LEBANON: AMINE GEMAYEL OPEN TO ARMY COMMANDER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001876 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM SY PTER LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: AMINE GEMAYEL OPEN TO ARMY COMMANDER SLEIMAN REF: A. BEIRUT 1854 ¶B. BEIRUT 1863 ¶C. BEIRUT 1865 BEIRUT 00001876 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). SUMMARY AND COMMENT -------------- ¶1. (C) In a November 27 meeting with the Ambassador, March 14 member and former president Amine Gemayel did not altogether rule out the possibility of electing a strong March 14 president by a half plus one majority, but gave the impression he is gradually (if sullenly) accepting the candidacy of Laf Commander Michel Sleiman (reftels). Gemayel expressed his apprehension about Sleiman as president, but indicated that he was the best fall-back choice available and that a strong, united March 14 could apply the necessary pressure to keep Sleiman in line with March 14 principles. Gemayel said that March 14 strength requires a solid and visible demonstration of U.S., Saudi, and other international support and that as long as there is no direct threat against Syria and Iran, there will not be an independent Lebanon. ¶2. (C) Clearly moving in the direction of supporting Sleiman, Gemayel seems to be keeping the door cracked open to electing a president with a half plus one majority. He was not as resolute in his convictions, unlike his fellow March 14 leaders with whom we have met recently (reftels). End summary and comment. SLEIMAN IS PREFERABLE TO A VACUUM -------------- ¶3. (C) Former president Amine Gemayel received the Ambassador and POLOFF in his Sin el-Fil residence on November 27. Our arrival overlapped with the conclusion of a gathering of prominent Maronites: Maronite League president Joseph Torbey, former Ambassador to the U.S. Abdallah Bouhabib, and Fady Abboud, head of the Industrialists Association. The three Maronite leaders had visited head of Free Patriotic Movement Michel Aoun, and Gemayel reported that many of Aoun's visitors were including Gemayel, who lives in the same area of the Beirut suburbs as Aoun, on their rounds. ¶4. (C) Immediately offering his opinion on the candidate of the week (reftels),Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman, a fairly energized Gemayel said, "If there is no choice, he is better than a vacuum." He emphasized that March 14 needs U.S. support for taking this decision, and that March 14 must remain united and committed to its principles. Gemayel is apprehensive about Sleiman as a president, but comfortable around him on a personal level. While wary of Sleiman's Syrian contacts, he believes that March 14 can contain him by its show of strength and unity. He admitted that if Sleiman senses division among March 14 leaders, he could work to further divide them and disregard March 14 principles in his actions. Gemayel stressed that he supported Sleiman, as did PM Fouad Siniora and majority leader Saad Hariri, "if a March 14 candidate is impossible." He added that the candidate who was being floated around the previous week, Michel Edde, would be a catastrophe because of his even stronger Syrian connections. IRAN AND SYRIA ARE THE REAL PROBLEMS -------------- ¶5. (C) Gemayel interjected numerous times that the problem the Lebanese face is not a domestic problem, but an Iranian and Syrian issue. The two intervening states want to control Lebanon and will not relent, he expected, unless the U.S. works with its international and regional partners to counterbalance Iran's influence. The tools March 14 possesses against Iran are its slight majority in parliament and its solidarity as a group. Conversely, Gemayel continued, Syria uses the tool of assassination and Iran spends billions of dollars on political, social, and military aid to Hizballah. March 14 cannot compete, he concluded, but the U.S. could more effectively fight back. Gemayel stressed that it is not the actions the U.S. takes in Lebanon that are important, but what the U.S. does "outside of Lebanon, for Lebanon." BEIRUT 00001876 002.2 OF 002 THREAT OF CHAOS MORE TANGIBLE TODAY -------------- ¶6. (C) Gemayel offered a contrasting assessment on timing to that of Lebanese Forces Samir Geagea (Ref C),saying that March 14 needed to act quickly and could not risk chaos as it did in previous instances, for example, with the Special Tribunal to investigate former PM Rafiq Hariri's assassination. He explained that March 14 leaders had been expecting big changes with the elections and were enthusiastic and united behind them, only to fail. Now, he said, he is concerned because first, March 14 is unable to elect a strong president; second, electing a president by a half plus one majority will not be easy; third, Hariri has a new feeling of panic over a Shia uprising in Beirut; and finally, he does not believe the U.S. will go as far as it needs to in deterring Lebanon's enemies. He added that it is too late for Speaker Nabih Berri to reconsider a list drawn up by March 14, which was the original French initiative. MESSAGE TO SLEIMAN: MARCH 14 REMAINS THE MAJORITY -------------- ¶7. (C) Gemayel believes neither March 14 leaders nor the U.S. should bother with seeking assurances from Sleiman, such as that he will respect UN Security Council resolutions, because such assurances can be overruled by its neighbors, Syria and Iran. Instead, Gemayel suggested, it is best for the U.S., the French, the Saudis, the Egyptians and other major players, to give their full support to the unity of March 14 and to continue to enable March 14 to act effectively, because he believes it is a strong March 14 which can assert control over Sleiman. Gemayel recommended the U.S. stay in continuous contact with Hariri and other leaders to demonstrate to Syria and Iran that they have the U.S.'s full backing and that the election of Sleiman does not change the U.S.'s support. Along these lines, continued Gemayel, March 14 needs to avoid conveying the impression that it is defeated with the election of Sleiman and must show Sleiman that he reports to March 14. IMPLICATIONS FOR MARCH 14 UNITY -------------- ¶8. (C) Gemayel acknowledged that he is concerned about March 14 unity if they move forward with Sleiman. He anticipates that the formation of the government will be a source of conflict within March 14 because its members will be jockeying for positions. He also predicts that opposition figure Michel Aoun will ultimately not protest Sleiman's election because he too will be focused on securing positions for his MPs in the government. ¶9. (C) Gemayel mentioned he was meeting March 14 allies Hariri, Geagea, and Druse leader Walid Jumblatt in the evening November 27 to discuss what March 14 needs to do under two different options: (1) electing a president with a half plus one majority and (2) electing Sleiman. FELTMAN