LEBANON: PM SINIORA WAITING FOR GREEN LIGHT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001894 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: PM SINIORA WAITING FOR GREEN LIGHT TO SET TRAIN IN MOTION BEIRUT 00001894 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) PM Siniora, downplaying threats of violence, is ready to take the first steps toward amending the constitution to allow Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman to be elected president, once all of the March 14 leaders are on board. Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, calling for more time and assurances on key military positions, remains a potential obstacle (septel). Parliament Speaker Berri, Siniora surmises, also is waiting for a green light from Damascus, but ultimately will convene parliament to vote on the amendment. Moderate Arab countries, seeking a solution, appear open to a Sleiman presidency. ¶2. (C) With the verdict still out on where Sleiman's allegiances lie, Siniora suggests a firm prime minister will be needed to keep him in line. The composition of the next government would depend in part on whether Hizballah votes for Sleiman; if so, expectations will be high for a national unity government. Some Aoun MPs also will switch in favor of Sleiman, Siniora believes. Either way, Siniora predicts it will take time to form a new cabinet, and his government will remain with full authority in caretaker capacity until then. But we don't want to count our chickens before they hatch; as expected, the opposition is already mounting roadblocks to Sleiman's presidency as this report goes to press. End summary. UNCONCERNED WITH OPPOSITION THREATS OF VIOLENCE -------------- -- ¶3. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, met with PM Siniora and advisors Mohamad Chatah and Rola Noureddine at the Grand Serail on November 29. Siniora, who planned to meet with Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman privately in the near future, seemed unconcerned about growing threats of violence by Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun and others. Acknowledging that many key LAF officers were sympathetic to Aoun, he suggested that many of them were "repositioning" their political affiliations in light of growing momentum for a Sleiman presidency. Siniora foresaw only a modest increase in activity of Hizballah's "tent city" sit-in (whose one year anniversary is December 1) over the next few days, later adding that he had told Sleiman that he must close the tent city "circus" immediately, if not before then after the election. ALL ABOARD, ALMOST -------------- ¶4. (C) The Lebanese people want a solution, Siniora said. Sleiman's increased popularity following the LAF's victory at Nahr al-Barid and the positive public reaction to his candidacy now will make it difficult for the opposition to resist him, he reasoned. Parliament Speaker Berri is waiting for a green light from Damascus, Siniora surmised; he would not break away from Hizballah, but Hizballah might decide to let Berri convene parliament even it decided to vote against Sleiman. Siniora, reporting on a recent meeting he had held with Aoun ally Michel Murr, said Murr had assured him he could secure the support of up to 10 Aoun MPs for Sleiman. Furthermore, Siniora predicted, Amal's three deputies would vote in favor of Sleiman. ¶5. (C) Siniora himself was waiting for March 14 to consolidate its position. "We are 80 percent there," he said. Minister of Social Affairs Nayla Mouawad had demonstrated excellent "repositioning," he joked, and was now embracing Sleiman (Comment: Probably to secure a role for her aspiring son Michel and key arch-rival Suleiman Franjieh at bay. End comment). Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea remained a problem, but not an insurmountable one. Chatah, noting he would see him later that day (as would the Ambassador, septel),said Geagea was upset at being presented with a fait accomplit by majority leader Saad Hariri and was seeking specific, written assurances from Sleiman on key military leadership positions. Siniora noted that, according BEIRUT 00001894 002.2 OF 003 to Michel Murr, one Lebanese Forces foe, LAF G-2 Intelligence Director Georges Khoury, would be sent on a diplomatic mission abroad ("to the Vatican," Noureddine chipped in). Agreeing on the need to package the Sleiman candidacy with agreements on cabinet formation and program, Siniora said he would urge March 14 leaders to meet with Sleiman as a group. ¶6. (C) Moderate Arab countries also appeared to support Sleiman. Siniora agreed that the Saudis, seeking to reconcile with Syria, wanted a solution. The Egyptians, he believed, genuinely favored Sleiman, who had a good relationship with Egyptian military leaders. Chatah, just back from Amman, reported that the Jordanians also were asking whether Sleiman was a product of Syria. The general hope is, Chatah said, that Syrian President Asad will do