Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BEIRUT1818
2007-11-20 14:42:00
SECRET
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:
LEBANON: AOUN PREDICTS VIOLENCE IF NO PRESIDENT IS
VZCZCXRO1245 OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV DE RUEHLB #1818/01 3241442 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 201442Z NOV 07 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0216 INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY 0889 RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1702 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1896 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001818
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: AOUN PREDICTS VIOLENCE IF NO PRESIDENT IS
ELECTED
BEIRUT 00001818 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b)
and (d).
SUMMARY
-------
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001818
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: AOUN PREDICTS VIOLENCE IF NO PRESIDENT IS
ELECTED
BEIRUT 00001818 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b)
and (d).
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) Despite persistent rumors that he has made a deal over
an abbreviated presidential term for Michel Edde, Free
Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun continues to reject any
candidate on the Patriarch's list of seven other than
himself. His only fall-back is an interim cabinet (which we
presume he expects to lead) to prepare the way for changing
the electoral law and then holding legislative elections.
Aoun refuses to play a constructive role in finding a
solution to the presidency, instead hinting at violence after
President Lahoud's term expires, though he denied the FPM
would be involved. French Foreign Minister Kouchner,
speaking with the Ambassador, expressed frustration with
Aoun's intransigence. End summary.
MORE SOUR GRAPES
--------------
2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, met
with Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun and his
advisor and son-in-law Gebran Bassil on November 20. Much of
the meeting was a rehashing of Aoun's complaints that the FPM
has been deprived its due representation in parliament and
the cabinet, and that Aoun, with the support of most of
Lebanon's Christians and the head of a major parliamentary
bloc, is the only candidate who has the legitimacy to become
presidency. Instead, he had been "evicted" and "punished"
because of his 2006 MOU with Hizballah, even though, he
claimed, unspecified others were providing Hizballah with
better, written offers on its arms. The Ambassador noted
that the nearly two-year old MOU had not accomplished much,
to which Aoun retorted that it was the fault of the Siniora
government and the summer 2006 "accident."
AOUN REJECTS PATRIARCH'S LIST OF CANDIDATES
--------------
3. (C) The Ambassador, stressing U.S. support for the French
initiative, asked Aoun where he thought it was heading.
Aoun, complaining that he was not informed about the
initiative beforehand or consulted by the French, expressed
disappointment with the Patriarch's list of seven candidates,
reiterating that he did not want to be on the list. Michel
Edde was full of empty promises, Nassib Lahoud had been a
member of a Palestinian militia, Robert Ghanem was a "nice
guy, from an honest family," but Lebanon needed leaders with
popular support, not honesty, and one who could restore the
role of the Christians in Lebanon. Riad Salameh was "young
and dynamic" but needed a constitutional amendment. In
short, he said, the French initiative was outside of
Lebanon's "democratic tradition" and outside of the
constitution. The Ambassador responded that, according to
the constitution, parliament should elect a president.
PRESIDENTIAL VACUUM WILL LEAD TO CONFLICT
--------------
4. (C) Aoun described what he saw as four possible scenarios.
The first two were either: 1) a consensus president is
reached; or 2) an interim government is formed, which would
provide "an honorable exit for everyone." Two other
unacceptable scenarios were either: 1) PM Siniora stays on
and his government assumes presidential powers; or 2) March
14 elects a president with a half plus one vote. Both of
these, Aoun claimed, would be unconstitutional (the first
scenario because the Siniora government itself is
illegitimate following the November 11, 2006 of its Shia
membership).
5. (C) Asked what will happen on midnight November 23, when
President Lahoud's mandate ends, Aoun predicted Lahoud would
leave office, with no replacement, PM Siniora will remain,
and political and physical conflict will ensue. The
Ambassador, noting that Siniora would resign once a new
president is elected, responded that there was no reason for
violence, and certainly March 14 would not start it; in whose
interest would it be? Aoun, dodging the question, said there
BEIRUT 00001818 002.2 OF 002
might not be violence immediately, but "certainly we'll have
problems" due to an atmosphere of "instability and
anxiousness." The FPM would not take any action, he claimed,
but nor would it renounce its political position.
6. (C) Bassil interjected that the way to avoid conflict was
through an interim government, based on the same
representation as parliament. The Ambassador, stating that
this would be tantamount to throwing away the last thread of
legitimacy of Lebanon's democratic institutions, said a
better solution was to elect a president before November 24.
The world will be watching to see who doesn't show up to
vote, he warned.
COMMENT
--------------
7. (S) Soon after the meeting with Aoun on November 20, the
Ambassador also spoke by phone with French Foreign Minister
Kouchner, who believes that Aoun, through unrelenting
intransigence, has now proven himself "irrelevant" to a
solution. Kouchner was very pessimistic, viewing March 8's
actions as proof that Syria does not want a solution, though
Kouchner himself had no back-up plan.
