might be tempted by the thought of a package deal on the presidency unless we explain to them that this is a bad idea. Even though the Turks were still talking to Syria, PM Erdogan's aide Ahmad bey Devotuglu had told him the day before that Turkey was disappointed with Berri because he had promised to facilitate the election and now suddenly changed his mind. But the Turks could play a more effective role than the French, Siniora argued, without making concessions. ¶4. (C) Is the election strictly a domestic issue? Siniora asked rhetorically. If not, then someone else needs to do something, not us. France must play a role by telling the Syrians they have let Paris down. They should warn both Syria (which is seeking concessions from the EU, especially in the form of recognition of Syria's role in Lebanon and the need for the Saudis to talk to Damascus) and Iran (which is seeking concessions on its nuclear program) that no concessions will be made, Siniora urged. ¶5. (C) This means, he continued, that we need a strong UNSC Presidential Statement, noting that he had asked FM al-Faisal to help. He had also talked to the Chinese and Russian Ambassadors in Lebanon, and planned to talk to the Qataris, Indonesia, and the UK. In addition, the government must get its act together, he said. The opposition is stopping the affairs of the state (Siniora later confirmed that telecom privatization would be delayed, since in the current situation the government could not make major decisions),so we need a steadfast approach and continued international support (financial and moral) to be able to fulfill our duties. Otherwise we must surrender and go home, he said. LEBANON HEADED TOWARD POINT OF NO RETURN -------------- ¶6. (C) Syria is pushing us to the point of no return, Siniora warned. March 14 has made a lot of concessions. First, we agreed to compromise our principle against amending the constitution, a calculated step that we made to allow the election to take place. I was the toughest opponent, Siniora said, but the opposition did not use the opportunity to BEIRUT 00001945 002.2 OF 003 demonstrate to the Lebanese people and Sleiman that they were willing to find a solution. Berri's proposals for amending the constitution are a "Pandora's Box" in terms of violating the constitution, he warned, adding that he believed Berri had received "clear instructions" (presumably from Damascus). ¶7. (C) The price of abandoning Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun was too high, Siniora surmised; Aoun put the opposition in a difficult situation by threatening to support March 14 if they did, and Hizballah needs Aoun's Christian cloak. Aoun's insistence on a package deal was just the "tip of the iceberg" in his effort to renegotiate the Taif Accord, he warned. ¶8. (C) Second, Siniora continued, we decided to support Sleiman, as a way to gain ground with the Patriarch, the Christians, and the army to pave the way towards a situation in which the president could play a role in promoting dialogue. This would build momentum that would decrease the probability of clashes and increase the probability of talking sensibly and encourage the Shia to regain their senses. But it seems again that the opposition is unwilling to desert Aoun, while at the same time it is unable to address their own constituency, Siniora said. When the dust settles, someone will question their actions, Siniora predicted, adding, "I'm betting on this." ¶9. (C) Asked whether, as time passed, the opposition would maintain its opposition to a package deal on the presidency, Siniora answered in the affirmative. He added, however, that it also would depend on the solidarity of March 14. The opposition is betting on time, and will continue until the next legislative session begins mid-March. Meanwhile, March 14's position was still that issues such as cabinet formation and program and a new electoral law would be worked out under the auspices of the new president, in accordance with the constitution. He confirmed he was consulting with Sleiman every day, whom he found "solid," and was dealing with him as if he were the president-designate CONSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS SHRINK AFTER DECEMBER 31 -------------- ¶10. (C) Regarding the December 31 end of the current legislative session (reftel),Siniora confirmed that Article 77 of the constitution could no longer be invoked to amend the constitution, since it stated that parliament, acting during an ordinary legislative session, must initiate the process. Article 76, under which the president initiates the process, then refers to the cabinet, and finally parliament, could still be used at any time, he said. ¶11. (C) While it would not be impossible to amend the constitution after December 31, it would be less bitter for the opposition to do before then, Siniora argued, since Article 76 entails a prominent role for the Siniora cabinet, which the opposition deems illegitimate. (Note: This interpretation was subsequently confirmed to us in a meeting with MP Bahije Tabbareh, a respected constitutional expert who was present during the December 7 meeting of French FM Kouchner, Berri, and Hariri. End note). ¶12. (C) Siniora stressed that his government's resignation (which Berri is demanding) was not the "way out." The opposition wants to delay the election, he said. I'm trying to find a balance between their regional agenda and our domestic situation; if the regional situation changes, so will the opposition, he said. But if the situation drags on for another three months, we'll wait, because we can't go against the constitution. SINIORA REVEALS HIS OWN SECRET PLAN -------------- ¶13. (C) Siniora (please protect) revealed his own plan for resolving the problem of the constitutional amendment. He would expand the cabinet to bring in more Shia and remove any doubt about its legitimacy. There is precedent for this, he insisted, adding that he would add people who "bring value" but won't have substantive portfolios. March 14 is "not BEIRUT 00001945 003.2 OF 003 short of ideas," Siniora said, but "it takes two to tango. We can't tango alone." (Talking with the Ambassador later, Siniora's senior aide Mohamad Chatah claimed that he had awakened at 5 a.m. this morning with the cabinet expansion idea. He missed our meeting with Siniora because he was with Saad Hariri at the time, selling the idea to him.) ¶14. (C) Siniora admitted he was not comfortable with the status quo. However, he had shown his government's good will in terms of amending the constitution and holding the election. People need to understand that this situation was not our choice, but it's one we have to deal with. After January 1, we will prepare our own draft law to amend the constitution, he said. Until now I'm "staying cool" he said, but don't rely on my patience; we need international support we can "translate" -- this is a major battle. FELTMAN