LEBANON: DEFENSE MINISTER SUPPORTS ARMY COMMANDER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001864

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: DEFENSE MINISTER SUPPORTS ARMY COMMANDER
FOR PRESIDENT

REF: A. BEIRUT 1855

B. BEIRUT 1854

C. BEIRUT 1852

BEIRUT 00001864 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b)
and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Deputy PM and Defense Minister Elias Murr reported on
November 24 that the army's deployment in downtown Beirut was
proceeding smoothly, and he expected the situation to remain
calm for the next few days (which it did). He fully supports
Saad Hariri's "Plan B" to elect Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
Commander Michel Sleiman as president. Murr had received
assurances from several sources that Sleiman was not
Hizballah's candidate and that Aoun firmly opposed him as
well. He also did believe Sleiman's candidacy was a Syrian
trap, outlining the reasons why be he believed the Commander
would make a good president, though he admitted work needed
to be done to get all of March 14 on board. End summary.

MAINTAINING THE CALM IN BEIRUT
--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, met
with Deputy PM and Defense Minister Elias Murr on November
24, one day after President Lahoud (Murr's former
father-in-law) left office. A relaxed Murr told the
Ambassador he had expected Lahoud to leave peacefully, as he
did, although there had been a "grey period" during which
Hizballah and Syria were pressuring Lahoud to appoint a
second government. The LAF deployment in Beirut (some 16,000
troops) was proceeding smoothly, he reported, thanks to clear
orders on the ground. He had cautioned Hariri and Jumblatt
not to send people into the streets, telling them to let the
LAF handle the front-line. He predicted the situation would
remain calm until the Annapolis conference, suggesting that
Syria had asked Hizballah to remain quiet for a few days.

SLEIMAN IS NOT A SYRIAN TRAP
--------------


3. (C) Murr, noting that Sleiman had told him his November
24 meeting with the Ambassador (Ref C) was "one of the best,"
confirmed that momentum was building within March 14 for a
Sleiman presidency, stating that he, Druse leader Walid
Jumblatt, and PM Siniora were all on board. Majority leader
Saad Hariri had first raised the idea with Murr two days
earlier. Saad reportedly was convinced Sleiman was not
Hizballah's candidate because, when he was negotiating with
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, Berri had ruled out Sleiman
because of the need for a constitutional amendment, and
because Hizballah would never accept him.


4. (C) Murr said he had held a two-hour meeting with Siniora
during which the PM swore on the Koran that he now would
accept a constitutional amendment to pave the way for
Sleiman's candidacy, a change from Siniora's previous strong
objection, because it was "the only way out for the country."
Siniora, like Murr and Hariri, was convinced that Hizballah
did not want Sleiman, and reportedly told Murr he respected
the General because he was the only one who told him to his
face that he did not want him as prime minister. Siniora
also told Murr that he had discussed Sleiman in his meeting
with the Patriarch earlier that day, and that the Patriarch
had responded that under this atmosphere, after the
Patriarch's list had failed, if this was March 14's choice,
he would not block it.


5. (C) Murr then sent his father Michel to Berri to confirm
Saad's assertion that Sleiman was not Hizballah's secret
candidate. Berri reportedly told Michel Murr that Syria had
only three candidates: Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh,
Jean Obeid, or Michel Edde. Why not Sleiman, Michel Murr
asked? His words are good, but his actions are bad, Berri
reportedly answered; he facilitated UNSCR 1701, he has sent
hundreds of army officers to the U.S. and Europe on training
programs, he sent troops into Nahr al-Barid despite
Hizballah's warning, and, his first crime, he caused the
2/28/05 collapse of the Omar Karami government two weeks

BEIRUT 00001864 002.2 OF 003


after Rafiq Hariri's murder by ordering the army to open the
streets for demonstrators. In addition, Berri reportedly
argued, Sleiman is from the same region as the Patriarch, so
he'll have the Maronites welcoming him home, rather than a
region under Syrian control. Syria would not even accept
Sleiman for a two-year presidency, Berri said; the most they
would agree to is one additional year as Commander in Chief.


6. (C) Michel Murr also met with Aoun, who "did not want to
hear" about a Sleiman presidency; "I hate him, I can't smell
him!" Aoun reportedly said. Aoun preferred chaos to Sleiman,
who did not respect or protect Aoun, and never visited him or
answered his calls or received his messengers. As LAF
Commander, Aoun delayed Sleiman's promotion, Elias explained.
Michel Murr reportedly accused Hizballah of hiding behind
Aoun's "no" vote to block the election. "I don't care," was
Aoun's reply. Elias said he believed Aoun's goal was to get
either Pierre Daccache or Michel Edde for president for a
year and a half (i.e., until the 2009 legislative elections).



7. (C) Elias dismissed the idea that Sleiman's candidacy was
a Syrian trap. The Syrians, he admitted, had pretended to
favor Sleiman, but what they were really after was the
support of the army. Sleiman himself recognized this, Elias
claimed, reportedly apologizing to his boss for the last two
years, stating that the Syrians were lying.

