LEBANON: MARCH 14 LEADER DECRIES PARTY'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001908 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: MARCH 14 LEADER DECRIES PARTY'S CAPITULATION BEIRUT 00001908 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) National Bloc leader Carlos Edde expressed strong opposition and concerns regarding his March 14 allies' decision to back Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman for president. Edde's "gut feeling" was that Sleiman was Syria's choice for president, and that, by electing him, March 14 was moving down a dangerous slope toward more assassinations, political irrelevance, and a resurgence of Syrian control over Lebanon. End summary. MIXED FEELINGS ABOUT SLEIMAN PRESIDENCY -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief and Senior FSN Political Advisor, met with National Bloc leader Carlos Edde and his legal advisor, Marwan Saqr, on December ¶3. A somber Edde revealed that he was contemplating taking his party out of March 14 to protest the direction it was heading. Admitting he has always been the dissident voice within March 14, Edde expressed "mixed feelings" about the party's decision to back Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman for president. He had always pushed for strong March 14 stances. Unfortunately, he said, March 14 was unable to elect one of its own candidates because, despite backing a good cause, March 14 suffered from bad management. March 8, on the other hand, had a bad cause, but excellent management. MARCH 14 LACKED LEADERSHIP -------------- ¶3. (C) Edde opposed Sleiman for two reasons. First, on principle, given that he did not belong to the majority's party. March 14 should have shown more leadership and strength and then worked to convince others one by one -- that's how we got the Syrians out in 2005, he stressed. Instead, we looked around to see which candidates would be accepted by others. The Patriarch had been conned into a list that was easily dismissed, when he should have supported the majority's right to elect a president with a half plus one vote. ¶4. (C) Saad, he complained, only turned to Sleiman as the solution after a process of elimination, since no other candidate seemed viable. But he didn't think about the consequences for his allies, Edde said, just like when he joined the Quadripartite alliance (Note: the short-lived 2005 legislative electoral alliance, with Hizballah, Amal, and Walid Jumblatt's Druse). SUSPICIOUS OF SLEIMAN -------------- ¶5. (C) Second, Edde's "gut feeling" told him not to trust Sleiman, and his "conviction" was that Sleiman was Syria's candidate for president. He feared electing Sleiman would lead to a repeat of the experience Lebanon had with Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri who, once re-elected Speaker in July 2005 after a period where he played a benign role, began to show his true, pro-Syrian colors. Edde was distrustful of Sleiman's allegiances, claiming he had close ties with both President Asad (to whom Edde said Sleiman owed his appointment as LAF Commander) and Sleiman Franjieh, with whom Sleiman shared family connections and whom he reportedly introduced to Asad. Saqr, who had participated on the Patriarch's Christian committee to agree on candidates (before the French initiative) echoed this, saying that overtly pro-Syrian figures like Suleiman Franjieh and Bishop Mazloum had pushed Sleiman's candidacy. ¶6. (C) Sleiman's "heroic" actions at Nahr al-Barid were in reality only his duty as LAF Commander, Edde continued. Furthermore, he had made statements expressing his support for the "resistance," though Edde admitted it was unclear whether he meant against Israel generally, or Hizballah. Sleiman will tell each person what he wants to hear, Edde insisted. When he realizes how weak March 14 is and how BEIRUT 00001908 002.2 OF 003 strong March 8 is, he'll choose the side of strength rather than make concessions. OPPOSITION WILL RETAIN THE UPPER HAND -------------- ¶7. (C) The opposition will continue to blackmail March 14 to get what it wants, Edde predicted, threatening civil war each time to make us blink. The only way to deal with bullies is an "equilibrium of terror," he argued. Otherwise, we're giving the opposition 115 percent of what they want with Sleiman, and now we're bargaining away the rest, he said, referring to expected negotiations over cabinet formation and government program. ¶8. (C) If Sleiman becomes president and March 8 appears to be cooperating, that only means they're happy with him and things are going their way, he added, but a more likely scenario is that they will try to use the period between now and the 2009 legislative elections to discredit March 14; there will be no "honeymoon," he said. Instead, referring to his "theory of the minorities," Aoun's FPM, Suleiman Franjieh's Marada, and Sleiman's Christian followers would team up with the Shia to counter the Sunnis, he predicted. MORE ASSASSINATIONS TO COME -------------- ¶9. (C) Edde also predicted that political assassinations would continue even after Sleiman's election. The Syrians are good at their game, he stated grimly, and the killer is always the person you expect least. It's when you relax a bit that you become the greatest target, he warned, suggesting that Druse leader Walid Jumblatt could be next on the list. It's just like Hariri, he said, referring to the former PM's assassination in 2005, just months after he had (reluctantly) agreed to a constitutional amendment to extend President Lahoud's term. ¶10. (C) Syrian leadership was born in a culture of dictatorship, he said. The only opposition they know is either in exile, in jail, or six feet under. They'll come to the conclusion that they were too permissive with the Lebanese opposition. They'll point to Lockerbie as an example of the culprit getting away and conclude that, while things might get a little rough temporarily, ultimately they won't be punished for killing major figures like Jumblatt. ADIEU TO MARCH 14? -------------- ¶11. (C) Edde, claiming to represent the "hard core" elements with March 14, said he was contemplating leaving the bloc, not to join the opposition, but to move to the "right of March 14," where he hoped to mobilize some followers. This was not an easy decision for him; he had always defended March 14 positions, but "now things have gone too far. I'd rather pack my bags and leave than be part of something that will go wrong," he stated categorically, adding that he hoped to be proven wrong. ¶12. (C) I'm influenced by two things, Edde explained, the need to pursue due diligence when there is a conflict of interest (from his career in the financial world) and the Hollywoodian belief that, in the end, the right always prevails. Noting that the French and other EU envoys had not consulted him during their visits to Lebanon, Edde admitted that he did not represent a large voice within March 14. But maybe they need someone on the outside to push them in the right direction. COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) Edde, who acknowledged during the meeting that his own little party had lost municipal and legislative elections because Sleiman was able to mobilize his own supporters against the Democratic Bloc and is an outspoken critic of Aoun, may appear to be just another embittered Christian left out of the fold. But we know him better than that. He is a man of conviction, a businessman established in Brazil who returned to Lebanon in 2000, with no prior political BEIRUT 00001908 003.2 OF 003 experience, to assume leadership of the National Bloc after his uncle's death. Perhaps the most March 14 of all the March 14 leaders, Edde genuinely believes Saad is making a mistake putting all his money on Michel Sleiman. Only time will tell whether Edde will get his Hollywood ending. End comment. FELTMAN