LEBANON: ARAB LEAGUE SYG PREDICTS EDDE PRESIDENCY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001830 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: ARAB LEAGUE SYG PREDICTS EDDE PRESIDENCY OR NO ELECTION BEIRUT 00001830 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Visiting Arab League SYG Amr Moussa does not support the theory that chaos will result if no president is elected by the midnight November 23 expiration of President Lahoud's mandate. He believes either Michel Edde will be selected as the consensus candidate, or discussions will continue, possibly with the addition of new names, after November 24. End summary. ¶2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, met with Arab League SYG Amr Moussa and three aides at his hotel room in the Phoenicia Hotel (also home to 46 March 14 MPs for the past two months, who have sought refuge based on concerns for their personal security). Moussa, who had just spoken with Secretary Rice and was completing another round of talks with Lebanese political leaders in an attempt to break the impasse over the presidential election, said he had drawn no conclusions from his visit, only impressions. First, Moussa noted dryly, Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun firmly supports his own candidacy. Second, after meeting with Hizballah SYG Hassan Nasrallah a day earlier, he believed Hizballah was open to consensus on any name, even without Aoun's acceptance, though it would continue to work on Aoun. In the absence of a Berri-Hariri consensus, however, Hizballah would continue to support Aoun. HELL WILL NOT BREAK LOOSE ON NOVEMBER 24 -------------- ¶3. (C) Third, the November 24 is not sacred; if a president is not elected by the midnight November 23 expiration of President Lahoud's term, efforts will continue and, he predicted, "hell will not break out." Fourth, he did not sense the tense atmosphere that surrounded his earlier visits, just resignation. He believed there was a general understanding that President Lahoud would not "do anything spectacular" before leaving office, i.e., he would not appoint a second government, and he would issue general guidelines to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to maintain order. MICHEL EDDE OR NO ELECTION -------------- ¶4. (C) The whole thing, Moussa said, depends on Michel Edde and Robert Ghanem, explaining that the March 14 majority vetoes the former, while the March 8 minority vetoes the latter. While people are working on the "reservations" regarding each candidate, more work is being done to build support for Edde than Ghanem, he said. Why, the Ambassador asked, do the pro-Syrians oppose Ghanem? It could be you or me, Moussa replied, the fact is they only want Edde. He is better liked by the Maronite church, and has lots of connections and previous favors that can be called in. Therefore, the opposition is trying to eliminate March 14's reservations about Edde; if they fail, there will be no election, he concluded. ¶5. (C) Moussa agreed that the Patriarch's list of seven names was not designed to end up with Edde, but only to exclude the "first tier" of clearly non-consensus candidates (Nassib Lahoud, Boutrous Harb, Michel Aoun). The Ambassador, stressing U.S. support for the French initiative, argued that the purpose of choosing a consensus president was to avoid electing a president who was rejected by a major segment of the population. However, Edde is rejected by a major part of Lebanon's Sunnis. Therefore, by pushing March 14 to accept Edde we are putting all the pressure on one confessional group, and the one group that happens to also hold the majority in parliament. ¶6. (C) Moussa countered that Edde also had more sympathizers in the Maronite community, and can therefore attract support from Aoun. A choice between Ghanem and Edde risks splitting the Christians, leaving Aoun the victor. Admitting that Edde's candidacy was not yet "wrapped up," Moussa nevertheless noted that even some March 14 members (i.e., BEIRUT 00001830 002.2 OF 003 Druse leader Walid Jumblatt, with whom he was about to meet following the meeting with the Ambassador),no longer seemed opposed. The Ambassador agreed, adding that Jumblatt was taking seriously the threats of chaos and civil war should there not be an election. Chaos and civil war are not looming, Moussa replied. ¶7. (C) The Ambassador, noting that all of the opposition parties seemed to be focused on Edde, responded that Hariri already had been pressured into accepting the French initiative, especially the revised version, and to renounce any hope of his preferred candidate (Nassib Lahoud). Why should he be forced to concede more when Berri has not had to concede anything? Berri, Moussa said, supports Ghanem, but admits he is not a free agent. His coalition does not favor Ghanem, Berri reportedly told Moussa. So basically we're engaged in a process by which Hizballah decides who will be president, the Ambassador remarked. The French initiative made the democratic concepts of majority and minority irrelevant, and now it should be the majority leader who makes the last concession. ¶8. (C) Ignoring the Ambassador's suggestion that, instead, more pressure should be put on March 8, which had rejected five out of seven of the Patriarch's candidates, Moussa said that it was "always like that" -- small, unified minorities with the support of large outside powers ultimately have more power. Just look at Israel, he said. Furthermore, Berri has the serious weapon of being able to open and close parliament. He added, however, that he had just reassured Secretary Rice that there would be no immediate chaos or SIPDIS civil war. LOOKING BEYOND NOVEMBER 24 -------------- ¶9. (C) Moussa, responding to the Ambassador's inquiry as to what would prompt consensus after November 24, cited PM Siniora's continuation in office -- opposed by many people -- as an "engine" that would propel the process forward. Berri will call a new election date, and the French and the Arab League would be back to continue their discussions. He agreed that the U.S. should continue to maintain a low profile throughout the process. Some believed the Patriarch had made a mistake with his list. With the passage of time, he predicted, other names would emerge ("some are already waiting in the wings"),which could prolong the process, but ultimately a solution would be found. (Note: We find this a particularly ominous comment. We hope that Moussa is not planning to revive the names of people like Fares Bouez and Jean Obeid, the elimination of whom as serious candidates was an important achievement of the Patriarch's list.) ¶10. (C) After November 24, Hariri and Berri will be more in a mood to agree on a consensus president, whereas until now they've been focusing on issues like the new government. Furthermore, the joint "Syrian-French" initiative -- "you know, this is now a joint initiative," Moussa emphasized -- will continue, and there will be an increased sense of urgency because of the lack of president, especially on the part of the Christians, who will "not be comfortable at all" with the situation. Moussa didn't rule out the possibility that LAF Commander Michel Sleiman could be called in as a "savior" if the security situation deteriorated, but opined that this would take time, as there were "many powerful circles" that opposed a constitutional amendment to allow his candidacy, let alone another military man as president. ¶11. (C) Aoun eventually would realized that he is an obstacle, not the answer, to the process. While not disagreeing with the Ambassador's assertion that Berri seemed to be using Aoun as the pretext for not reaching consensus, Moussa said Berri was not comfortable with Aoun and clearly preferred Edde. Hizballah, however, was the opposite; it needed to honor its commitment to support Aoun. Moussa repeated, however, that Nasrallah had told him Hizballah would support any candidate that Berri and Hariri agree on, adding that not everyone was convinced of Aoun's "God-given right to the presidency, neither within the opposition or other circles." SENDING MESSAGE OF HOPE BEIRUT 00001830 003.2 OF 003 -------------- ¶12. (C) In what he called a short joint "opportunity for press" following his next meeting with French FM Kouchner, Moussa said he would stress a message of hope: there was still time to find a consensus candidate, it was not a hopeless cause, and the French and Arab League would be back to help. COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) Despite Moussa's upbeat public message, we find it disheartening that the only solution he sees are either March 14 capitulating (leaving Edde as president) or we go back to the drawing board, probably enlarging the list to include equally uninspiring (and no less pro-Syrian) candidates like Fares Boueiz or Jean Obeid. Perhaps the silver lining in Moussa's message is that, like us, he does not see Lebanon erupting into violence in the near future. On the other hand, it appears the process of electing Lebanon's next president easily could drag on for weeks. End comment. FELTMAN