LEBANON: LAF COMMANDER SLEIMAN WANTS NEW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001852

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA FRONT OFFICE AND NEA/ELA; NSC FOR
ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2027
TAGS: PREL KDEM PGOV PTER LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: LAF COMMANDER SLEIMAN WANTS NEW
LANGUAGE, BEHAVIOR IN PRESIDENCY

BEIRUT 00001852 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a 11/24 one-on-one meeting with the Ambassador,
Lebanese Armed Forces Commander Michel Sleiman said all the
right things: he and the army would respect and recognize
the Siniora cabinet until Lebanon's next president is chosen,
the army would strive to maintain security and stability, and
-- if he is elected president himself -- he will work to
change both the language and behavior of the presidency.
Criticizing the just-ended Emile Lahoud presidency, he agreed
that Lebanon's president must work hand-in-hand with the
prime minister and cabinet. He said that, while disarming
Hizballah required a political process, he would see that a
credible army commander and credible officers would be chosen
committed to implementing UNSCR 1701. End summary.

LAF WILL RESPECT SINIORA CABINET
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2. (C) At the conclusion of a larger meeting on 11/24 that
included aides and notetakers, the Ambassador asked to see
LAF Commander Michel Sleiman one-on-one. The Ambassador
noted that, with the expiration of President Emile Lahoud's
term the previous evening with no successor elected, people
were questioning Sleiman's intentions. Assuming the
Ambassador was raising topics discussed first in the larger
session, Sleiman repeated his earlier vow that the LAF would
respect and recognize the Siniora cabinet as the
constitutional authority holding the powers of the presidency
ad interim. Emile Lahoud's outgoing letter, which was not a
declaration of a state of emergency, to the army did not
change anything on the ground. Moreover, as demonstrated by
the heavy deployment of the LAF in and around Beirut, Sleiman
and the LAF were committed to maintaining security and
stability.

CLAIMING NOT TO BE SYRIA'S CANDIDATE
--------------


3. (C) The Ambassador specified that he was hearing people
mentioning Sleiman's name again as a presidential candidate,
a problematic development if that meant the victory of
Hizballah and Syria over the democratic majority. Sleiman
acknowledged that his name was circulating again, but he
denied promoting himself. "I know what the presidency means;
why would I want the headache?" He noted the requirement for
a constitutional amendment (to overcome a two-year
cooling-off period) had thwarted Central Bank Governor
Salameh's candidacy, and he assumed it would do the same for
him. But if two-thirds of the MPs want him (the number
required to amend the constitution),then of course he was
willing to serve.


4. (C) But, Sleiman said, "I am not Syria's candidate; you
must know that." While he has maintained some channels of
communication to Syrian President Bashar al-Asad, he claimed
that much of the Syrian apparatus, including Rustom Ghazaleh
and Assaf Shawkat, "is against me." Citing his defiance of
the Hizballah "red lines" against entering the Nahr al-Barid
camp, Sleiman also claimed that Hizballah's alleged support
of him is lukewarm at best. The Ambassador noted that Hassan
Nasrallah's 11/11 speech seemed to be a tailor-made campaign
speech thanking and promoting Sleiman, and Hizballah has
assembled its arsenal while Sleiman was in charge of the LAF.
These factors naturally concern us. Expressing some
impatience, Sleiman again denied that he has the support of
Hizballah. (UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Geir Pedersen
told us on 11/24 that his Hizballah contacts at least told
him that they rejected a Sleiman candidacy.)

ADVOCATING "NEW LANGUAGE AND NEW BEHAVIOR"
FOR THE NEW PRESIDENT
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5. (C) The Ambassador noted that the international
community would have certain expectations of the new Lebanese
president. There could be no continuation of the policies
and attitudes of the Lahoud years. Sleiman readily agreed.
The new president must have "new language and new behavior,"

BEIRUT 00001852 002.2 OF 002


compared to Lahoud, whom Sleiman described in terms not
normally seen in cable traffic. Unlike Lahoud, the new
president must work in partnership with the cabinet the the
prime minister.

HIZBALLAH'S ARMS: NO PLAN,
BUT COMMITMENT TO UNSCR 1701
--------------


6. (C) The Ambassador asked about Hizballah's arms, our
primary concern and an issue that keeps Lebanon at risk.
Sleiman said that it would be unreasonable of the
international community to expect the new president and the
new cabinet to disarm Hizballah by force. "Don't ask me to
take 30,000 rockets by force; I would be lying to you if I
said I could do it." There needs to be a credible political
process to wean Hizballah from its militia. But, the
Ambassador noted, part of the problem is that Hizballah
continues to smuggle arms; at least the new president and
cabinet need to prevent the Hizballah problem from getting
worse. Agreeing, Sleiman said that having better relations
with Syria (possible under a new cabinet, he argued) would
help, but so would selecting the right people for army
command positions. In an implicit (and probably
unintentional) swipe at Military Intelligence (G-2) Chief
Georges Khoury, Sleiman said that the new president would
have to work to see that a credible G-2 chief was appointed.
If he were elected president, Sleiman vowed to do all that he
could to support the implementation of UNSCR 1701.

COMMENT
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7. (C) Given multiple visitors, surges in mil-mil
assistance and cooperative programs, and the Nahr al-Barid
fight, we have seen much of Sleiman in recent months.
Undoubtedly at this point, he must find our questions and
concerns fairly predictable. What we can say, however, is
that practice makes perfect: having rehearsed his lines on
us before, he is certainly sounding better and knows in
general what we wish to hear. (We also note that it is far
easier speaking to Sleiman, who at least stops to listen,
than to, say, another presidential hopeful, Michel Edde, who
does not.) At this point, if the choice of Lebanon's
presidency would come down to Michel Aoun or Michel Sleiman,
we'd quietly root on Sleiman in hopes that his practice would
more closely approximate his words to us.
FELTMAN