LEBANON: MARCH 14 LEADER DECRIES PARTY'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001908

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MARCH 14 LEADER DECRIES PARTY'S
CAPITULATION


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Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b)
and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) National Bloc leader Carlos Edde expressed strong
opposition and concerns regarding his March 14 allies'
decision to back Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel
Sleiman for president. Edde's "gut feeling" was that Sleiman
was Syria's choice for president, and that, by electing him,
March 14 was moving down a dangerous slope toward more
assassinations, political irrelevance, and a resurgence of
Syrian control over Lebanon. End summary.

MIXED FEELINGS ABOUT SLEIMAN PRESIDENCY
--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief and
Senior FSN Political Advisor, met with National Bloc leader
Carlos Edde and his legal advisor, Marwan Saqr, on December

3. A somber Edde revealed that he was contemplating taking
his party out of March 14 to protest the direction it was
heading. Admitting he has always been the dissident voice
within March 14, Edde expressed "mixed feelings" about the
party's decision to back Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
Commander Michel Sleiman for president. He had always pushed
for strong March 14 stances. Unfortunately, he said, March
14 was unable to elect one of its own candidates because,
despite backing a good cause, March 14 suffered from bad
management. March 8, on the other hand, had a bad cause, but
excellent management.

MARCH 14 LACKED LEADERSHIP
--------------


3. (C) Edde opposed Sleiman for two reasons. First, on
principle, given that he did not belong to the majority's
party. March 14 should have shown more leadership and
strength and then worked to convince others one by one --
that's how we got the Syrians out in 2005, he stressed.
Instead, we looked around to see which candidates would be
accepted by others. The Patriarch had been conned into a
list that was easily dismissed, when he should have supported
the majority's right to elect a president with a half plus
one vote.


4. (C) Saad, he complained, only turned to Sleiman as the
solution after a process of elimination, since no other
candidate seemed viable. But he didn't think about the
consequences for his allies, Edde said, just like when he
joined the Quadripartite alliance (Note: the short-lived 2005
legislative electoral alliance, with Hizballah, Amal, and
Walid Jumblatt's Druse).

SUSPICIOUS OF SLEIMAN
--------------


5. (C) Second, Edde's "gut feeling" told him not to trust
Sleiman, and his "conviction" was that Sleiman was Syria's
candidate for president. He feared electing Sleiman would
lead to a repeat of the experience Lebanon had with
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri who, once re-elected Speaker
in July 2005 after a period where he played a benign role,
began to show his true, pro-Syrian colors. Edde was
distrustful of Sleiman's allegiances, claiming he had close
ties with both President Asad (to whom Edde said Sleiman owed
his appointment as LAF Commander) and Sleiman Franjieh, with
whom Sleiman shared family connections and whom he reportedly
introduced to Asad. Saqr, who had participated on the
Patriarch's Christian committee to agree on candidates
(before the French initiative) echoed this, saying that
overtly pro-Syrian figures like Suleiman Franjieh and Bishop
Mazloum had pushed Sleiman's candidacy.


6. (C) Sleiman's "heroic" actions at Nahr al-Barid were in
reality only his duty as LAF Commander, Edde continued.
Furthermore, he had made statements expressing his support
for the "resistance," though Edde admitted it was unclear
whether he meant against Israel generally, or Hizballah.
Sleiman will tell each person what he wants to hear, Edde
insisted. When he realizes how weak March 14 is and how

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strong March 8 is, he'll choose the side of strength rather
than make concessions.

OPPOSITION WILL RETAIN THE UPPER HAND
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7. (C) The opposition will continue to blackmail March 14 to
get what it wants, Edde predicted, threatening civil war each
time to make us blink. The only way to deal with bullies is
an "equilibrium of terror," he argued. Otherwise, we're
giving the opposition 115 percent of what they want with
Sleiman, and now we're bargaining away the rest, he said,
referring to expected negotiations over cabinet formation and
government program.


8. (C) If Sleiman becomes president and March 8 appears to be
cooperating, that only means they're happy with him and
things are going their way, he added, but a more likely
scenario is that they will try to use the period between now
and the 2009 legislative elections to discredit March 14;
there will be no "honeymoon," he said. Instead, referring to
his "theory of the minorities," Aoun's FPM, Suleiman
Franjieh's Marada, and Sleiman's Christian followers would
team up with the Shia to counter the Sunnis, he predicted.

MORE ASSASSINATIONS TO COME
--------------


9. (C) Edde also predicted that political assassinations
would continue even after Sleiman's election. The Syrians
are good at their game, he stated grimly, and the killer is
always the person you expect least. It's when you relax a
bit that you become the greatest target, he warned,
suggesting that Druse leader Walid Jumblatt could be next on
the list. It's just like Hariri, he said, referring to the
former PM's assassination in 2005, just months after he had
(reluctantly) agreed to a constitutional amendment to extend
President Lahoud's term.


10. (C) Syrian leadership was born in a culture of
dictatorship, he said. The only opposition they know is
either in exile, in jail, or six feet under. They'll come to
the conclusion that they were too permissive with the
Lebanese opposition. They'll point to Lockerbie as an
example of the culprit getting away and conclude that, while
things might get a little rough temporarily, ultimately they
won't be punished for killing major figures like Jumblatt.

ADIEU TO MARCH 14?
--------------


11. (C) Edde, claiming to represent the "hard core" elements
with March 14, said he was contemplating leaving the bloc,
not to join the opposition, but to move to the "right of
March 14," where he hoped to mobilize some followers. This
was not an easy decision for him; he had always defended
March 14 positions, but "now things have gone too far. I'd
rather pack my bags and leave than be part of something that
will go wrong," he stated categorically, adding that he hoped
to be proven wrong.


12. (C) I'm influenced by two things, Edde explained, the
need to pursue due diligence when there is a conflict of
interest (from his career in the financial world) and the
Hollywoodian belief that, in the end, the right always
prevails. Noting that the French and other EU envoys had not
consulted him during their visits to Lebanon, Edde admitted
that he did not represent a large voice within March 14. But
maybe they need someone on the outside to push them in the
right direction.

COMMENT
--------------


13. (C) Edde, who acknowledged during the meeting that his
own little party had lost municipal and legislative elections
because Sleiman was able to mobilize his own supporters
against the Democratic Bloc and is an outspoken critic of
Aoun, may appear to be just another embittered Christian left
out of the fold. But we know him better than that. He is a
man of conviction, a businessman established in Brazil who
returned to Lebanon in 2000, with no prior political

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experience, to assume leadership of the National Bloc after
his uncle's death. Perhaps the most March 14 of all the
March 14 leaders, Edde genuinely believes Saad is making a
mistake putting all his money on Michel Sleiman. Only time
will tell whether Edde will get his Hollywood ending. End
comment.
FELTMAN