LEBANON: SPEAKER BERRI SURPRISINGLY FOCUSES ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000184 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2017 TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY SUBJECT: LEBANON: SPEAKER BERRI SURPRISINGLY FOCUSES ON TRIBUNAL AS A WAY TO MOVE FORWARD REF: BEIRUT 00156 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: section 1.4 (b) . SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a 2/2 meeting, Speaker Berri told the Ambassador that despite recent unproductive discussions between Saudi Arabia and Iran regarding Lebanon, he believes options now exist to escape from the current impasse. Specifically, he listed three ways to establish the "critical" Special Tribunal (over intractable Syrian objections) : 1) a committee comprised of both government and opposition representatives to review (and perhaps modify) the GOL/UN Special Tribunal documents; 2) removal of wording from tribunal documents which require parliamentary approval; and 3) allowing the UN to establish the tribunal under Chapter VII authority. For a variety of reasons, he strongly preferred the first option. Berri (disingenuously?) insisted he is not concerned about implacable Syrian objections, but argued a way must be found that would bring Hizballah on board. In his scenario, if Hizballah could be convinced to support the tribunal -- by demonstrating it will not be indicted -- President Lahoud would be compelled to sign the establishment decree, because he could not stand alone in opposition. When told about Berri's ideas later in the day, March 14th consigliere Marwan Hamadeh thought he saw the sign of an opening that should be carefully considered. Hamadeh agreed that Berri could never be taken at face value, but a joint committee just might be the opportunity March 14th needs to break the siege of the Serail and move back to negotiations, vice the street. Hamadeh thought that Amr Moussa should see the establishment of such a committee as his goal for his next round of diplomacy. End summary. ¶2. (C) Amal leader and Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri met with the Ambassador and Special Assistant in his offices in Ain el Tine in West Beirut. Amal political advisor Ali Hamdan also attended the meeting. Berri expressed quiet satisfaction that Lebanon had received such generous international support at the recent Paris III conference, and interestingly, rebutted PM Siniora's contention, voiced to the Ambassador earlier in the week (reftel),that he had been aloof and cold toward the Prime Minister. Berri also made it clear that he had enjoyed immensely the spectacle of Lebanon's many Maronite presidential aspirants vying for attention in the French capital. Immediately following his meeting with Berri, the Ambassador met briefly with Walid Jumblatt's senior advisor, Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh, to obtain his perspective on Berri's comments. LAST WEEK'S NEAR DISASTER CREATES AN OPPORTUNITY -------------- --- ¶3. (C) Speaker Berri was unexpectedly upbeat about the present situation. He expressed relief that last week's Sunni-Shia confrontation at Beirut's Arab University (where ironically the most aggressive participants were Amal's student supporters) had died down as quickly as it had escalated, and gave his opinion that recent measures taken in reaction to the violence would prevent a similar situation. (Note: On 2/1, Berri had encouraged MP Bahia Hariri to sponsor an inclusive meeting of university presidents and representatives of the various political blocs at parliament. The attendees agreed to put in place measures designed to reduce sectarian friction on the campuses and decided to keep the two most dangerous campuses, Beirut Arab University and Lebanese University, closed for another week to allow tempers to cool. End note.) ¶4. (C) The Speaker said the country's brush with sectarian violence on January 23 and 25 had been a sobering experience for all "reasonable" Lebanese, particularly because so many of the images from the confrontations bore an unsettling resemblance to Lebanon's 1975-1990 civil war. On a positive note, he felt that the wide-spread public desire to step back from last week's events, combined with the positive developments of Paris III, just might allow Lebanon's warring political factions to find a way out of the current, unsustainable crisis. ¶5. (C) He acknowledged that even though Lebanon's political crisis had several components (the Lahoud presidency, parliamentary elections, Shia representation, and the Special BEIRUT 00000184 002 OF 004 Tribunal),it was the deadlock on the tribunal that stopped all other progress. Even the recent round of meetings between Saudi Prince Bandar ibn Sultan and Iran's senior leadership had apparently foundered principally because of an inability to produce a workable solution for the tribunal. ¶6. (C) Berri referred to his own initiative on the tribunal (which others have described as a thinly veiled version of the Syrian agenda),which called for a delay in establishing the court until after the final UNIIIC report had been issued by Commissioner Serge Brammertz in mid-June. This delay would supposedly have allowed Hizballah to learn whether it would be a persecutorial target of the investigation. Berri expressed conviction that Hizballah was not involved and that it was