LEBANON: MARADA FAVORS EDDE OR SLEIMAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001857

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MARADA FAVORS EDDE OR SLEIMAN


BEIRUT 00001857 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b)
and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Marada leader Suleiman Franjieh supports Michel Edde
as president, but stresses the need to get Free Patriotic
Movement leader Michel Aoun on board and to find a candidate
who can safeguard Hizballah's interests. He suggests that,
if a consensus is not reached, Lebanese Armed Forces
Commander Michel Sleiman should head a transitional
government until new parliamentary elections are held.
Franjieh dismisses the possibility of a second government or
opposition-initiated violence, claiming the opposition would
not oppose the Siniora government as long as it kept a low
profile. End summary.


2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief and
Senior FSN Political Advisor, met with Marada leader Suleiman
Franjieh at his Swiss Chalet home in Bneshay on November 21.
Franjieh advisors Stephan Doueihy, Raymond J. Araygi, and
Richard Haykal (AmCit) also attended the one and a half hour
meeting. The Ambassador opened the meeting, his first with
Franjieh in over six months, stressing full U.S. support for
the French initiative to find a consensus candidate.
However, it appeared that March 8 was blocking progress more
than March 14. The U.S. hoped to see a president before the
midnight November 23 expiration of President Lahoud's term,
he said, warning there would be consequences for any party
that attempted to undermine PM Siniora's government.

IF NOT EDDE, THEN SLEIMAN
--------------


3. (C) Franjieh, commenting that the Patriarch's list had
more pro-March 14 names than pro-March 8, said the opposition
would not accept a March 14 candidate or even one close to
March 14. It is looking for a candidate who will reassure
Hizballah, satisfy all groups in the opposition, and not pose
a serious threat to the popularity of Free Patriotic Movement
leader Michel Aoun. Aoun must be on board, he stressed.
Otherwise, Aoun could make a deal with Hariri and leave the
rest of the opposition out.


4. (C) Franjieh claimed the opposition would support a
consensus candidate. Michel Edde is the only feasible
consensus candidate on the Patriarch's list, he argued, since
he satisfied both Hizballah and the international community,
was a friend to March 14, and did not pose a threat to Aoun.
The Christians would not be happy with a weak Edde
presidency, but the more Aoun was on board, the easier it
would be. The opposition supported Edde's candidacy because
it views him as being equal distance from all parties, unlike
Robert Ghanem, whom most of the opposition viewed as a March
14 figure. The opposition does not want to obstruct an
agreement over the presidency, Franjieh claimed; if majority
leader Saad Hariri refuses Edde's candidacy, he will bear the
responsibility for the failure to elect a consensus president.


5. (C) As for Aoun's own candidacy, Franjieh said he
believed Aoun was convinced he has no chance to become
president, and that he would not be surprised to see Aoun
move towards a consensus candidate. Franjieh was working on
Aoun to accept Edde, he said, asking that we not share this
information with Aoun himself, but Aoun was an "extremely
difficult personality." You've studied his psychology, he
said; only Aoun can influence Aoun. He works on an
action/reaction dynamic, and pushing him too hard on Edde
could backfire. "We are more than halfway," he said, saying
we should see more flexibility from Aoun in the coming days.
(Note. The following day Aoun announced an initiative
whereby he would nominate a non-March 8 president and the
majority would nominate a non-March 14 prime minister. March
14 promptly rejected the initiative. As of November 25, we
understand that Aoun is now cooking up a new initiative. End
note.)


6. (C) Franjieh recognized that the March 14 majority would
determine the next prime minister, but the opposition would
attempt to get the maximum out of the new cabinet and would
use this a leverage in negotiations over the presidency. The
next government should be a national unity government, he

BEIRUT 00001857 002.2 OF 002


said, and the president will be the referee between the two
camps.


7. (C) If a consensus could not be reached, Franjieh proposed
a transitional solution in the form of a national unity
government whose primary goal would be to amend the electoral
law and hold early parliamentary elections. Lebanese Armed
Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman would be a good
candidate to head this transitional government.

FRANJIEH PREDICTS NO SECOND GOVERNMENT,
NO VIOLENCE, AFTER PRESIDENT LAHOUD LEAVES OFFICE
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Franjieh said President Lahoud would not appoint a
second cabinet before stepping down. He hinted that the
opposition might work with the Siniora government (which,
under the constitution, assumed presidential powers as of the
midnight November 23 expiration of Lahoud's mandate) as long
as it keeps a low profile and avoids taking major decisions
such as appointing a new LAF commander or changing the LAF's
mission statement, in which case the LAF would split.


9. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question on the
possibility of armed conflict, Franjieh said Marada, like
everyone else, had the right to defend itself. However, it
would be in reactive mode and would not initiate anything,
though he would not rule out the possibility that the
opposition might support any street demonstrations that occur
in protest of low wages or other related socioeconomic
issues. It depends on "them," he said, warning that if March
14 decided to proceed with a half plus one vote, however,
there would be a "big problem." The status quo was "easier"
than a half plus one president, he said. Conflict was a
"last resort," and Franjieh hoped that "they" would not push
the opposition into a corner, forcing them into conflict.
The opposition would then take all steps to preserve its
interests, he warned, but it was not looking for riots or
violence.
FELTMAN