LEBANON: INCREASING THE HEAT ON THE PRESIDENTIAL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001916

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA; NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2027
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: INCREASING THE HEAT ON THE PRESIDENTIAL
ISSUE


BEIRUT 00001916 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
--------------


1. (S) The pro-Syrian March 8-Aoun forces have much to
gain, and March 14 forces much to lose, from the ongoing
delay in filling Lebanon's presidential vacuum. Tactically,
March 14 has more bargaining power on selecting the prime
minister and cabinet if the normal constitutional processes
are followed. As long as March 14 remains committed to the
core principles we are supporting in Lebanon, it is in our
interest to see March 14 succeed and thus the constitutional
processes used to the extent possible. Therefore, in our
view, the international community should work collectively
and forcefully to defeat the insistent March 8-Aoun attempts
to link presidential elections to a whole package of issues.


2. (S) By agreeing to endorse LAF Commander Michel Sleiman
as president via a constitutional amendment, March 14 has
already made significant concessions. Rather than asking
March 14 to give more, the international community should, in
our view, give the same message, loudly and in unison:
presidential elections now, and without linkage to other
issues. Having watched the French badly fumble (or
intentionally foul) the presidential elections so far, we
assume we will need to take on the leadership role in
building an international consensus for presidential
elections now, without complicating linkages. While sharing
a few specific ideas in this cable, we recommend starting to
point fingers at who is to blame for Lebanon's presidential
vacuum. End summary and comment.

UNHAPPY WITH KOUCHNER'S SURPRISE RETURN
--------------


3. (S) March 14 leaders view with trepidation the
unexpected return to Beirut today (12/4) of French Foreign
Minister Bernard Kouchner. They believe that, in lifting
their objections to a constitutional amendment and endorsing
LAF Commander Michel Sleiman as president, they have gone
quite far enough in concessions. They fear that Kouchner
will be seduced by the March 8-Aoun call for a package deal
-- presidential elections only once agreement is reached on a
prime minister, cabinet, cabinet program, new LAF commander,
etc. -- and that he will be drawn into negotiations by which
March 14 is pressured into further capitulation. In the
March 14 view, the Sleiman presidency is a generous (some
would say overly generous) take-it-or-leave-it offer that
should not be linked to the other difficult issues that will
follow.

MARCH 8 USES DELAY TO WEAKEN MARCH 14
--------------


4. (S) Kouchner's visit aside, the evidence supports March
14's view that the March 8-Aoun forces are trying to use what
March 14 saw as a necessary concession and turn it into a
full-scale surrender. Michel Aoun's public histrionics
yesterday linked his lukewarm support for Sleiman to March 14
acceptance of a whole range of Aoun-centric demands,
including agreement that Fouad Siniora's replacement as prime
minister would not come from March 14. Nabih Berri and
Hizballah continue to hide behind Aoun, asking everyone to
come up with a deal that satisfies Aoun that they can then
endorse. But Berri has told people that the idea of deciding
on a cabinet and new army commander in advance of
presidential elections is sensible. Such a position, if
accepted, virtually ensures weeks of delay before Lebanon
sees a new president.

DELAY CONVEYS TACTICAL ADVANTAGE TO MARCH 8
--------------


5. (S) With a half-plus-one absolute majority election of
Nassib Lahoud as improbable today as it was a month ago
(alas!),we see nothing constructive and much risk in
delaying the presidential vote. An intriguing question is
why Lebanon's pro-Syrian political figures, who technically
and constitutionally concede nothing on the cabinet even were
Sleiman elected today, are so insistent on a delay: do they
not trust Michel Sleiman, as president, to protect their
interests? We conclude that the pro-Syrians, with their eye

BEIRUT 00001916 002.2 OF 004


on weakening and splintering March 14 into irrelevance, are
thinking of the tactical benefits to a delay: The longer the
vacuum persists, the more Michel Aoun will whip up populist,
Christian sentiment against March 14. With each day Baabda
Palace is empty, the pressure will increase on March 14 to
make concessions on the other issues that March 8-Aoun forces
are linking to the presidential elections.