Walid Jumblatt's fault for raising Hizballah's suspicions of a politically-motivated tribunal, when Jumblatt accused Hizballah of involvement in all of the 2004-2005 attacks. According to Berri, when (in the Speaker's opinion) Hassan Nasrallah discovered that he had dodged the tribunal's bullet, he would drop his (and Iran's, who supposedly has no dog in the fight) opposition to the tribunal. ¶7. (C) But this neat package had fallen apart yesterday, when French Ambassador Bernard Emie informed a "surprised" Berri that Brammertz' final report would not be when the UNIIIC's current mandate expires in June. Berri had counted on Brammertz ending his investigation in June with a final report. Emie astonished him by noting that, in all likelihood, the investigation will have to continue beyond June in some form. That is, even in June, Hizballah would still be uncertain whether it would be free from suspicion. (Note: Whether the ever-calculating Berri is ever surprised by any development in Lebanon is difficult to determine; it is more likely he was simply using Emie's remarks -- which concerning the highly-disciplined Brammertz' intentions are probably not any more accurate than anyone else -- to distance himself from an initiative that was simply not gaining any traction. End note.) Whatever his motivation, Berri ruefully stated that his "delay-till-June" concept was now apparently dead. THREE OPTIONS -------------- ¶8. (C) Once the notetaker left the meeting, however, Speaker Berri confided to the Ambassador that there still were three ways to move forward with the problematic tribunal, which had become, to almost every participant in Lebanon's complex crisis, the long pole in the tent -- solve it, argued Berri, and the rest of the issues would become vastly simplified. The first option: create a broadly representative committee, presumably under the Speaker's sponsorship, that would review the tribunal documents which had already been approved by the Siniora cabinet. Once the review, and possible editing, of the documents had been completed, they could be re-submitted to the UN Security Council for implementation, in accordance with the committee's decisions. Berri strongly preferred this option, because it would (theoretically) eliminate Hizballah's objections and allow the Siniora government and parliament (which will meet in normal session beginning March 17) to address Lebanon's other political disputes in a less heated atmosphere. In essence, the logjam would be broken. ¶9. (C) The second option: permit the Siniora cabinet to remove specific wording in the tribunal documents which trigger the requirement for parliamentary approval, specifically, those clauses dealing with funding and the multi-year length of the tribunal's mandate. The obvious drawback to this approach to the stalemate is that the March 8th opposition would surely attack it as yet another example of unilateral Sunni action. It would establish the tribunal, but seriously undermine its popular legitimacy. Berri seemed to include this option merely as proof of his intellectual rigor. ¶10. (C) The final option: introduction of a new Security Council resolution that would authorize the Special Tribunal under Chapter VII. Although he could barely conceal his desire to transfer responsibility for the establishment of the radioactive tribunal to some other entity -- in this case the UN Security Council -- Speaker Berri understood the long odds this option entails. But for Berri, a veteran of Lebanon's complex political maneuvers, it is an alternative that could not be ignored, especially since with Chapter VII, he could not be blamed by Syria for failure. BEIRUT 00000184 003 OF 004 ¶11. (C) The Speaker strived to leave the impression that he preferred the initial option for a number of reasons: its elegant disarming of Hizballah's opposition to the tribunal; it would bring Lebanon's disparate blocs back into a form of negotiations; and undoubtedly, it would add to his personal prestige and solidify his position. In an interesting aside, his advisor Ali Hamdan remarked that, following his success in Paris, PM Siniora was now well positioned to make the "small" concession of submitting the already-approved tribunal documents to cross-confessional review. Berri argued that opposition to the tribunal was what really held the various March 8th partners together and solving it in an acceptable way was the best way forward. But probably with an eye toward U.S. perceptions and support, Berri emphasized that the "committee" method was by far the most acceptable way to cut Syria out of the pattern -- a development for which he took pains to express his support. MARWAN HAMADEH -- SKEPTICAL, BUT INTRIGUED -------------- ¶12. (C) In a meeting that closely followed the discussions with Berri, the Ambassador presented the rough outlines of the Speaker's new plan to a smiling Marwan Hamadeh, a person who has jousted with Berri for decades. Hamadeh plainly stated that Berri's primary interest is always Nabih Berri, but his idea of a committee, despite its obvious pitfalls, was worth pursuing, principally because the time seemed right. Last week's violence had badly tarnished both Nasrallah and Michel Aoun, PM Siniora had emerged from Paris as a resilient and internationally respected leader, and the Lebanese public have just about had their fill of the now-desultory