LEBANON'S PRESIDENCY: GHANEM, EDDE, SALAMEH STILL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001820 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA FRONT OFFICE AND NEA/ELA; NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/27 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KDEM LE SY FR SUBJECT: LEBANON'S PRESIDENCY: GHANEM, EDDE, SALAMEH STILL IN PLAY; SLEIMAN LURKING IN THE BACKGROUND BEIRUT 00001820 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY AND COMMENT -------------- ¶1. (S) Despite French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner and Special Envoy Jean-Claude Cousseran shuttling among the major political players, the French initiative to solve Lebanon's presidential election crisis is faltering. Only three names from the Patriarch's original list of seven potential candidates remain in play, but all pose serious problems: Robert Ghanem, whom the French are pushing Nabih Berri to accept, is fine with Saad Hariri but an anathema to March 14 Christians, who threaten to bolt. Hariri, in turn, is resisting pressure to accept an interim presidency in the form of Michel Edde. The third, Riad Salameh, would require a constitutional amendment that the Lebanese army want to use to promote LAF Commander Michel Sleiman instead. Despite his absence from the Patriarch's list, Sleiman still seems to be the pro-Syrian stealth candidate of choice. ¶2. (S) With threats of vacuum and chaos in the aftermath of the expiration of Emile Lahoud's presidential terms, the March 14 majority is on the verge of splitting apart. Given the presumed bounties on their heads, its leaders have difficulty meeting and coordinating positions. Walid Jumblatt, detecting an absence of tangible international support for March 14 candidates, now advocates backing Sleiman -- on the theory that Syria won't rest until Sleiman becomes president, and it's better for March 14 to support Sleiman's presidential bid than to oppose it. We are urging March 14 leaders to view all initiatives in light of the need to maintain March 14 unity for the difficult exercise of forming a cabinet and cabinet program. ¶3. (S) With the French initiative, March 14's majority position has become irrelevant, in favor of "consensus" (that in practice has meant giving Berri the right to veto candidates). The French initiative will expire along with Emile Lahoud's presidential term at midnight on 11/23. If no consensus candidate emerges before Friday night, we believe that we need to prepare the international community now to restore the concept of majority-minority to the process. For example, a French-U.S.-Egyptian-Saudi-Vatican statement calling on the Patriarch's list to be submitted to parliament either in its entirety or stripped of its "political" names (leaving four for the MPs to choose from) would reinvigorate lagging March 14 morale and restore some element of democracy to Lebanon's presidential elections in favor of the side we wish to see prevail. End summary and comment. FROM SEVEN TO ZERO: BERRI AND HARIRI DEMOLISH PATRIARCH'S LIST OF CANDIDATES -------------- ¶4. (S) Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and Saad Hariri met twice over last weekend, but they failed to make progress on identifying consensus names of presidential candidates to take to parliament. The Patriarch's list, as is now known, contains seven names: March 14 candidates Nassib Lahoud and Boutros Harb, March 8 candidate Michel Aoun, MP Robert Ghanem, former Minister Michel Khoury, former Minister Michel Edde, and Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh. (Salameh's name was added, we understand, only at the last minute, at the French request and with a caveat: if Salameh is seen as needing a constitutional amendment to overcome the requisite cooling-off period for some senior civil servants, then the list has only six, not seven, names.) ¶5. (S) Predictably, Berri vetoed Lahoud and Harb, while Hariri vetoed Aoun. Berri also nixed Michel Khoury, saying that he was too close to March 14. Unexpectedly, given previously warm hints, Berri also rejected MP Robert Ghanem, describing him to visitors as "100 percent March 14," a description that would astonish Ghanem and March 14 stalwarts. Hariri then said no to Edde, and Berri pronounced that Salameh would need a constitutional amendment. Seemingly, all of the Patriarch's candidates had been felled by the dueling vetoes. GHANEM, EDDE, SALAMEH BACK IN PLAY -------------- BEIRUT 00001820 002.2 OF 003 ¶6. (S) In the meantime, March 8-Aoun continues to threaten violence, chaos, and demonstrations, should a president not be elected by the expiration of Emile Lahoud's presidential term at midnight on 11/23. The threats of physical takeover of government facilities seem credible. This has provoked extreme unease on the part of March 14 leaders, who have responded to French and Arab calls to try again to reach consensus. French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, who told the Ambassador on 11/20 that it was "unacceptable" that no candidate from the Patriarch's list could serve as a consensus, has also pushed the political leaders from both sides to try again for consensus. ¶7. (S) March 14 fears and the international push for consensus have