LEBANON: BERRI DEMANDING CONSENSUS ON HOW TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001931 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA FRONT OFFICE AND NEA/ELA; NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: BERRI DEMANDING CONSENSUS ON HOW TO AMEND CONSTITUTION REF: STATE 164382 BEIRUT 00001931 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 ( b) and (d). SUMMARY AND COMMENT -------------- ¶1. (C) Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri insists on amending the constitution to elect Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman as president via methods that bypass the Siniora government. Blaming, as usual, everyone but himself for the ongoing impasse, Berri cites Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun as the real "political" problem. While it is as yet unclear what tangible political gains Berri hopes to secure by throwing up legal obstacles to the election of what until now has been an elusive consensus candidate, we suspect the current delay is yet a further attempt to wring concessions in terms of the next cabinet's formation and program. End summary and comment. ¶2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by DCM and Pol/Econ Chief, met with Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and his advisor Ali Hamdan at Berri's office in Ain el-Tineh on December 8. Berri began the meeting by stating that, after parliament was postponed for a seventh time on December 7 (until December 11) in its efforts to elect a president, he was "not so optimistic" this time. He still believed amending the constitution would be an easy task and had proposed two ways to do so (which he claimed were "not from my brain"),but the March 14 majority would not accept them. BENDING THE CONSTITUTION TO BYPASS SINIORA: FIRST PROPOSAL -------------- ¶3. (C) The first proposal was to have the Siniora government resign. (Note: The opposition considers the government illegitimate after the November 11, 2006 walk-out of six opposition ministers, including all five Shia ministers, thereby depriving it of its confessional balance. This has not stopped the "resigned" ministers from carrying out their day to day activities, though they refuse to attend cabinet meetings. Their resignations were never officially accepted by the Siniora cabinet. End note.) The government then would automatically become a caretaker government. ¶4. (C) Berri agreed that a caretaker government normally would not be allowed to undertake important government business such as amending the constitution, but argued that if everyone agreed on the need for the amendment, the government could be given that right, only "tangentially touching" any constitutional irregularities. Furthermore, PM Siniora already had said he would give his resignation to the new president; why not resign a half an hour earlier (i.e., before the election) to make this proposal feasible? The process of amending the constitution and electing the president then could be done in two hours, he said. (Note: The prime minister's resignation is automatic upon election of a new president. End note.) ¶5. (C) In a twist on this proposal, Berri suggested that, if the Siniora government did not voluntarily resign, it would automatically be considered resigned should two more ministers resign from the cabinet. (Note: Cabinet must have two-thirds, or 16 out of 24 original ministers, to remain in power. After the resignation of the six opposition ministers, and assassination of Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel, the current cabinet has only 17. End note.) BENDING THE CONSTITUTION TO BYPASS SINIORA: SECOND PROPOSAL -------------- ¶6. (C) Berri's second proposal, assuming the resigned Shia ministers would not return to the government and the government itself would not resign, was for ten MPs to sign a petition proposing a constitutional amendment, then for parliament to pass the amendment without referring it to the government (as mandated under the constitution). It would be ordained a "law to be implemented immediately," thereby BEIRUT 00001931 002.2 OF 004 obfuscating the need for government approval. Under this scenario, the amendment and election of the president could be done in one a half hours, he said. EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES CALL FOR EXCEPTIONAL MEASURES -------------- ¶7. (C) For both proposals, Berri argued, after reading from past legal decisions he claimed supported his argument, "exceptional circumstances" and the "interests of the state" could be invoked as reasons for not adhering strictly to constitutional procedures. As he had told majority leader Saad Hariri, the presidential vacuum, the ongoing problem with Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun, and the risk of a Sunni-Shia conflict all justified this approach. It's like after 9/11, he said, when the U.S. took actions that encroached upon civil liberties in the name of national security. Furthermore, Berri concluded, the Lebanese constitution is based on the French, and French jurists agree with this approach. REWRITING HISTORY -------------- ¶8. (C) The Ambassador noted that in the past Berri had said an easy -- and constitutional -- solution would be for at least one resigned minister to return to the cabinet temporarily to remove any questions about its legitimacy, thereby allowing the cabinet to play its constitutional role in amending the constitution. Berri denied this (although Saad told us Berri told him the same thing),saying he "didn't go into the details" of procedures for amending the constitution. ¶9. (C) Berri admitted, however, that the possibility had been discussed. MP Bahije Tabbareh had told Berri, French FM Kouchner, and Hariri that, although the current government was not constitutional, the Shia could return and include in the minutes of the Council of Ministers their reservations about the government. The issue also had been raised with Hizballah; (Rresigned) Energy Minister Fneish reportedly said Hizballah would agree only if all the decrees passed during the past year by the "illegitimate" Siniora government were reviewed by the fully reconstituted cabinet. Saad had discussed the issue with Berri and Hizballah MP Mohamad Raad, who reportedly said he would ask Hizballah SYG Hassan Nasrallah. Berri told the Ambassador that he would stand aside if Nasrallah gave the green light. ¶10. (C) The Ambassador then suggested that the Siniora government could accept the resignation of the six "resigned" ministers, and appoint a new Shia minister, thereby removing any doubt about the cabinet's legitimacy. Berri, appearing not to have considered this solution (though we're sure he'll find a legal study to tell us why it won't work next time we