March 8th street presence in Riad Solh Square and on the approaches to the Grand Serail. He also made the interesting observation that Berri himself wanted this matter resolved before he is constitutionally compelled to reconvene parliament in mid-March and he effectively becomes a "prisoner of the (March 14th) majority" that according to Hamadeh, could actually approve the tribunal as a law with a simple majority vote. (We will check this. This is the first we have heard of such an option, and we note that Hamadeh is not a constitutional lawyer.) ¶13. (C) Hamadeh said that Siniora's ministers were meeting this evening (2/2) to discuss a number of pressing issues, and indicated he would elicit opinions on the Speaker's idea. He cautioned that several aspects of the committee plan would have to be worked out, but it was an initiative worth discussing -- if nothing else, to buy time -- and he agreed with Berri that resolution of the tribunal impasse, with buy-in from Hizballah, could open the door to solving Lebanon's other political challenges. Hamadeh thought that Amr Moussa could work to set up such a committee when he returns to Lebanon. The formation of such a committee, after all, does not in and of itself mean that either side is conceding anything, but at least a dialogue is started. ¶14. (C) In addition to discussion of Berri's "committee" idea, Minister Hamadeh said tonight's ministerial gathering would also decide: when to hold the next formal cabinet meeting (Siniora doesn't want to antagonize March 8th needlessly, but at the same time he could ill afford to allow too much time to elapse between formal cabinet sessions); set the next meeting's agenda; decide how to manage the return of Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa to Lebanon next week to maximize progress; assess the Saudi-Iranian negotiations; and probably most important, decide how to maintain momentum for the commitments made in Paris III. Due to the multitude of important and time-sensitive issues, Hamadeh said he would give the Ambassador a read-out of the meeting as soon as possible. ¶15. (C) In closing, Minister Hamadeh gave his opinion that despite the ambiguous status of the Amr Moussa and Saudi-Iranian initiatives, and the on-going March 8th street presence outside the Serail, there was definitely perceptible political movement. He remarked that Michel Aoun, although still verbally aggressive, was "basically finished" due to his significant loss of support in the Maronite community by his maladroit actions on January 23. Hamadeh also observed that General Aoun appeared to be out of the diplomatic loop and was beginning to imagine enemies around every corner -- which in Marwan's amused opinion, was not a bad development. BEIRUT 00000184 004 OF 004 COMMENT -------------- ¶16. (C) This was very peculiar meeting. We find it implausible that Berri has never heard before that the UNIIIC investigation might not be completed when the UNIIIC mandate expires in June. And, now that he has been told that explicitly by the French and U.S. Ambassador, it would have been more in character for him to insist that the tribunal be delayed that much longer -- instead of a June establishment (which has been his position of late),an establishment triggered by the end of the UNIIIC investigation, whenever that is. In other words, he was given the perfect opportunity to insist on an even longer postponement than his June offer. Instead, he at least purported to accept that an indefinite delay in the tribunal's establishment was not possible: a potentially positive overture. While he says he thinks having a committee examine the tribunal documents for possible amendment is the best option, we suspect that, is Berri is sincere in that preference, he likes it because he sees a vehicle for long delays and debate. Chapter VII more effectively takes the responsibility completely off his shoulders, of course. ¶17. (C) But, in this tense and worrying atmosphere, forming a technical committee would be a positive step, a sign of optimism to the Lebanese people that their leaders are at last starting to get serious about trying to find a way forward. As Hamadeh said, a committee does not mean that March 14 has conceded the substance of the tribunal, nor does it mean that March 8 has conceded its demands. It simply buys time. After last week, we're ready for some time. So if Amr Moussa could get the two sides to agree to such a committee, we at least have some positive domestic momentum for a change. In another interesting development, Berri also insisted that he would open parliament in March, depriving Emile Lahoud of his constitutional right to ask for parliament to be dissolved if it fails to meet in its normal session. (There is little danger that, as long as the Siniora cabinet survives, the prime minister and cabinet would endorse such a request, which is required to dissolve parliament.) In our view, our tactical, short-term goal should be to find ways to keep the Lebanese from using the street until the mid-March parliament opening, when the debate can shift to the chamber. Creating a tribunal committee is one vehicle to do that. The question is whether Berri was serious or not. And, even if he is serious, will his Iranian-Syrian-Hizballahi partners allow him to move in this direction. We hope Moussa can explore these questions. FELTMAN