LEBANON: SAAD HARIRI: OPPOSITION DOESN'T WANT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001936 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: SAAD HARIRI: OPPOSITION DOESN'T WANT ELECTIONS BEIRUT 00001936 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Majority leader Saad Hariri believes that the opposition's continuing efforts to block the election of Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman reflect Syria's desire to maintain a presidential vacuum. Still disillusioned with the French and expressing frustration with US policy , he is seeking Saudi, Egyptian, Jordanian, and Turkish pressure on Damascus. He remains firm in his rejection of a package deal linking the presidency to cabinet formation, and is mulling other options to force Parliament Speaker Berri's hand. If the election is postponed until after December 31 (the end of the current legislative session),the legal context for electing Sleiman will become even more complicated, as parliament will no longer be able to convene to amend the constitution. Saad believes the opposition beQves that violating the constitution to elect Sleiman is a violation of UNSCR 1559, and will use this to attack other provisions in UNSCR 1559. End summary. SYRIANS DON'T WANT ELECTIONS -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by DCM and Pol/Econ Chief, met with majority leader Saad Hariri at his office in Qoreitem on December 10. Hariri advisors Ghattas Khoury and Nader Hariri and notetaker also attended the meeting. Saad wasted no time in getting to the point: the Syrians are lying, and the opposition will try to delay the elections, maybe until after New Year's. They just don't want an election, he said; "a void is in their interests...instead of bombing them, we go talk to them." (Note: Parliament's legislative session ends December 31. The next one does not begin until March. By delaying the election until after New Year's, it could be argued that parliament no longer has the legislative power to amend the constitution. End note.) ¶3. (C) Noting that he had spoken on the phone that afternoon with French Presidential Envoy Claude Gueant, King Abdallah of Jordan, and President Mubarak, Saad said Gueant was not going to return to Damascus and that he had advised the French to talk to the Jordanians and Egyptians, not to the Syrians, who have been "lying and lying" while March 14 was "compromising and compromising." Saad reportedly told Gueant that Paris should send a message through Amman and Cairo to Damascus, and "let it be the last." ¶4. (C) King Abdallah reportedly told Saad that the Syrians wanted the Saudis to talk to them, but that Saudi Arabia would not until Syria took its hands off Lebanon and the Palestinian issue. Saad agreed that the Arab League summit in March, hosted by the Syrians, could be playing a role in Syria's thinking. What is U.S. policy on Syria? Saad demanded, adding that there was a "lack of clarity" and a lot of "sweet talking" with the Syrians regarding their role in Iraq. ¶5. (C) Talk to the Turks, Saad said, tell them we've reached the end of our patience. If the opposition allows the election to happen, it will not be because of the French (who allowed Syria back into Lebanon),but because of Turkey. President Asad promised PM Erdogan, Saad claimed, adding that he had sent Erdogan another message earlier in the day to urge the Turks to pressure the Syrians to stop playing an obstructionist role. NO TO PACKAGE DEAL ON PRESIDENCY -------------- ¶6. (C) Redirecting the whole political debate from the presidency to the next government was just an effort to delay the election, Saad explained, but there was no more talk of a package deal. Saad, who had just returned from a 48 hour trip to Saudi Arabia where he met with King Abdallah, said the Saudis were "very solid" in their opposition to a package deal on the presidency. No one in the international community was looking at a package, Saad said, adding that even if they did, they would find him firmly against. BEIRUT 00001936 002.2 OF 002 ¶7. (C) Saad said Berri and Hizballah MP Mohamad Raad had told him in their meeting that they wanted him to be prime minister. He reportedly replied that he had never said he was a candidate; the issue on the table was the presidency. The day I say I'm a candidate, he explained, is the day we start negotiating on the cabinet, and I don't want to start bazaar. MORE CONSTITUTIONAL WRANGLING -------------- ¶8. (C) Saad also had spoken with Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and Hizballah MP Mohamad Raad earlier that day, who both told him the constitutional amendment could not pass through the cabinet. They claim it's because of (Free Patriotic Movement leader) Michel Aoun, Saad said, but even Kouchner has given up on Aoun. Saad said ten March 14 MPs would sign the petition requesting a constitutional amendment, then ask parliament to vote on a draft to send to cabinet. If Berri continued to reject a cabinet role in the process (as mandatQby the constitution),the he would bear the blame for not amending the constitution, not March 14. ¶9. (C) The Ambassador suggested that, as Berri had claimed in the past he would do, the simple solution was to have one Shia minister return to the cabinet to temporarily restore its legitimacy. Alternatively, perhaps the cabinet could at last accept at least one of the Shia ministerial resignations given 11/11/06 and then replace the Shia, to make it harder for the opposition to claim the cabinet is illegitimate. Saad replied that March 14 had discussed this, but because cabinet appointments require the approval of the president (whose powers the cabinet assumed following President Lahoud's departure),they would need the Patriarch's blessing (presumably to counter the opposition's objections). ¶10. (C) Saad then revealed that March 14 was prepared to elect Sleiman even if it meant violating the constitution. "It's a slam dunk," he said. Khoury explained that, modifying an idea proposed by former Speaker Hassan Husseini, parliament could vote to suspend the relevant provisions of Article 49 of the constitution calling for a constitutional amendment. Again, this would need cabinet approval, which if Berri refused would make him the party responsible for violating the constitution. ¶11. (C) The reason the opposition wants to violate the constitution, Saad said, is that it would call into question UNSCR 1559, which says the elction must be conducted according to Lebanese constitutional rules. They will argue that if we violate one provision in 1559, we can violate other provisions as well. COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) Saad is standing firm, as well he should, on refusing to discuss a package deal on the presidency. We share his suspicions on Syrian intentions, and we will support any move March 14 makes to corner Berri into allowing the election to move forward. Saad's comment on UNSCR 1559 could provide the motive we have been seeking for Berri's insistence on electing Sleiman via what are blatantly unconstitutional means. If so, since we do not want to see UNSCR 1559 weakened or ignored, we should discourage March 14 even more strongly from agreeing to any procedures other than those prescribed by the constitution. ¶13. (C) With the session to elect a president now postponed for the eighth time (septel),until December 17, we are increasingly concerned that Sleiman's presidency is at risk. If parliament fails to convene on December 17, chances are the next session will be postponed until after the holidays. And after December 31, the legal procedures for electing Sleiman become even more complicated, probably increasing the opposition's calls for an extra-constitutional solution. End comment. FELTMAN