Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BEIRUT1824
2007-11-21 15:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:
LEBANON: SHIA LAWYER ON ELECTION; SHIA ECONOMIC
VZCZCXRO2613 PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV DE RUEHLB #1824/01 3251513 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 211513Z NOV 07 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0263 INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1904 RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001824
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SHIA LAWYER ON ELECTION; SHIA ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
Classified By: DCM William Grant for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
SUMMARY
--------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001824
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SHIA LAWYER ON ELECTION; SHIA ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
Classified By: DCM William Grant for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) Prominent Shia lawyer Mohamed Matar believes
Lebanon's real problem is not election of a president, but
rather formation of a viable, effective government. Matar
does not think the majority and opposition will resolve the
deadlock by the November 23 deadline, a situation Syria would
welcome, but that ultimately March 14 will go ahead and elect
its preferred candidate by a simple majority. Matar
predicted disturbances following the passing of the deadline,
beginning with President Emile Lahoud refusing to leave his
post. However, according to Matar, the Shia do not want a
confrontation; even Hizballah realizes the situation needs to
be defused.
2. (C) Matar spoke at length on a subject obviously dear to
him: lifting the Shia underclass out of poverty and
providing them with economic opportunities. To this end,
Matar and other Shia notables have initiated a microcredit
lending scheme modeled on Grameen Bank. Although it is still
in the planning stage, Matar envisages a microcredit program
that eventually will benefit not only Shia, but all Lebanese.
According to Matar, this is the only way to successfully
draw the Shia away from Hizballah assistance and handouts.
Although admitting this will be no easy task, Matar pointed
out that increasing numbers of Shia resent Hizballah's
overbearing presence, as well as the fact many Hizballah
members have claimed higher status than traditional Shia
leaders. End summary.
MARCH 14 WILL PREVAIL, DESPITE PAST MISTAKES
--------------
3. (C) In a November 19 meeting, Matar, who is majority
leader Saad Hariri's legal advisor, as well as head of the
Lebanese national chapter of Transparency International, told
Poloff and FSN Political Advisor that the Syrians do not want
a president since none of the names on Maronite Patriarch
Sfeir's list--not even those considered consensus
candidates--could render them services equal to those of
President Emile Lahoud. Matar implied that March 14 has
itself to thank for this mess; it should not have cut deals
with Hizballah and Berri in 2005 and not allowed Berri to
continue his tenure as speaker of parliament, but rather
allied itself with Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader
Michel Aoun and fostered relations with independent Shia.
4. (C) As for the current deadlock over agreement on a
consensus candidate, Matar said sources told him Aoun has
vetoed MP Robert Ghanem because Ghanem had previously blocked
Aoun's appointment to the parliamentary justice committee,
which Ghanem heads. It would suit the Syrians well if the
impasse continues, since they would like to see a gap of at
least two years during which an interim president to their
liking may be (or may not be) installed. In any case, the
Syrians would welcome the political vacuum so dreaded by most
Lebanese.
5. (C) Matar, confident that March 14 will ultimately go
ahead and elect a candidate by a simple majority, argued that
Article 74 of the Lebanese constitution does not require a
two-thirds parliamentary quorum to elect a president. Matar
does believe opposition-instigated trouble is brewing, noting
he has been told that numerous busloads of what appear to be
ordinary travelers on the roads leading south actually are
bands of young men plying the roads back and forth, with no
apparent destination.
HIZBALLAH NOT AS INVINCIBLE AS MIGHT SEEM
--------------
6. (C) According to Matar, Shia will back Hizballah as long
as the standoff exists, but they are increasingly
apprehensive, knowing full well they cannot bear the brunt of
another war, and that no one would accept them if they are
driven from their homes once again. Hizballah itself does not
want another war, having learned the limits of its power in
July 2006. Its harping on Israeli and U.S. intent to
eliminate the Shia does not resonate as it once did, as more
and more Shia are pointing out how the U.S. helped Shia in
Iraq. Furthermore, genuine support for Hizballah is
overestimated because of its outstanding organization and
discipline. Matar noted that in the south resentment is
BEIRUT 00001824 002 OF 002
growing against Hizballah officials who suddenly have
supplanted traditional Shia leaders, such as the Osseiran
family. Alluding to the fact that these newly prominent
officials have taken their cut from Hizballah assistance
funds, Matar referred to them as Hizballah "nouveau riches."
MICROCREDIT: THE ROUTE TO ECONOMIC PROSPERITY
--------------
7. (C) Matar's social conscience was highlighted as he
described how he and a group of 200 other Shia professionals
and businessman have commissioned Booz, Allen, Hamilton and
Price Waterhouse to draft a plan for a microcredit program
modeled on Mohamed Younus' phenomenally successful Grameen
Bank in Bangladesh. The program is conceived to not only
benefit Shia in the south, north and the Biqa', but all
Lebanese, regardless of religious affiliation.
8. (C) Matar envisages villages consulting with program
administrators to define what kind of project(s) they need.
The program experts and administrators would then study each
proposal and grant appropriate financing. A village would
commit itself to begin paying back the loan once it begins to
make a profit on the initial investment. Matar hopes to
begin pilot implementation of the program as soon as a
semblance of tranquility and security is achieved. Matar
stressed that the plan needed support from all quarters:
Lebanese, Arab, and international. He sees no problem with
soliciting Saudi or USG help as long as the process is
totally transparent.