MARCH 8 GETS MORE SAY IN PM, CABINET
IF LINKED TO PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
--------------


6. (S) Moreover, in terms of selecting a prime minister and
a cabinet, March 8-Aoun forces are in a stronger position now
than they will be in the normal constitutional process, that
favors March 14's majority. For picking a prime minister,
MPs individually tell the president who is their choice for
leading the next cabinet. These consultations are binding on
the president's choice, meaning that, if March 14 stays
together, the March 14 parliamentary majority can select the
next PM. By insisting on knowing in advance who will be PM
before agreeing to vote for the president, March 8 has
eliminated March 14's constitutional advantage.


7. (S) Regarding the full cabinet, the situation is more
complicated. The PM and the president together sign the
decree of the cabinet ministers -- this is one of the
strongest discretionary powers left to the president after
Taif. So, while the PM can work to assemble the cabinet, he
must satisfy the president sufficiently to win his signature
on the decree. Usually, this means that the president will
demand his share of the cabinet. (For the Siniora cabinet,
Emile Lahoud insisted on three ministers, two of whom --
Elias Murr and Charles Rizk -- subsequently switched sides.)
In practice, the PM and president alone can negotiate on the
cabinet, which then goes to parliament for a vote of
confidence. With the PM and the parliamentary majority in
March 14 hands, only Sleiman needs to be brought on board.
But by linking the cabinet to the presidential elections, the
March 8-Aoun forces are trying to make March 14 negotiate
with Aoun, Berri, and Hizballah all at once, and in ways
ultimately acceptable to Sleiman, who must co-sign the decree.

MARCH 14 MAJORITY STILL COUNTS --
IN CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES
--------------


8. (S) None of the other big issues -- selection of a PM,
formation of a cabinet, writing of a cabinet decree,
appointment of a new army commander -- will be particularly
easy even once a president (particularly a president of
questionable allegiances) is in place. But we conclude that,
despite the constitutional transformation of the Siniora
cabinet to a caretaker cabinet upon Sleiman taking office, it
is better for March 14 to negotiate via the constitutional
processes, where the razor-thin majority still counts for
something, rather than be forced to made decisions now. With
March 14 leaders more committed to the principles of
Lebanon's sovereignty and independence we are trying to
support, we hope that we can begin to tip the balance of
power back in their direction.

A SIMPLE INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL MESSAGE:
ELECTIONS NOW (AND WITHOUT LINKAGES)
--------------


9. (S) We have often wondered how to replicate the success
of spring 2005, when the message "Syria out!" was so
effective in persuading the Syrians that they had no choice
but to withdraw their military and intelligence forces.
The current presidential vacuum may provide the same
opportunity for a simple, coherent message that has domestic,
regional, and international support: "Elections now!" By
emphasizing the urgency, we also underscore that there should
be no linkages with other issues -- by definition, such
linkages delay elections. Part of this message should also
be directed to MPs, since it is their responsibility to vote.
Given the failure of the French initiative, we wonder if we
should be exercising leadership in seeing that the Europeans,
Egyptians, Saudis, GCC, Arab League, Vatican, and others all
echo this message, loudly and clearly and repeatedly, in ways
that make the March 8-Aoun forces recognize that they have no
escape from going for Sleiman now.

BEIRUT 00001916 003.2 OF 004



SPECIFIC IDEAS FOR PUBLIC, PRIVATE MESSAGES
--------------


10. (S) Nabih Berri has called for a parliament session on
Friday, and (we understand) March 14 MPs are to present a
petition today for the constitutional amendment needed to
elect Sleiman. Theoretically, then, the presidential
election could move ahead rapidly, if the proposed March
8-Aoun linkages are dropped and March 8-Aoun MPs feel the
heat. We suggest giving a push, via the following means:

-- High-level engagement with the French: while it is too
late to turn off the Kouchner visit that so unnerves our
March 14 contacts, we recommend talking with the French about
the fact that March 14, even after conceding the presidency,
is being blackmailed. This is not the constructive role that
France thought Syria's Lebanese allies would play after
French re-engagement with Damascus. We hope that the French,
who here told us that they would be "more Chirac than Chirac"
in terms of holding Damascus responsible for problems here,
will start pressuring those Lebanese parties who are delaying
the elections rather than continuing to push March 14 into
"consensus" positions.

