LEBANON: ARAB LEAGUE SYG PREDICTS EDDE PRESIDENCY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001830

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: ARAB LEAGUE SYG PREDICTS EDDE PRESIDENCY
OR NO ELECTION


BEIRUT 00001830 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b)
and (d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) Visiting Arab League SYG Amr Moussa does not support
the theory that chaos will result if no president is elected
by the midnight November 23 expiration of President Lahoud's
mandate. He believes either Michel Edde will be selected as
the consensus candidate, or discussions will continue,
possibly with the addition of new names, after November 24.
End summary.


2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, met
with Arab League SYG Amr Moussa and three aides at his hotel
room in the Phoenicia Hotel (also home to 46 March 14 MPs for
the past two months, who have sought refuge based on concerns
for their personal security). Moussa, who had just spoken
with Secretary Rice and was completing another round of talks
with Lebanese political leaders in an attempt to break the
impasse over the presidential election, said he had drawn no
conclusions from his visit, only impressions. First, Moussa
noted dryly, Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun
firmly supports his own candidacy. Second, after meeting
with Hizballah SYG Hassan Nasrallah a day earlier, he
believed Hizballah was open to consensus on any name, even
without Aoun's acceptance, though it would continue to work
on Aoun. In the absence of a Berri-Hariri consensus,
however, Hizballah would continue to support Aoun.

HELL WILL NOT BREAK LOOSE ON NOVEMBER 24
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3. (C) Third, the November 24 is not sacred; if a president
is not elected by the midnight November 23 expiration of
President Lahoud's term, efforts will continue and, he
predicted, "hell will not break out." Fourth, he did not
sense the tense atmosphere that surrounded his earlier
visits, just resignation. He believed there was a general
understanding that President Lahoud would not "do anything
spectacular" before leaving office, i.e., he would not
appoint a second government, and he would issue general
guidelines to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to maintain
order.

MICHEL EDDE OR NO ELECTION
--------------


4. (C) The whole thing, Moussa said, depends on Michel Edde
and Robert Ghanem, explaining that the March 14 majority
vetoes the former, while the March 8 minority vetoes the
latter. While people are working on the "reservations"
regarding each candidate, more work is being done to build
support for Edde than Ghanem, he said. Why, the Ambassador
asked, do the pro-Syrians oppose Ghanem? It could be you or
me, Moussa replied, the fact is they only want Edde. He is
better liked by the Maronite church, and has lots of
connections and previous favors that can be called in.
Therefore, the opposition is trying to eliminate March 14's
reservations about Edde; if they fail, there will be no
election, he concluded.


5. (C) Moussa agreed that the Patriarch's list of seven names
was not designed to end up with Edde, but only to exclude the
"first tier" of clearly non-consensus candidates (Nassib
Lahoud, Boutrous Harb, Michel Aoun). The Ambassador,
stressing U.S. support for the French initiative, argued that
the purpose of choosing a consensus president was to avoid
electing a president who was rejected by a major segment of
the population. However, Edde is rejected by a major part of
Lebanon's Sunnis. Therefore, by pushing March 14 to accept
Edde we are putting all the pressure on one confessional
group, and the one group that happens to also hold the
majority in parliament.


6. (C) Moussa countered that Edde also had more sympathizers
in the Maronite community, and can therefore attract support
from Aoun. A choice between Ghanem and Edde risks splitting
the Christians, leaving Aoun the victor. Admitting that
Edde's candidacy was not yet "wrapped up," Moussa
nevertheless noted that even some March 14 members (i.e.,

BEIRUT 00001830 002.2 OF 003


Druse leader Walid Jumblatt, with whom he was about to meet
following the meeting with the Ambassador),no longer seemed
opposed. The Ambassador agreed, adding that Jumblatt was
taking seriously the threats of chaos and civil war should
there not be an election. Chaos and civil war are not
looming, Moussa replied.