come together to revive three names from the Patriarch's original seven. But all pose what may be insurmountable problems: -- Robert Ghanem: The French are pushing Nabih Berri to lift his veto on this fence-sitting MP. Berri, in fact, may extract a high enough price that he would do so. The advantage to Ghanem is that part of Michel Aoun's bloc has stated its intention to go for Ghanem, should he emerge as the consensus candidate. Splitting the Aoun bloc should be a strategic victory for March 14. The problem with Ghanem is that March 14 Christians, from Samir Geagea through Boutros Harb, do not consider him to have sufficient weight in the Maronite community to withstand the populist attacks Michel Aoun will launch against him. March 14 Christians have threatened to bolt, should Ghanem (who Hariri convinced Jumblatt to accept) prevail. -- Michel Edde: The octogenarian Edde has the Maronite weight (literal as well as figurative) that Ghanem lacks, so, curiously, March 14 Christians seem to tolerate him despite his known connections to Syrian intelligence via the odious Michel Samaha. Samir Geagea accepts him as a fall-back. Berri and Hizballah are reportedly thrilled with Edde. Because Edde has hinted that he would step down less than two years into a six-year presidential term (allowing a new president to be elected after 2009 parliamentary elections), Michel Aoun is also said to be intrigued by Edde, whom the French also like. The trouble is Saad Hariri, who has some family grudges with Edde and who has heard too many reports of Edde's Sunni-bashing. For Edde to prevail, Hariri -- who is the majority leader, after all -- would have to be the one to surrender. We are uncomfortable telling Saad, who has demonstrated much flexibility, to cross yet another red line in Berri's direction. -- Riad Salameh: The enigmatic Central Banker seems to have begrudging acceptance from Hariri and -- depending on the source -- more enthusiastic backing from Hizballah and Berri. His name popped back into the fray unexpectedly over the weekend, when Hariri pitched him to Berri. But the constitutional amendment issue hinders his chances: if the MPs vote to change the constitution to elect him, then the Lebanese Armed Forces officers and soldiers will likely resent that Salameh got the nod while LAF Commander Michel Sleiman (who also faces a two-year constitutional cooling-off period before being eligible for the presidency) did not. MICHEL SLEIMAN: THE STEALTH CANDIDATE? -------------- ¶8. (S) Many March 14 supporters believe that LAF Commander Michel Sleiman, in fact, remains the candidate of choice for Syria and Hizballah. According to their theory, Emile Lahoud's presidential term will expire, March 8 will find ways of provoking violence. In the mayhem that follows, Sleiman will emerge as the natural savior. Walid Jumblatt, in fact, is so worried at what he sees as a lack of tangible international support for March 14 presidential candidates that he is now advocating that March 14 throw its support behind Sleiman. In Jumblatt's view, if it is inevitable that Lebanon is facing a Sleiman presidency, it would be better for March 14 to create that presidency than to block it. Saad Hariri, we believe, will be susceptible to these arguments, and Michel Murr would happily split from Michel Aoun's bloc to support Sleiman. (We ourselves would find it easier to deal with a Sleiman presidency than, say, a Michel Edde regime.) BEIRUT 00001820 003.2 OF 003 IF THE FRENCH INITIATIVE FAILS, USING THE FAILURE AS AN OPPORTUNITY -------------- ¶9. (S) Marwan Hamadeh has noted, acidly, that the French initiative has already accomplished much: it brought the Syrians formally back into Lebanese decision making regarding the presidency, it damaged the unity of March 14, it erased the concept of "majority" and minority" in favor of a consensus where March 14 and March 8 have equal weight, it restored to prominence the once-discredited pro-Syrian Maronite Suleiman Franjieh, and it eliminated the strongest March 14 presidential candidates (Nassib Lahoud and Boutros Harb). But we wonder if, should the French fail by Friday to produce a consensus presidential candidate, the failure becomes an opportunity to restore the concept of majority-minority democratic, parliamentary decision making. ¶10. (S) Specifically, we would like to see a fall-back process whereby the pressure rests entirely on those who have blocked parliament from meeting so far: Berri, Hizballah, Michel Aoun, and their Syrian backers. The French experience shows that, with Hariri vetoing only two candidates (Aoun and Edde) and Berri four (Lahoud, Harb, Ghanem, and Khoury),one side has shown more flexibility than the other. We would like to see the international community make it clear that, now, the Patriarch's list -- either in full or with the "big three" political names (Lahoud, Harb, and Aoun) erased -- should go before the parliament for election. In a free parliamentary election, March 14 will reunite and will become the primary decision maker. In our view, an international statement or statements along these lines from the United States, France, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Vatican would help restore March 14 unity and morale. FELTMAN