the right thing given the chance. RESIGNED TO REALITY -------------- ¶7. (C) Siniora, admitting that he had strongly opposed a constitutional amendment, cited new circumstances as the reason for his change of heart. Now there was a presidential vacuum and absence of any other credible solution. Furthermore, Aoun was increasing tensions in the country, calling for the Christians to take action. (What Aoun really wanted, Siniora said, was to change the constitution to increase the powers of the president, while key Maronites had told him recently that what is really needed is a president who knows how to use that power.) People will understand why we changed the constitution, he predicted. ¶8. (C) Siniora did not see other alternatives. Neither the Patriarch nor the public, nor March 14 leaders like Druse Walid Jumblatt or Hariri, were prepared to move forward with a half plus one vote. If the opposition rejected Sleiman, that was just fine, he exclaimed. In that case no one can claim the majority wasn't serious about electing a president, since it had done everything it could to elect one. That would be my justification, Siniora said, for a half plus one vote. NEXT STEPS -------------- ¶9. (C) If there is political consensus on Sleiman, Chatah said, the "resigned" Shia ministers could formally return to the cabinet to allow the government to approve a decree to amend the constitution. This would avoid the sticky issue of the government's legitimacy absent Shia representation for the past year. Siniora said he already had begun working with some of his ministers to prepare the decree, in case March 14 decided to "squeeze" it in before parliament met the next day to try to elect a president. (Note: Chatah, speaking to Pol/Econ Chief separately, said the cabinet probably would meet December 1 or 3 to approve the decree, anticipating the parliamentary vote would occur the following week, possibly as early as December 4. Berri advisor Ali Hamdan told polstaff November 29 that Berri foresaw the three Shia ministers returning to cabinet to vote on the decree. End note.) ¶10. (C) Siniora said he had spoken with Sleiman on many issues, and, judging by his behavior and way of thinking, Siniora was not unhappy with what he saw. Sleiman is a "simple" man, not sophisticated, he remarked. He'll tell you what you want to hear, he admitted, adding that it takes people of character to be independent actors. Chatah noted that Sleiman was a product of 17 years of subservience to the Syrians. Siniora, nodding, said the next prime minister would have to be firm to keep Sleiman in line. LOOKING AHEAD TO CABINET FORMATION -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) The Ambassador, noting that danger lay in the cabinet formation, warned that if the opposition were to receive a "toppling" one-third of the seats, March 14 would be no better off under a Sleiman presidency than it had under pro-Syrian President Lahoud, perhaps worse. Siniora said this was an issue for Hariri, while Chatah agreed that if the opposition voted in favor of Sleiman, expectations would be BEIRUT 00001894 003.2 OF 003 high that Sleiman would form a national unity government. ¶12. (C) Cabinet formation would not be an easy task, Siniora agreed, adding he had told Sleiman it could take a long time. In the meantime, his government would continue. Siniora and Chatah both insisted, citing expert opinions, that the current government was not merely a caretaker government, but had full authority and jurisdiction to continue "business as usual," without limitations. (Note: Constitutionally, the cabinet does become a caretaker cabinet when a new president begins his term of office. End note.) Moreover, he said, the three "resigned" Shia ministers in his cabinet were in reality practicing, signing decrees and communicating with the rest of the Council of Ministers. COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) The Sleiman train is fueled up and ready to leave the station, once Geagea decides he is comfortable with the destination. We doubt it will be an entirely smooth or linear ride, if it takes off at all; Berri, citing the need for a "formal" March 14 request to amend the constitution and demanding that the cabinet, with Shia ministers back on board, review all of the Siniora government's decrees over the past year, already is putting up (minor) roadblocks, although whether to extract a higher price for his nod or to block the process entirely remains unclear. Aoun, meanwhile, has claimed to jump on the bandwagon, claiming to support Sleiman's candidacy, but, again, with perhaps deal-breaking conditions. It is difficult to say at this juncture who is bluffing or whether the Sleiman train will indeed take off. The only thing we can predict with a fair degree of confidence is that the next scheduled parliamentary session to elect a president, November 30, will end in failure just like the previous five attempts. End comment. FELTMAN