7. (C) The Ambassador, noting that all of the opposition
parties seemed to be focused on Edde, responded that Hariri
already had been pressured into accepting the French
initiative, especially the revised version, and to renounce
any hope of his preferred candidate (Nassib Lahoud). Why
should he be forced to concede more when Berri has not had to
concede anything? Berri, Moussa said, supports Ghanem, but
admits he is not a free agent. His coalition does not favor
Ghanem, Berri reportedly told Moussa. So basically we're
engaged in a process by which Hizballah decides who will be
president, the Ambassador remarked. The French initiative
made the democratic concepts of majority and minority
irrelevant, and now it should be the majority leader who
makes the last concession.


8. (C) Ignoring the Ambassador's suggestion that, instead,
more pressure should be put on March 8, which had rejected
five out of seven of the Patriarch's candidates, Moussa said
that it was "always like that" -- small, unified minorities
with the support of large outside powers ultimately have more
power. Just look at Israel, he said. Furthermore, Berri has
the serious weapon of being able to open and close
parliament. He added, however, that he had just reassured
Secretary Rice that there would be no immediate chaos or

SIPDIS
civil war.

LOOKING BEYOND NOVEMBER 24
--------------


9. (C) Moussa, responding to the Ambassador's inquiry as to
what would prompt consensus after November 24, cited PM
Siniora's continuation in office -- opposed by many people --
as an "engine" that would propel the process forward. Berri
will call a new election date, and the French and the Arab
League would be back to continue their discussions. He
agreed that the U.S. should continue to maintain a low
profile throughout the process. Some believed the Patriarch
had made a mistake with his list. With the passage of time,
he predicted, other names would emerge ("some are already
waiting in the wings"),which could prolong the process, but
ultimately a solution would be found. (Note: We find this a
particularly ominous comment. We hope that Moussa is not
planning to revive the names of people like Fares Bouez and
Jean Obeid, the elimination of whom as serious candidates was
an important achievement of the Patriarch's list.)


10. (C) After November 24, Hariri and Berri will be more in a
mood to agree on a consensus president, whereas until now
they've been focusing on issues like the new government.
Furthermore, the joint "Syrian-French" initiative -- "you
know, this is now a joint initiative," Moussa emphasized --
will continue, and there will be an increased sense of
urgency because of the lack of president, especially on the
part of the Christians, who will "not be comfortable at all"
with the situation. Moussa didn't rule out the possibility
that LAF Commander Michel Sleiman could be called in as a
"savior" if the security situation deteriorated, but opined
that this would take time, as there were "many powerful
circles" that opposed a constitutional amendment to allow his
candidacy, let alone another military man as president.


11. (C) Aoun eventually would realized that he is an
obstacle, not the answer, to the process. While not
disagreeing with the Ambassador's assertion that Berri seemed
to be using Aoun as the pretext for not reaching consensus,
Moussa said Berri was not comfortable with Aoun and clearly
preferred Edde. Hizballah, however, was the opposite; it
needed to honor its commitment to support Aoun. Moussa
repeated, however, that Nasrallah had told him Hizballah
would support any candidate that Berri and Hariri agree on,
adding that not everyone was convinced of Aoun's "God-given
right to the presidency, neither within the opposition or
other circles."

SENDING MESSAGE OF HOPE

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12. (C) In what he called a short joint "opportunity for
press" following his next meeting with French FM Kouchner,
Moussa said he would stress a message of hope: there was
still time to find a consensus candidate, it was not a
hopeless cause, and the French and Arab League would be back
to help.

COMMENT
--------------


13. (C) Despite Moussa's upbeat public message, we find it
disheartening that the only solution he sees are either March
14 capitulating (leaving Edde as president) or we go back to
the drawing board, probably enlarging the list to include
equally uninspiring (and no less pro-Syrian) candidates like
Fares Boueiz or Jean Obeid. Perhaps the silver lining in
Moussa's message is that, like us, he does not see Lebanon
erupting into violence in the near future. On the other
hand, it appears the process of electing Lebanon's next
president easily could drag on for weeks. End comment.
FELTMAN