-- Engagement with EU countries, Vatican, SAUDI Arabia,
Egypt, other Arabs: We could, via phone calls or quick
demarche, give a similar message about March 14 being
blackmailed. The purpose would be to urge that the others
join us in conveying by all means possible the unified
message noted in para 8 above.

-- UNSC Presidential Statement: While we would find it
unlikely to get consensus for a clearly March 14 presidential
statement, perhaps we could get one that notes the problem of
the presidential vacancy and that urges elections now. This
will contribute to the pressure to get the elections done
now, without linkages.

-- High-level phone call to Speaker Berri: Perhaps the
Secretary could urge Berri to move now, noting that the U.S.

SIPDIS
expects him to fulfill his responsibility as Speaker in
seeing the vacuum filled. (Berri sent us a message today,
incidentally, saying that he would welcome talking to the
Secretary. This is a belated response to our offer to set up

SIPDIS
a phone call several weeks ago. In fact, he claims to have
placed a call to the Secretary earlier, which was allegedly
not returned.)

-- High-level phone call to Patriarch Sfeir: This call
would be designed to reassure Sfeir that we are supporting
efforts to elect a president, and it would also help restore
some luster to the badly tarnished Patriarchate. It would
also undermine Michel Aoun's arguments that Aoun, not the
Patriarch, is the political point of reference for Lebanon's
Christians.

-- U.S. public statement lamenting the continued vacuum and
-- possibly -- hinting at sanctions in the case of further
delays.


11. (S) On the latter point -- a U.S. public statement --
we see value in using the visa ban and August E.O. that were
designed to deter acts that undermined Lebanon's stability
and constitutional organs. We believe that these tools have
had a beneficial impact in reducing financial support to
Michel Aoun and that they contributed to Emile Lahoud's
decision to leave office on time without taking
extra-constitutional measures. Now, we suggest using these
tools in order to move toward presidential elections as
quickly as possible. We have drafted a statement that we
could use in one of two ways. We could either issue this as
a Department press release now, or -- our preference for the
moment -- we be given authority by Washington to share
privately (as something under consideration) with people
close to Berri and Aoun, in hopes of enlisting them to
pressure their bosses into going through with presidential
elections.


12. (S) Our draft statement follows:

-- In August, the President authorized two new tools -- a
visa ban and financial sanctions -- in response to threats

BEIRUT 00001916 004.2 OF 004


against Lebanon's democracy, stability, and constitutional
order. Unfortunately, it is clear that, once again,
Lebanon's constitutional institutions are at risk. Lebanon
faces the danger of an extension of the presidential vacuum
created when Members of Parliament allied with Syria refused
to attend the electoral sessions scheduled before the
expiration of President Emile Lahoud's term.

-- The March 14 majority, in withdrawing its own
presidential candidates and moderating its concerns about
constitutional amendments, has offered a compromise solution
to fill Lebanon's presidential vacuum. Politicians from
across Lebanon's political spectrum have stated that Lebanese
Armed Forces Commander Michel Sleiman is broadly acceptable
for the presidency. With Speaker Berri having called for an
electoral session on Friday and with March 14 having proposed
a solution, the United States hopes that all MPs will respond
positively in order to give Lebanon a chance to fill the
presidential vacuum now. The United States will consider
that those who once again thwart the elections by their
absence or by attaching conditions to the elections are
intentionally trying to undermine Lebanon's democracy and
constitutional institutions.

MOVING TOWARD PLAN C
--------------


13. (S) There is a chance that, with the vacuum serving
their interests in wanting to undermine March 14's
credibility and ability to govern, the March 8-Aoun forces
will remain impervious to the pressure being applied to elect
Sleiman now. We could easily envision a scenario, for
example, by which the holidays intervene to provide a
convenient excuse for further delays At some point in the
near future, we should engage with March 14 contacts and with
our allies about looking again at other options, whether
absolute majority election or "half-plus-plus" candidates.
In our view, we should be seen as aggressive in trying to get
the presidential vacuum filled. But, given the failure of
the French initiative before Emile Lahoud's departure from
office and given the lack of support for the "half-plus-one
approach, there remains no easy way of persuading March
8-Aoun MPs to show up to vote.
FELTMAN