see him),said, "We can talk about that." HARIRI STALLS ON SIGNING PETITION -------------- ¶11. (C) Berri claimed he had asked MPs Bahije Tabbareh and Robert Ghanem (who heads the parliamentary legal committee tasked with studying the issue of the amendment) to prepare the petition to start the process. The petition, he said, would not specify how the constitution would be amended, it would just request that it be amended. Five MPs from each side would sign it (five from March 14, two from Hizballah, two from Amal, and Michel Murr, representing Aoun's bloc). ¶12. (C) Berri said he urged Hizballah and Saad to sign the petition on December 7, reportedly telling Hizballah to sign first and ask Nasrallah later. Saad reportedly agreed at first, then said he wanted to wait until he was comfortable with the whole process. Hamdan chipped in that the rumor was that Telecom Minister Marwan Hamadeh had advised Saad to wait (Hamadeh later confirmed this in a separate meeting with the Ambassador, saying he had advised Saad "not to rush"). This was a big mistake, Berri said, as it would have put a lot of pressure on Aoun. BEIRUT 00001931 003.2 OF 004 SLEIMAN IS U.S.' CANDIDATE -------------- ¶13. (C) The Ambassador insisted that, since there was a consensus on Sleiman and an urgent need to fill the presidential vacuum, parliament should be convened immediately to vote. March 8 already had won a victory by getting March 14 to propose a candidate from outside its bloc. "Which victory?!?" Berri exclaimed, affecting astonishment. The U.S. was the first to mention Sleiman, giving the green light by saying it was not opposed to a constitutional amendment, he said. Even with consensus, it is a different thing to talk about going to parliament and actually doing it, he added, suggesting that first there had to be agreement on how to amend the constitution. STILL HIDING BEHIND AOUN -------------- ¶14. (C) All of Lebanon is with Michel Sleiman, Berri said, except one person. That's the real issue, not how we amend the constitution. There is a political problem with Aoun, he said, shaking his head, "he is unbelievable!" ¶15. (C) Aoun wants two things, Berri continued: partnership in the government and a new electoral law. Referring to the proposed French communique, Berri said Saad wouldn't accept language on the need for a "proportional" government, which Aoun was claiming the French had assured him would be included. Aoun is pocketing French assurances of a "55/45" cabinet formation (to reflect the majority/minority composition of parliament). He also claims the Europeans promised him language on a new electoral law that would reference the "qada" (small district) voting system, Berri said. (Note: Aoun believes the "qada" system will lead to electoral gains for his party, and blames an unfair electoral law for not receiving a fair share of seats in the 2005 elections. End note.) ¶16. (C) In addition, Aoun is insisting that Sleiman only remain in office for "one year and seven months" (i.e., until the 2009 legislative elections) and that Saad not become prime minister, Berri continued. Claiming to object to both demands, he added that he had said so to Amal and Hizballah, warning them that Aoun's demands go against the interests of the Christians (presumably because they would weaken the Christian-held presidency),and we can't oppose an entire community. ¶17. (C) The Ambassador noted that cabinet formation should be the new president's prerogative; otherwise he would be deprived of his constitutional role. Sharing points from reftel demarche, the Ambassador said he had already begun notifying Aoun MPs that they could potentially risk financial sanctions and a travel ban to the U.S. should they continue to obstruct efforts to elect a president. COMMENT -------------- ¶18. (C) For many months, Berri insisted on the need for a two-thirds quorum to elect a president in order to ensure consensus. Now that a consensus candidate has been found in Michel Sleiman, Berri is raising the bar yet again: consensus now must be reached not only on the candidate but also on the procedure for amending the constitution. When questioned why the simple strategy of having one resigned Shia return to the cabinet was no longer acceptable, Berri first denied having discussed it, then put the onus on Hizballah, stating that if Nasrallah was on board, it could be done. The slippery Speaker again has an answer for everything, but his answers are beginning to lose credibility with us and only raise our suspicions about his true aims. ¶19. (C) What does Berri gain by having the Siniora government resign or eliminating it from the amendment process? The satisfaction (on par with March 14's victory of watching President Lahoud leave Baabda Palace) of seeing Siniora prematurely leave the Grand Serail, with the implicit suggestion that March 8 was right all along and his government was indeed illegitimate? Whatever ego the BEIRUT 00001931 004.2 OF 004 do-no-wrong Speaker may have, this doesn't strike as the full answer -- unless Berri gambles that somehow this would lead to the unraveling of all the accomplishments of the Siniora government. The Special Tribunal presumably is safe, having been ordered by the UN. But decisions regarding telecom privatization (highly opposed by March 8, which sees them as benefiting the pockets of March 14, not to mention a threat to Hizballah's own independent telecom network) probably would be the first target. ¶20. (C) Would Siniora's resignation somehow strengthen Berri's posture with his Hizballah and Aoun allies (or Syria, for that matter),after so much bending in the wind over the past months in an effort to appease all sides? Again, not a fully satisfactory explanation. Despite Berri's efforts to lay all the blame at Aoun's doorstep, we view this as a convenient pretext for not moving forward with elections. After all, there is a two-thirds quorum without Aoun's MPs (and two MPs from his bloc showed up for the vote on December 7). ¶21. (C) Granted, Hizballah would lose its Christian cover should it split with Aoun. Berri therefore may be trying to buy time to find a way to bring Aoun on board, as he claims he is. Moreover, assuming that the opposition (and its Syrian and Iranian masters) do indeed want a president, we suspect that Berri, to ensure March 8's key interests are protected (i.e., Hizballah arms),is seeking more tangible gains, most likely related to cabinet formation and program. How he extracts those from lobbing up obstacles to the constitutional amendment is as yet unclear, but the latest twists are no doubt part of the delay, delay, delay game for which he has become famous to us, as he waits for instructions from Damascus and for the winds to shift even more decisively in his favor. FELTMAN