FELTMAN
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SHIA LAWYER ON ELECTION; SHIA ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
Classified By: DCM William Grant for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) Prominent Shia lawyer Mohamed Matar believes
Lebanon's real problem is not election of a president, but
rather formation of a viable, effective government. Matar
does not think the majority and opposition will resolve the
deadlock by the November 23 deadline, a situation Syria would
welcome, but that ultimately March 14 will go ahead and elect
its preferred candidate by a simple majority. Matar
predicted disturbances following the passing of the deadline,
beginning with President Emile Lahoud refusing to leave his
post. However, according to Matar, the Shia do not want a
confrontation; even Hizballah realizes the situation needs to
be defused.
2. (C) Matar spoke at length on a subject obviously dear to
him: lifting the Shia underclass out of poverty and
providing them with economic opportunities. To this end,
Matar and other Shia notables have initiated a microcredit
lending scheme modeled on Grameen Bank. Although it is still
in the planning stage, Matar envisages a microcredit program
that eventually will benefit not only Shia, but all Lebanese.
According to Matar, this is the only way to successfully
draw the Shia away from Hizballah assistance and handouts.
Although admitting this will be no easy task, Matar pointed
out that increasing numbers of Shia resent Hizballah's
overbearing presence, as well as the fact many Hizballah
members have claimed higher status than traditional Shia
leaders. End summary.
MARCH 14 WILL PREVAIL, DESPITE PAST MISTAKES
--------------
3. (C) In a November 19 meeting, Matar, who is majority
leader Saad Hariri's legal advisor, as well as head of the
Lebanese national chapter of Transparency International, told
Poloff and FSN Political Advisor that the Syrians do not want
a president since none of the names on Maronite Patriarch
Sfeir's list--not even those considered consensus
candidates--could render them services equal to those of
President Emile Lahoud. Matar implied that March 14 has
itself to thank for this mess; it should not have cut deals
with Hizballah and Berri in 2005 and not allowed Berri to
continue his tenure as speaker of parliament, but rather
allied itself with Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader
Michel Aoun and fostered relations with independent Shia.
4. (C) As for the current deadlock over agreement on a
consensus candidate, Matar said sources told him Aoun has
vetoed MP Robert Ghanem because Ghanem had previously blocked
Aoun's appointment to the parliamentary justice committee,
which Ghanem heads. It would suit the Syrians well if the
impasse continues, since they would like to see a gap of at
least two years during which an interim president to their
liking may be (or may not be) installed. In any case, the
Syrians would welcome the political vacuum so dreaded by most
Lebanese.
5. (C) Matar, confident that March 14 will ultimately go
ahead and elect a candidate by a simple majority, argued that
Article 74 of the Lebanese constitution does not require a
two-thirds parliamentary quorum to elect a president. Matar
does believe opposition-instigated trouble is brewing, noting
he has been told that numerous busloads of what appear to be
ordinary travelers on the roads leading south actually are
bands of young men plying the roads back and forth, with no
apparent destination.
HIZBALLAH NOT AS INVINCIBLE AS MIGHT SEEM
--------------
6. (C) According to Matar, Shia will back Hizballah as long
as the standoff exists, but they are increasingly
apprehensive, knowing full well they cannot bear the brunt of
another war, and that no one would accept them if they are
driven from their homes once again. Hizballah itself does not
want another war, having learned the limits of its power in
July 2006. Its harping on Israeli and U.S. intent to
eliminate the Shia does not resonate as it once did, as more
and more Shia are pointing out how the U.S. helped Shia in
Iraq. Furthermore, genuine support for Hizballah is
overestimated because of its outstanding organization and
discipline. Matar noted that in the south resentment is
BEIRUT 00001824 002 OF 002
growing against Hizballah officials who suddenly have
supplanted traditional Shia leaders, such as the Osseiran
family. Alluding to the fact that these newly prominent
officials have taken their cut from Hizballah assistance
funds, Matar referred to them as Hizballah "nouveau riches."
MICROCREDIT: THE ROUTE TO ECONOMIC PROSPERITY
--------------
7. (C) Matar's social conscience was highlighted as he
described how he and a group of 200 other Shia professionals
and businessman have commissioned Booz, Allen, Hamilton and
Price Waterhouse to draft a plan for a microcredit program
modeled on Mohamed Younus' phenomenally successful Grameen
Bank in Bangladesh. The program is conceived to not only
benefit Shia in the south, north and the Biqa', but all
Lebanese, regardless of religious affiliation.
8. (C) Matar envisages villages consulting with program
administrators to define what kind of project(s) they need.
The program experts and administrators would then study each
proposal and grant appropriate financing. A village would
commit itself to begin paying back the loan once it begins to
make a profit on the initial investment. Matar hopes to
begin pilot implementation of the program as soon as a
semblance of tranquility and security is achieved. Matar
stressed that the plan needed support from all quarters:
Lebanese, Arab, and international. He sees no problem with
soliciting Saudi or USG help as long as the process is
totally transparent.
FELTMAN