8. (C) Aoun's extreme dislike of PM Siniora (whom he believes
supports "tawteen" or nationalization of Palestinian refugees
in Lebanon to increase Lebanon's Muslim population at the
expense of the Christians) was evident in the meeting. He
even claimed to have sent a letter to UN SYG Ban Ki-Moon
protesting the international community's excessive support to
Siniora, which would lead to "tawteen."
FELTMAN
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: AOUN PREDICTS VIOLENCE IF NO PRESIDENT IS
ELECTED
BEIRUT 00001818 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b)
and (d).
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) Despite persistent rumors that he has made a deal over
an abbreviated presidential term for Michel Edde, Free
Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun continues to reject any
candidate on the Patriarch's list of seven other than
himself. His only fall-back is an interim cabinet (which we
presume he expects to lead) to prepare the way for changing
the electoral law and then holding legislative elections.
Aoun refuses to play a constructive role in finding a
solution to the presidency, instead hinting at violence after
President Lahoud's term expires, though he denied the FPM
would be involved. French Foreign Minister Kouchner,
speaking with the Ambassador, expressed frustration with
Aoun's intransigence. End summary.
MORE SOUR GRAPES
--------------
2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, met
with Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun and his
advisor and son-in-law Gebran Bassil on November 20. Much of
the meeting was a rehashing of Aoun's complaints that the FPM
has been deprived its due representation in parliament and
the cabinet, and that Aoun, with the support of most of
Lebanon's Christians and the head of a major parliamentary
bloc, is the only candidate who has the legitimacy to become
presidency. Instead, he had been "evicted" and "punished"
because of his 2006 MOU with Hizballah, even though, he
claimed, unspecified others were providing Hizballah with
better, written offers on its arms. The Ambassador noted
that the nearly two-year old MOU had not accomplished much,
to which Aoun retorted that it was the fault of the Siniora
government and the summer 2006 "accident."
AOUN REJECTS PATRIARCH'S LIST OF CANDIDATES
--------------
3. (C) The Ambassador, stressing U.S. support for the French
initiative, asked Aoun where he thought it was heading.
Aoun, complaining that he was not informed about the
initiative beforehand or consulted by the French, expressed
disappointment with the Patriarch's list of seven candidates,
reiterating that he did not want to be on the list. Michel
Edde was full of empty promises, Nassib Lahoud had been a
member of a Palestinian militia, Robert Ghanem was a "nice
guy, from an honest family," but Lebanon needed leaders with
popular support, not honesty, and one who could restore the
role of the Christians in Lebanon. Riad Salameh was "young
and dynamic" but needed a constitutional amendment. In
short, he said, the French initiative was outside of
Lebanon's "democratic tradition" and outside of the
constitution. The Ambassador responded that, according to
the constitution, parliament should elect a president.
PRESIDENTIAL VACUUM WILL LEAD TO CONFLICT
--------------
4. (C) Aoun described what he saw as four possible scenarios.
The first two were either: 1) a consensus president is
reached; or 2) an interim government is formed, which would
provide "an honorable exit for everyone." Two other
unacceptable scenarios were either: 1) PM Siniora stays on
and his government assumes presidential powers; or 2) March
14 elects a president with a half plus one vote. Both of
these, Aoun claimed, would be unconstitutional (the first
scenario because the Siniora government itself is
illegitimate following the November 11, 2006 of its Shia
membership).
5. (C) Asked what will happen on midnight November 23, when
President Lahoud's mandate ends, Aoun predicted Lahoud would
leave office, with no replacement, PM Siniora will remain,
and political and physical conflict will ensue. The
Ambassador, noting that Siniora would resign once a new
president is elected, responded that there was no reason for
violence, and certainly March 14 would not start it; in whose
interest would it be? Aoun, dodging the question, said there
BEIRUT 00001818 002.2 OF 002
might not be violence immediately, but "certainly we'll have
problems" due to an atmosphere of "instability and
anxiousness." The FPM would not take any action, he claimed,
but nor would it renounce its political position.
6. (C) Bassil interjected that the way to avoid conflict was
through an interim government, based on the same
representation as parliament. The Ambassador, stating that
this would be tantamount to throwing away the last thread of
legitimacy of Lebanon's democratic institutions, said a
better solution was to elect a president before November 24.
The world will be watching to see who doesn't show up to
vote, he warned.
COMMENT
--------------
7. (S) Soon after the meeting with Aoun on November 20, the
Ambassador also spoke by phone with French Foreign Minister
Kouchner, who believes that Aoun, through unrelenting
intransigence, has now proven himself "irrelevant" to a
solution. Kouchner was very pessimistic, viewing March 8's
actions as proof that Syria does not want a solution, though
Kouchner himself had no back-up plan.
8. (C) Aoun's extreme dislike of PM Siniora (whom he believes
supports "tawteen" or nationalization of Palestinian refugees
in Lebanon to increase Lebanon's Muslim population at the
expense of the Christians) was evident in the meeting. He
even claimed to have sent a letter to UN SYG Ban Ki-Moon
protesting the international community's excessive support to
Siniora, which would lead to "tawteen."
FELTMAN