MAKING THE CASE FOR SLEIMAN
--------------


8. (C) Murr said the LAF's actions at Nahr al-Barid against
Fatah al-Islam extremists demonstrated Sleiman would be tough
on terrorism. He would pursue diplomatic relations with
Syria and gave Murr assurances that he would implement UNSCR

1701. Murr said the two already had agreed on names of the
next LAF Commander (BG Jean Kahwaji or Francois Hajjz Harari)
and next LAF G-2 Intelligence Director (Current G-2 Director
in the Mount Lebanon region, Joseph Najm). Murr added that
the current G-2 Director, Georges Khoury, was already taken
care of; given his close relations with the Maronite
Patriarch, he would be Lebanon's next envoy to the Vatican.
Sleiman also reportedly told Murr that he would comply with
Hariri's request to remove Walid Jezzini (close to Hizballah)
from the head of Surete Generale. Murr himself would either
continue as Minister of Defense or become Minister of
Interior. And with Sleiman as president, the army will be on
March 14's side.


9. (C) Murr admitted that Sleiman had been weak on
Hizballah's arms, but argued that, as president, he would be
forced to find a solution. This was a problem for the entire
country, and Sleiman would no longer be able to make excuses.

BUT HOW TO CONVINCE MARCH 14 ALLIES?
--------------


10. (C) Murr admitted, however, that March 14 would have a
problem selling Sleiman to Lebanese Forces leader Samir
Geagea, whose forces had killed LAF soldiers during the civil
war. Geagea will always oppose a military option, he said.
He did not, however, foresee a problem with Minister of
Social Affairs Nayla Mouawad, whom he claimed secretly sent
her son Michel to Sleiman to tell him that their family would
"support him to the end." (Comment. Our meeting with Nayla
suggests she is more in tune with Geagea. See Ref A. End
comment.) Transportation Minister Mohamad Safadi was a
friend of Sleiman's, Murr said, so no problem there.


11. (C) Moreover, some Aoun MPs (Selim Salhab, Ghassan
Moukheiber, Walid Khoury) and allies (Michel Murr, Ily Skaff)
as well as the Tashnaq Armenian party would support Sleiman.
Aoun would only have his Free Patriotic Movement MPs left,
Murr predicted. Murr reportedly told Sleiman that he needed
him to produce three or four Hizballah MPs to bring Berri on
board. Sleiman reportedly responded that he could not
guarantee he would be able; "I don't think they want me, and
I don't want to lie to you and say yes," he reportedly said.

AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION
--------------


BEIRUT 00001864 003.2 OF 003



12. (C) Murr explained the procedures for amending the
constitution to allow Sleiman to run for president. First,
the cabinet would vote to amend the constitution (Note. This
would require a two-thirds majority, or 16 out of 23
surviving ministers. After the November 2006 walkout of six
opposition ministers, 17 ministers remain, one more than the
16 need for a two-thirds majority, though it is not clear
whether all the Christian ministers would support a
constitutional amendment for Sleiman. End note.) Murr
claimed cabinet had been scheduled to meet on November 24 (at
the time of the Ambassador's meeting) to take the first step
to amend the constitution, but Murr had insisted that they
wait until after the Annapolis conference and until they had
had an opportunity to discuss the idea with other March 14
partners. He admitted that Tourism Minister Joseph Sarkis, a
Geagea ally, might present a problem, and with Acting Foreign
Minister Tareq Mitri in Annapolis, they would not have the 16
votes in favor.


13. (C) Second, cabinet refers the issue to parliament, where
a two-thirds majority also is needed. The second step is
meant to call the opposition's bluff, Murr explained. If
Berri refuses to convene parliament to vote, then it is clear
the pro-Syrian opposition does not want a president. If he
accepts, it means he is recognizing the legitimacy of the
government, something the opposition has refused to do for
more than a year. In recognizing the legitimacy of the
government in passing the decree proposing the constitutional
amendment, then the pro-Syrians will have, in effect,
post-facto accepted all decisions taken by the Siniora
cabinet.

COMMENT
--------------


14. (C) As we will report septel, a Sleiman presidency has
its advantages and disadvantages. Whereas, however, March 14
was fully united behind, say, Nassib Lahoud, that is not the
case with Michel Sleiman. Saad Hariri, Elias Murr and others
have quite a bit of homework to do if they decide to proceed
down this route -- or risk creating permanent cracks within
March 14. What we like best about this option is that it
would definitely clip Michel Aoun's wings permanently. But,
while we would welcome seeing an end to Aoun's outrageously
irresponsible behavior, we don't want our March 14 friends to
fall into a cleverly placed Syrian trap (and one that
requires the type of constitutional amendment we've opposed
for the past three-plus years). We expect that exploration
of the Sleiman option is going to move very quickly, however
-- Saudi Ambassador Khoja went to see Geagea today to try to
get the Lebanese Forces on board. If we are going to
intervene one way or another, we need to do so now. End
comment.
FELTMAN